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JURISDICTION

The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§§ 630-4-401, 630-4-403, and 78A-4-l 03(2)(a)(i)(A).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES

Petitioner Jack Phillips ("Phillips") raises six legal challenges to the legality of the
order of the Utah Securities Commission affirmed by the Utah Department of Commerce
(together "the Agency") requiring him to pay a $413,750.00 monetary penalty, comprised
of $315,000.00 in "investor losses," a $78,750.00 "fine", and $25,000.00 in
"investigative costs" for four violations of the Utah Securities Act. He also responds to a
seventh issue concerning his preservation of these issues for judicial appeal. The seven
issues on appeal are as follows:
First Issue

Did the Agency exceed its statutory authority under Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-20
when it ordered Phillips to pay a civil penalty greater than $10,000 per violation of the
Utah Uniform Securities Act?
Standard of Review: This issue whether the Agency acted beyond the jurisdiction
conferred by statute and/or erroneously interpreted or applied the law is subject to
judicial review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 630-4-403(4)(b), (d) and is reviewed by
this Court for correctness. See Hughes Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Utah Labor Comm 'n,
2014 UT 3, ~ 6, 322 P.3d 712.
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Issue Preservation: Phillips preserved this issue for appeal in his June 9, 2014
Request for Agency Review, R. at 001114-1115, and his Memorandum in Support of
Request for Agency Review, July 16, 2014, R. at 001199-1200.

Second Issue
Did the Agency order restitution and thereby exceed its statutory authority under
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-20 when it ordered Phillips to pay $315,000.000 representing
"investor losses" as one of three components of a $413,750.00 monetary penalty?
Standard of Review: This issue whether the Agency acted beyond the jurisdiction
conferred by statute and/or erroneously interpreted or applied the law is subject to
judicial review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4 )(b ), ( d) and is reviewed by
this Court for correctness. See Hughes Gen. Contractors, 2014 UT 3, 16.
Issue Preservation: Phillips preserved this issue for appeal in his June 9, 2014
Request for Agency Review, P. 5-7 (R. at 001114-1116) and his July 16, 2014
Memorandum in Support of Request for Agency Review, P. 13-14( R. at 001201-1202.)

Third Issue
Did the Agency's order that Phillips pay a $413,750.00 monetary penalty,
comprised of $315,000.00 in "investor losses," $78,750.00 in "fines", and $25,000.00 in
"investigative costs" violate Phillips' right to be free of excessive fines under the Eighth
Amendment?
Standard of Review: This issue whether the Agency action is unconstitutional is
subject to judicial review under Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(a) and is reviewed by
this Court for correctness. See, e.g., Brent Brown Dealerships v. Tax Comm 'n Motor
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Vehicle Enforcement Div., 2006 UT App 261, 18, 139 P.3d 296 (applying the "correction
of error" standard to an Eighth Amendment challenge to agency action).
Issue Preservation: Phillips preserved this issue for appeal in his June 9, 2014
Request for Agency Review, R. at 001117, and Memorandum in Support of Request for
Agency Review, July 16, 2014, R. at 001202-1203.
Fourth Issue

Did the Agency act contrary to law and procedure where the Utah Securities
Commission initially ordered Phillips to pay a $413,750.00 monetary penalty comprised
of $315,000.00 in "investor losses," a $78,750.00 "fine", and $25,000.00 in
"investigative costs" without weighing the required factors in Utah Administrative Code
R164-31-1, and then after administrative appeal of that issue, the Director remanded only
the application of the R164-31-1 factors but not the penalty amount to the Commission?
Standard of Review: This issue whether the agency acted beyond the jurisdiction
conferred by any statute, erroneously interpreted or applied the law, and/or engaged in an
unlawful procedure or decision making process, or failed to follow prescribed procedure
is subject to judicial review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 630-4-403(4 )(b ),( d), & (e),
·and presents a legal issue reviewed for ~orrectness. See Hughes Gen. Contractors, 2014
UT 3, 16.
Issue Preservation: Phillips preserved this issue for appeal in his June 9, 2014
Request for Agency Review, R. at 001110, Memorandum in Support of Request for
Agency Review dated July 16, 2014, R. at 001189, and his March 6, 2015 Motion and
Memorandum in Support of Request for Agency Review, R. at 001309-1310.
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Fifth Issue
Is the Agency time barred by Utah Code Ann.§ 61-1-21.1(1) from ordering and
enforcing a civil penalty on one of the four alleged violations, the "GIT transaction"?
Standard of Review: This issue presents a question whether the Agency acted
beyond the jurisdiction conferred by statute and/or erroneously interpreted or applied the
law, which is subject to judicial review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(b),
(d) and is reviewed by this Court for correctness. See Hughes Gen. Contractors, 2014
UT 3, 16.
Issue Preservation: Phillips preserved this issue for appeal in his June 9, 2014
Request for Agency Review, R. at 001119-001120, and Memorandum in Support of
Request for Agency Review, July 16, 2014, R. at 001205-1209.

Sixth Issue
Did the Agency improperly shift the Utah Division of Securities' ("Division")
burden of proof concerning damages to Phillips by requiring Phillips to establish the
value of emeralds purchased with the victims' investor funds that that victims took into
their possession?
Standard of Review: This issue presents a question whether the Agency
erroneously interpreted or applied the law and/or engaged in an unlawful procedure,
which is subject to judicial review pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 630-4-403(4) (d) & (e)
and is reviewed by this Court for correctness. See Hughes Gen. Contractors, 2014 UT 3,
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Issue Preservation: Phillips preserved this issue for appeal in his June 9, 2014
Request for Agency Review, R. at 001116, July 16, 2014 Memorandum in Support of
Request for Agency Review, R. at 001213-1214, and March 6, 2015 Request for Agency
Review, R. at 001310-1312.
Seventh Issue
Did Phillips properly file his judicial appeal of the Agency's monetary penalty
after the Department of Commerce made its final affirmance of the justification of the
monetary penalty in its June 5, 2015 Second Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order on Review?
Standard of Review: This is an issue of law reviewed for correctness. See Utah
Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(d); Heber Light & Power Co. v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm 'n,
2010 UT 27, 16,231 P.3d 1203.
Issue Preservation: The Agency raised this issue sua sponte in the Department of
Commerce's June 5, 2015 Second Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order on
Review, R. at 001338.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
The statutes and rules determinative in this matter are set forth verbatim in
Phillips' Supplemental Addendum 1 and include the following:
United States Const. Amend. VIII
Utah Code Ann.§ 61-1-20
Utah Code Ann.§ 61-1-21.1
Utah Admin. Code Rl 64-31-1
Utah Admin. Code Rl51-4-708
Utah Admin. Code Rl51-4-709
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63 G-4-403 (4), Petitioner Jack Phillips seeks
judicial review of the legality of the Agency's order that he pay a monetary penalty of
$413,750.00, comprised of$315,000.00 in "investor losses," a $78,750.00 "fine", and
$25,000.00 in "investigative costs" for four violations of the Utah Securities Act. Phillips
appeals the monetary penalty on the basis that ( 1) the Agency is without statutory
authority to order and enforce a monetary penalty in excess of $10,000 per violation,
(2) the Agency is without statutory authority to order restitution in an administrative
proceeding, (3) the monetary penalty is an excessive fine in violation of the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, (4) the Agency failed to apply the factors
in Utah Admin. Code R164-31-1 when setting the penalty, (5) the Agency is time barred
from ordering and enforcing a monetary penalty for one of the four violations, and (6) the
Agency shifted the burden of proof and improperly required Phillips to disprove investor
losses used by the Agency to support the monetary penalty.
On May 23, 2014, after a hearing before the Utah Securities Commission, the
Commission entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in which it
found Phillips liable for four violations of the Utah Securities Act and imposed the
monetary penalties referenced above, entered a cease and desist order and barred Phillips
from the securities industry. R. 001127-1141. On July 9, 2014, Phillips made an
administrative appeal to the Utah Department of Commerce, in which he raised the above
issues of law relating to the monetary penalty imposed by the Commission. R. at 0011101123 On January 9, 2015, the Department of Commerce affirmed the amount of the
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monetary penalty, but remanded "solely for a more detailed Order that discusses the
Commission's thought process and analysis with respect to the Subsection R164-31-1 (1)
factors," which are the factors that the commission was required to apply to determine the
monetary penalty. R. at 001282. The Department of Commerce concluded that this
remand was necessary because the "Utah Court of Appeals would not have the same
knowledge of the agency's precedent" and therefore the Commission needed to "state
rather than imply its analysis of the [Rl 64-31-1 ( 1)] factors in order to facilitate judicial
review." R. at 001340. The Commission issued an Amended Order on February 4, 2015
providing additional post hoc justification for the $413,750.00 civil penalty ("Amended
Order"). See generally R. at 1090-1094. On June 5, 2015, the Department of Commerce
affirmed. Thereafter, Phillips timely filed this judicial appeal of the June 5, 2015 Order
and all Agency orders previously entered.
On March 6, 2015, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 630-4-301 and Utah Admin.
Code Rl 51-4-902, Phillips filed a Request for Agency Review with the Department of
Commerce challenging the Amended Order as improper post hoc rationalization. R. at
001309-1310.
On June 5, 2015, the Department of Commerce affirmed the Commission's
Amended Order. R. at 001332-001343. The Department of Commerce found that the
Amended order was not impermissible post hoc bolstering because the Executive
Director of the Department of Commerce was "able to conduct a meaningful review in
light of the Commission's stated findings, its implied findings, and the Executive
Director's own knowledge." R. at 001340 (citations omitted). Further, the Department of
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Commerce purported that Phillips waived any right to appeal the issues supposedly
settled in the Department of Commerce's January 9, 2015 affirmance because Phillips
failed to request immediate agency reconsideration or judicial review at that time. R. at
001338.
On July 2, 2015 Phillips petitioned this Court for review of the Agency's action
against Phillips, which encompasses the Initial Order and Amended Order affirmed by
the Agency on June 5, 2015.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

In an administrative adjudication, the Utah Securities Commission found that
Phillips and a Tennessee resident named Elliott James, aka James Elliott ("James") 1
violated the Utah Uniform Securities Act by soliciting Utah residents Bill and Gidgette
Persch (the "Persches") and Paul and Sherry Reutlinger (the "Reutlingers") to invest in
securities investments in: (1) a deal to import emeralds from Brazil and sell them in the
United States (hereinafter the "Emerald Deal") and (2) a multi-level marketing
opportunity called "GIT". See R. at 001097-1099. Based on its findings that Phillips
committed four securities violations relating to these transactions, the Utah Securities
Commission imposed a monetary penalty of$413,750.00, comprised of$315,000.00 in
"investor losses," a $78,750.00 "fine", and $25,000.00 in "investigative costs" for four
violations of the Utah Securities Act and it also ordered Phillips to cease and desist from
any violations of securities laws and permanently barred him from: (a) associating with

1 James

was named in the Notice of Agency Action, see generally R. at 498-501, but he
did not appear.
xv

any broker-dealer or investment advisor licensed in Utah, (b) acting as an agent for any
issuer or solicitor of investor funds in Utah, and (c) being licensed in any capacity in the
securities industry for life ("Initial Order"). R. at 001107.
Phillips did not challenge the Commission's liability determination, which did not
require evidence of a culpable state of mind or of investor loss. Phillips challenges only
the monetary penalty the Commission imposed. Phillips and the Utah Securities Division
of the Department of Commerce stipulated to and/or the Commission found several facts
relevant to the calculation of the monetary penalty, including Phillips' level of culpability
and the quantification of investor losses arising from Phillips' violations of the Act.
A.

Relevant Agency Stipulations and Findings Regarding the Emerald
Deal.

In or about November 2006, James approached Phillips with a deal involving the
purchase, importation, and sale of emeralds. R. at 000948. After James approached
Phillips regarding the Emerald Deal, Phillips relayed James' s representations regarding
the Emerald Deal to the Persches and the Reutlingers. See R. at 001097-1098.
Additionally, James made representations and promises directly to the Persches and the
Reutlingers about the Emerald Deal. R. at 000949. Based on James' representations,
Phillips, the Persches, and the Reutlingers all invested money in the Emerald Deal. R. at
000949, R. at 001099. Phillips invested $250,000 of his own monies in the Emerald
Deal. Id. Some of the monies paid by Phillips, the Persch es, and the Reutlingers were
used by James and his associates to purchase 31 small barrels of raw, uncut "emeralds".

R. at 000949. The rest of the monies were not returned by James and/or his associates.
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R. at 000950. Phillips and the Reutlingers did not receive any of the monies invested in
the Emerald Deal or any emeralds, and Phillips did not receive a commission on the
Emerald Deal. R. at 001099, R. at 001092. Although the Persches did not receive cash
from the Emerald Deal, the Perches took 21 barrels of the raw uncut "emeralds" 2 out of a
storage facility maintained by James. R. at 000712, 719. The undisputed testimony of
Bill Persch is that he is in possession of 21 of the barrels of raw uncut "emeralds" from
Brazil. R. at 000712, R. at 000719, R. at 000771.
The value of the "emeralds" in the Perches' possession has not been established.
In view of the conflicting and insufficient evidence of the value of the "emeralds", the
Commission concluded that there was no "credible or admissible evidence" concerning
the actual value of the "emeralds." 3 R. at 001099. The Agency further concluded that it
was not required to assign a value to the "emeralds" to determine the amount of the losses

2

All versions of the evidence indicate that the stones in these barrels, referred to
herein as "emeralds", have some value. However there is unresolved conflicting
evidence concerning the value of the "emeralds", including whether the term "emeralds"
properly applies to the stones in the barrels. At the hearing, over objection of Phillips'
counsel, Bill Persch offered hearsay evidence of an unnamed appraiser who Persch
testified told an agent named "Lemmon" and Lemmon told Persch that the 21 barrels of
emeralds in Persches' possession were worth less than $10,000. R. at 000715-000719
Bill Persch acknowledged that no one opened all of the barrels or bags within the barrels
to make this assessment. R. at 000719, R. at 000772. Phillips placed into evidence a
copy of an appraisal by an expert hired by the Agency, Tracy A. Bowen, which indicated
that the emerald specimens he examined were worth $0.09 to $5.00 each. R. at 001029;
R. at 001222-1223. Mr. Bowen had not determined the number of specimens in each of
the 21 barrels of"emeralds." See Id. Additionally, Phillips offered testimony from Gail
Cato, one of James's associates, that the "emeralds" were worth one to three percent of
an appraised value of $12 million. R. at 001017-1018.
3
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to investors resulting from Phillips' violation of the Utah Uniform Securities Act. It
characterized the "emeralds" taken by the Perches as an "offset" and assigned the burden
of proof for determining the value of the emeralds to Phillips. R. at 001139. In the
absence of sufficient evidence of the actual value of the "emeralds", the Agency
determined the penalty in this proceeding based on money invested by the Pershes
without concern for the value of the "emeralds" the Pershes obtained from James and his
associates. R. at 001138-39.
B.

Relevant Commission's Findings Related to the GIT Transaction.

James was also the Vice President of the multi-level marketing company known as
GIT. R. at 00 I 096. Phillips, the Persches, and the Reutlingers each purchased and sold
the opportunity offered by GIT. R. at 000948. The Commission concluded that Phillips
violated the Securities Act based on his representations regarding GIT to the Reutlingers
and the Persches. See R. at 001103, R. at 001104. The alleged conduct regarding the
GIT transaction occurred on or about July 2006. Id. at P. 3, ,r IO R. at 001097
C.

Other Initial Findings of the Commission Relevant to the Assessment
of a Penalty

The Commission found that "[t]here is no evidence in the record that [Phillips]
received any meaningful financial benefit, enrichment, commission, fee or other
consideration from the transactions involving the Persches and Reutlingers." R. at
001092. Additionally, the Commission found that there is no "evidence that [Phillips]
has a history of previous violations" of the securities laws. Id.
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However, the Commission faulted Phillips for statements he made when soliciting
the Persches and the Reutlingers to join a conference call in which James would invite
them to invest in the emerald deal, including that the emeralds were gem-quality, there
was already a buyer on board, investments would be used as proof of funds, they would
be repaid in 90 days, and there was no risk. R. at 001102, R. at 001103, R. at 001104.
The Commission also faulted Phillips for not informing the Persches and the Reutlingers
that he had not received payment from his own investment in the Emerald Deal 90 days
after his own investment as James had promised. R. at 001099.

D.

The Commission's Post Hoc Justifications of the Monetary Penalty in
Its Amended Order

On January 9, 2015, after Phillip's initial administrative appeal of the
Commission's findings, the Department of Commerce affirmed the amount of the
$413,750.00 monetary penalty, comprised of$315,000.00 in "investor losses," a
$78,750.00 "fine", and $25,000.00 in "investigative costs", but remanded "solely for a
more detailed Order that discusses the Commission's thought process and analysis with
respect to the Subsection R164-31-1 (1) factors," -- the factors that the commission was
required to apply to determine the monetary penalty. R. at 001282.
The Department of Commerce later explained that this remand was necessary because the
"Utah Court of Appeals would not have the same knowledge of the agency's precedent"
and therefore the Commission needed to "state rather than imply its analysis of the
[R164-31-1(1)] factors in order to facilitate judicial review." R. at 001340. As required
by the Department of Commerce's order on remand, the Commission issued an Amended
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Order on February 4, 2015 providing additional post hoc justifications for the
$413,750.00 civil penalty ("Amended Order"). See generally R. at 1090-1094. It
bolstered its prior deficient reasoning by adding the following aggravating factors to the
Initial Order: (1) Phillips' "predatory behavior in taking advantage of persons with whom
he had a close, personal relationship"; (2) Phillips' failure to "cooperate" with the
Agency to locate James; and (3) without citation, the Commission concluded that the fine
is supported by "established precedent for a first offense." R. 001091-1092.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This appeal concerns whether there are legal limitations on the amount of the
monetary penalties that the Agency may order an individual to pay for violations of the
Utah Uniform Securities Act. The Utah Department of Commerce has taken the position
that after an administrative adjudication it may order an individual to pay a fine or other
monetary penalty for a violation of any amount, subject only to Agency discretion. It
also takes the position that statutes of limitation do not apply to the Agency's
administrative adjudications, and so it may award monetary penalties for violations at any
time. The Agency's position cannot be correct. Under Utah Code Ann. 61-1-20, the
same statute that authorizes the agency to enforce the Utah Uniform Securities Act in
agency adjudications, see id at § 61-1-20( 1), the agency is also given the option of
bringing an enforcement proceeding in a judicial proceeding, id. at§ 61-1-20(2). If the
Agency does so, or if it seeks to enforce an administrative order in a judicial proceeding,
the statute limits the judge to imposing a fine of $10,000 per violation. Utah Code Ann. §
61-1-20(2). It would be illogical for the legislature to limit the authority to impose a fine
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in only judicial proceedings, where the accused individual has the benefit of greater due
process protections but at the same time allow the Agency to impose fines ( or other
monetary penalties however designated) in this case exceeding $100,000 per violation for
violations of the Utah Uniform Securities Act, especially for strict liability violations that
that require no culpable mental state.
As described in detail in this appeal, the Agency's position is in error because it
ignores the requirement that the Agency enforce any administrative award through a
judicial proceeding, in which the limitations on the amount of the fine from Utah Code
Ann. 61-1-20(2) apply. In doing so, it ignores the Utah Court of Appeals decision in

State v. Bushman, 2010 UT App 120,121 n.4, 231 P.3d 833, which explains that "[t]he
fines that the [Utah Department of Commerce's Division of Securities] could impose and
judicially enforce are . . . limited to $10,000 per violation" pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

§ 6 l- l-20(2)(b)(viii)).
A.

The Monetary Penalty Is Unlawful and Unconstitutional.

In total, the Agency made at least six errors of law in ordering Phillips to pay the
$413,750.00 monetary penalty, comprised of $315,000.00 in "investor losses," a
$78,750.00 "fine", and $25,000.00 in "investigative costs". First, as described, the
Agency is without statutory authority to order and enforce a monetary penalty in excess
of $10,000 per violation. Second, the Agency is without statutory authority to order
restitution in an administrative adjudication; restitution is reserved to enforcement actions
originally filed in judicial proceedings under 61-1-20(2). Third, the monetary penalty is
an excessive fine in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution
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because it far exceeds the $10,000 per violation set by the legislature in section 61-120(2) and the standard fines for violations set by Uniform Securities Acts in other states
throughout the nation. Fourth, the Agency failed to apply the factors in Utah Admin.
Code R164-31-1 when setting the monetary penalty and improperly attempted to justify
an improperly set monetary penalty with post hoc rationalizations. Fifth, the Agency is
time barred by the statute of limitations applicable to judicial enforcement actions from
ordering and enforcing a monetary penalty for the GIT deal violations, and sixth, the
Agency shifted the burden of proof and improperly required Phillips to disprove the
investor losses used by the Agency to support the monetary penalty.
B.

Phillips Did Not Waive His Appeal.

The Agency purports that Phillips waived any right to appeal the amount of the
monetary penalty, which it affirmed in its January 9, 2015 order, because Phillips did not
request immediate agency reconsideration or judicial review at that time. It also argues
Phillips waived his legal challenge to the Agency's decision to make only a partial
remand of the findings on the factors. To the contrary, the January 9th order was not a
final agency action subject to judicial appeal. The Department of Commerce remanded
the case to the Commission to enable judicial review because the "Utah Court of Appeals
would not have the same knowledge of the agency's precedent" and therefore the
Commission needed to "state rather than imply its analysis of the [R164-3 l-l{l)] factors
in order to facilitate judicial review." R. at 001340. In any case, under Barker v. Utah
PSC, 970 P .2d 702, 705 (Utah 1998) and Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n,
2000 UT 40, ,r 16, 999 P .2d 17, Phillips is permitted to wait until the last day to appeal
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the "last final agency action" before seeking judicial review of all final agency actions.
This Court has jurisdiction to review all issues presented for appeal by Phillips.

xxm

ARGUMENT

I.

THE MONETARY PENALTY IS UNLAWFUL AND
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY EXCESSIVE.
After an administrative adjudication, the Agency unlawfully ordered Phillips to

pay a monetary penalty for violations of the Utah Securities Act in the amount of
$413,750.00, which the Agency explained is comprised of$315,000.00 in "investor
losses," a $78,750.00 "fine", and an additional $25,000.00 in "investigative costs." 4 R.
at 001107. This monetary penalty is unlawful and excessive for three reasons. First,
under section 61-1-20(2) the Agency may not enforce a monetary penalty of more than
$10,000 per violation. In this case, the Agency found only four violations. Therefore,
the maximum potential monetary penalty was $40,000. Second, the Agency unlawfully
ordered restitution without statutory authority to do so and invaded the province of the
judiciary by ordering Phillips to pay $315,000.00 representing "investor losses." Third,
the monetary penalty is a constitutionally excessive fine in violation of Phillips' rights
under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
A.

The Agency Exceeded Its Statutory Authority by Imposing a Monetary
Penalty in Excess of $10,000 Per Violation of the Utah Securities Act.

In State v. Bushman, 2010 UT App 120, the Utah Court of Appeals previously
considered Utah Code Ann. Section 61-1-20 and concluded that the Agency cannot
escape the limit of $10,000 per violation of the Utah Uniform Securities Act set forth in

~

Utah Code Ann. Section 61-1-20(2)(b)(viii) by bringing an enforcement action in an
4

The Agency provided additional justification for the fine in its Amended Order. R. at
001091-1092. But, as will be discussed below, the Agency's post hoc rationalizations are
contrary to law, improper, and must be disregarded.

•
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administrative proceeding under Utah Code Ann. Section 61-1-20(1 ). Utah Code Ann. §
6 l-1-20(2)(b)(vii) applies to judicial actions brought in the court in the first instance, as
well as to actions to enforce a decision of the agency under 61-1-20(1). See State v.

Bushman, 2010 UT App 120, 121 n.4, 231 P.3d 833. Therefore, in State v. Bushman, the
Utah Court of Appeals reasoned that "[t]he fines that the [Utah Department's Division of
Securities] could impose and judicially enforce are ... limited to $10,000 per violation"
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 6 l-l-20(2)(b )(viii)). That same rule should be applied in
this case.
Section 61-1-20(1) of the Securities Act provides that, after an adjudicative
hearing, the Agency may issue an order and impose any combination of three available
remedies: ( 1) an order against the respondent to cease and desist the activity constituting
a violation of securities laws, (2) a fine, and (3) a bar or suspension which prevents the
respondent from associating with a licensed broker-dealer or investment adviser in the
state of Utah. See Utah Code Ann.§ 61-l-20(l)(e)-(h). The "fine" is the only monetary
penalty the Agency is authorized to impose in an administrative proceeding. To enforce
an order entered by the Agency, the Division must file an action in district court pursuant
to§ 61-1-20(2)(a). 5 This civil enforcement action triggers the limitations of§ 61-1-

5

The Utah Division of Securities of the Department of Commerce argued in its
response to Phillips request for agency review that it is not required to follow the
procedure of 61-1-20(2) to enforce an Agency Order. It claims it can enforce an Agency
order in the district court by simply filing an "Abstract of Award" R. at 001231. Once
the abstract is recorded, the Division claims orders such as the Agency's order against
Phillips are "given a civil district court case number and collection activities such as
garnishments and executions through writs begin." Id. However, the Division cites no
statutory or regulatory authority for this proposition. Id. The Division merely cites past
2

20(2)(b)(viii). See Career Serv. Review Bd. v. Utah Dep 't ofCorrections, 942 P.2d 933,
940-41 (Utah 1997) ("[A] suit to enforce such an administrative decision or order [under
predecessor statute Utah Code Ann.§ 63-46b-19(l)(a) (1993)] is an original and
independent proceeding, and such actions are actions at law ... and are not actions in the
administrative decision or order."). Section 61-l-20(2)(b) limits the district court in what
Agency-imposed penalties it can enforce. Specifically, under subsection (2)(b)(viii) a
district court is only allowed to enforce ''fines" up to $10,000 for each violation of the
Securities Act. Therefore, the amount of any monetary penalty assessed in an
administrative proceeding is limited to $10,000 per violation. In State v. Bushman, This
Court recognized this syllogism observing:
[T]he the fines that the Division could impose and judicially enforce were
limited to $ 500 for each violation of the Act at the time of the entry of the
Consent Order, see Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-20(2)(b)(vii) (2006), and are
now limited to $ I 0,000 per violation, see id. § 6 l-1-20(2)(b )(viii) (Supp.
2009).
Bushman, 2010 UT App 120,121 n.4.
As in Bushman, this court should reject the proposition now asserted by the
Agency in this case that the Agency could simply avoid the limitation of civil penalties to
$10,000 fine per violation in Utah Code Ann. 61-1-20(2) by filing the case in an

course of conduct, which is nothing but a previously unchallenged practice. Id.
Regardless, the Division is describing a civil action of enforcement, thus triggering the
limitations of§ 61-1-20(2)(b)(viii). See Career Serv. Review Bd. v. Utah Dep 't of
Corrections, 942 P.2d 933, 940-41 (Utah 1997) ("[A] suit to enforce such an
administrative decision or order [under predecessor statute Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b19(l)(a) (1993)] is an original and independent proceeding, and such actions are actions
at law ... and are not actions in the administrative decision or order.").
3
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administrative adjudication. 6 Bushman, 2010 UT App 120. Because the Agency must
enforce any orders through Utah Code section 61-1-20(2), the $10,000 fine per violation
limitation applies to limit the monetary penalty imposed by the Agency in this case.
Therefore, a fine or other monetary penalty of any amount in excess of $10,000 per
violation. With a maximum of four violations, the monetary penalty in this matter can be
no more than $40,000 total, inclusive of "investor losses" and "investigative costs",
which are not separately permitted under Utah Code Ann.§ 61-1-20(1). Therefore, the
Division's order that Phillips pay a fine of $413,750.00 is unlawful. 7
Bolstering this plain language interpretation of Section 61-1-20, this Court's
interpretation of the Uniform Securities Act as limiting all fines for violations to $10,000
per violation is consistent with the majority of other states who have adopted the Uniform
Securities Act. Almost every state that has adopted the Uniform Securities Act has
capped their respective securities agencies to a maximum fine per violation, frequently in

6

To enforce Utah's Uniform Securities Act, the Agency may either bring a
judicial action in district court in the first instance, see Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-20(2), or it
may proceed through an administrative adjudication, see id§ 61-1-20(1). Although the
administrative adjudicative proceeding may be faster and may give the agency additional
control over the proceeding, the penalties available in an administrative proceeding are
circumscribed. For instance, Utah Code Ann. § 6 l-1-20(2)(b) allows the district court to
order restitution. No similar authority is provided to the Agency in an administrative
adjudicative proceeding. Furthermore an agency order ultimately can only be enforced
by a judicial proceeding subject to Utah Code Ann § 62-l-20(2)(b).
These sections work in concert and must be interpreted in together. It would be
irrational to apply a $10,000 limitation on fines imposed in district court where the
f roceedings offer additional due process violations.
Even if the Court only considered the purported "fine" of $78,750.00 representing four
violations of the Securities Act, the Agency's fine is $38,750.00 greater than the statutory
maximum. See generally R. at 001095-1109.
4

the $10,000 range as imposed by the Utah Securities Act. 8 The Utah Uniform Securities
Act requires this Court to interpret the Utah Uniform Securities Act in conformity with
the states that have adopted the Uniform Securities Act. See Utah Code Ann.§ 61-1-27.
Additionally, this Court's interpretation of§ 61-1-20 is the most logical reading of
the Utah Uniform Securities Act. It would be specious for the legislature to allow the

8 See

Alaska, Alaska Stat. § 45.55.920 (b) (limiting the administrator to $2,500 for a
single violation, not to exceed $25,000 for multiple violations); Arkansas, Arkansas Code
Ann. § 23-42-209(a)(2)(C)(ii)(a) (limiting the commissioner to $10,000 per violation);
Delaware, 6 Del. Admin. Code§ 73-601(b) (limiting the director to $10,000 per
violation); Hawaii, Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 485(A)-604(d) (limiting the commissioner to
$50,000 per violation); Idaho, Idaho Code Ann. § 30-14-604(d) (limiting the director to
$5,000 per violation); Indiana, Ind. Code Ann. § 23-19-6-4 (d) (limiting the
commissioner to $10,000 per violation); Iowa, Iowa Code § 502.604(4) (limiting the
administrator to $5,000 per violation); Kansas, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 17-12a604(b) (limiting
the administrator to $25,000 per violation); Kentucky, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 292.500(14)
(limiting commissioner to $20,000 per violation); Maine, 32 Me. Rev. Stat. § 16604(4)
(limiting the administrator to $5,000 per violation); Maryland, Md. Corp. & Assoc. Code
Ann. § 11-701.1 (b)(4) (limiting the commissioner to $5,000 per violation);
Massachusetts, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 110A, § 407A(a)(limiting the secretary of state to
$25,000 per violati_on); Michigan, Mich. Comp. Laws§ 45 l.2604(4)(a) (limiting the
administrator to $10,000 per violation); Minnesota, Minn. Stat. 80A.8 l (d) (limiting the
administrator to $10,000 per violation); Mississippi, Miss. Code Ann.§ 75-71-613(d)(l)
(limiting the administrator to $25,000 per violation); Montana, Mont. Code Ann. § 30-10305(3) (limiting the commissioner to $5,000 per violation); Nevada, Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 90.630 (2)(d) (limiting the administrator to $25,000 per violation); New Hampshire,
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 421-B:26(1) (limiting administrative fines to $2,500 per violation);
New Jersey, N.J. Stat. Ann.§ 49:3-70.1 (limiting the civil penalty for a first time offender
to $10,000); North Carolina, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 78A-47(c)(l) (limiting administrator to
$2,500 for a single violation or up to $25,000 for multiple violations in a single
proceeding); Oklahoma, 71 Oki. St. § l-604(D) (limiting administrator to $5,000 for a
single violation or $250,000 for multiple violations on a registrant); South Carolina, S.C.
Code Ann. § 35-l-412(c) (limiting commissioner to $10,000 per violation); South
Dakota, S.D. Codified Laws§ 47-31B-604(d) (limiting director to $10,000 per violation);
Vermont, 9 V.S.A. § 5604(d) (limiting Commissioner to $15,000 for each violation);
Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. § 551.604( 4) (limiting administrator to $5,000 per violation);
Wyoming, Wyo. Stat. § l 7-4-124(f)(ii) (limiting the secretary of state to $250 per
violation, and not more than $10,000 in a single proceeding).
5

Agency to impose a higher fine than the Division is capable of enforcing in the district
court. Without this important statutory limitation, the Division would never exercise its
authority originally in the district court. The Division would have no reason or incentive
to do so. The Agency could impose a fine, no matter how large the fine or how old the
underlying conduct, see infra, without the additional due process constraints placed on
the Division in district court. The Court should avoid interpreting the Securities Act in a
manner that renders portions of the statute '"superfluous or inoperable."' Brent Brown
Dealerships, 2006 UT App 261, 1 11 (citations omitted).
Conversely, the district court enforcement of an Agency order does not render the
Agency administrative action available through Utah Code Ann.§ 61-1-20(1)
superfluous. The legislature provided a dual system that offers the Division the option of
bringing offenses before the Agency in an administrative proceeding that is inherently
less economically burdensome. 9 Further, the role of the district court in an action to
enforce an order is more limited than the original enforcement proceeding brought in
district court. In the former, the court is focused on whether the Agency has exceeded its
jurisdiction by, for example, imposing a fine that cannot be rendered into judgment
within the terms of§ 61-1-20. If the Agency properly executes fines within the scope of
§ 61-1-20, the enforcement action will not be a substantial hurdle to the enforcement of
administrative orders. Conversely, if the Division wishes to seek a broader order,
encompassing restitution and disgorgement, it can bring the action originally in the
9

For example, the Division is free to introduce credible hearsay testimony and is
not constrained to the procedural limitations of the district court. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 630-4-206( I)( c); Utah Rules of Evidence R. 802.
6

district court where the defendant is provided with more procedural protections. See §
61-l-20(2)(b)(i)-(ix). The Agency's enforcement authority in Section 61-1-20(1) was
not designed to shortcut the important due process limitations of a district court
proceeding. The Agency exceeded its authority under§ 61-1-20(1) and the Agency's
fine against Phillips must be vacated.
B.

The Agency Exceeded Its Statutory Authority by Imposing Restitution
on Phillips.

The Agency's inclusion of an order to pay $315,000.00 representing "investor
losses", R. at 001107, as part of the monetary penalty is an order of restitution, which
improperly invades the province of the district court. 10 Section 61-1-20 provides that,
after an administrative hearing, the Agency may issue an order and impose any
combination of the three available remedies: (1) injunctive relief, (2) afine, and (3) a bar

o

from associating with any licensed broker-dealer or investment advisor in Utah. See Utah
Code Ann. § 61-1-20( 1)( e )-(h) . If the Division chooses to bring suit originally in a
district court, the district court may impose broader remedies including, but without
limitation, disgorgement, rescission, or "restitution." See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1©

20(2)(b )(i)-(ix) (emphasis added).
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the distinction between remedies
available to the Agency and the district court under the Securities Act. In Mack v. Utah

State DOC, the Court stated:
Utah Code section 61-1-20 allows the Division to use adjudicative
procedures in the administrative forum to petition the Division of Securities
10

See supra note 2.
7

director to enter a cease and desist order, impose fines, and bar persons
from the securities industry in the state of Utah. Utah Code Ann. 61-1-20(1)
. Under the same section, the Division may also bring an action in district
court to enforce compliance with the Act or any rule made pursuant to the
Act. Subsection 2 grants the district court jurisdiction to issue equitable
relief, order disgorgement and rescission, impose fines, or 'enter any other
relief the court considers just.'

Mack v. Utah State, 2009 UT 47,

~

27,221 P.3d 194,202 (citations omitted). The

remedies available to a district court under § 61-1-20(2) , including restitution, are not
available to the Agency. 11
Supporting the conclusion that the "investor loss" component of the monetary
penalty is an improper award of restitution, are statements from the Division's Director,
Keith Woodwell. In an interview with the Salt Lake Tribune, Mr. Woodwell indicated
that the Division had eannarked any money collected from Phillips to be provided to
investors through Utah's whistleblower statute. 12 Section 61-1-20 does not give the
Division the authority to do an end-run around the district court by seeking an Agencyimposed fine representing "investor losses" and then paying these "investor losses" to
investors through Utah's whistle blower statute.

11

Bolstering this proposition is Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-l 8.5(2)(a) which states "The
commission shall ... except as provided in Subsection (2)(b), and consistent with Section
61-1-20, impose a sanction as provided in this chapter." (emphasis added). Here the
legislature has expressly limited the Agency to remedies found in subsection l(a).
12 Tom Harvey, Oregon Man Liable for Emerald Scam, Utah Panel Says, The Salt Lake
Trib. (Mar. 29, 2014), available at http://m.sltrib.com/sltrib/mobile3/58004 l 48219/phillips-utah-case-securities.html.csp (stating, "Phillips can receive credit if he
repays investors. If not, the state can provide investors any money it recovers through a
whistleblower law, Woodwell said."); see also R. at 001277-1278.
8

The Agency relies exclusively on Utah Admin. Code Rl 64-31-1 for its authority
to impose investor losses on Phillips. 13 R164-31-1 is an Agency rule that provides the
factors the Agency should consider in setting the amount of the fine within the limitations
on the fine set by statute. Among other factors, it is appropriate for the Agency to
consider "harm to other persons, including the amount of investor loses" when
determining whether to impose the maximum fine of$10,000 per violation of the Utah
Uniform Securities Act. See Utah Admin. Code R164-31-l(b).

If the Division wished

to seek restitution against Phillips, Utah Code Ann.§ 61-1-20(2) requires the Division to
pursue that remedy originally in the district court, where Phillips is provided with more
extensive protections of his due process rights. Because the Agency improperly imposed
restitution for which it has no statutory authority, the Initial Order imposes an unlawful
civil penalty and must be vacated.

C.

The Agency's Fine Is Unconstitutionally Excessive under the Eighth
Amendment.

The Agency's fine far exceeds the statutory limit provided by§ 61-1-20 and bears
no reasonable relationship to Phillips' conduct; therefore, the fine is
unconstitutional and must be vacated. 14 The United States Constitution
provides, "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed ...." U.S. Const. amend. VIII.; see also, Utah Const. art. I, § 9.
"The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the Excessive Fines
Clause is the principle of proportionality: The amount of forfeiture must
bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to
punish." US. v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321,334 (1988) (citations omitted);.
State v. Truman Mortensen Family Trust, 2000 UT 67, ,i 33, 8 P.3d 266,
273 (concluding that the "proper analysis as to whether a fine violates the
13

R. at 001234; R. at 001277; see generally R. at 001090-1094.
14 This Court reviews an Eighth Amendment challenge to an agency action for
correctness. Brent Brown Dealerships, 2006 UT App 261, 18 (applying the "correction
of error" standard to an Eighth Amendment challenge to an agency action).
9

Excessive Fines Clause is outlined in United States v. Bajakajian ... "). In
the context of administrative agency actions, Utah courts apply Bajakajian
by balancing a number of factors including the "gravity of the offense, the
maximum fine that could be imposed, the extent of the unlawful activity,
the amount of illegal gain in relation to the penalty, and the harm caused."
Brent Brown Dealerships, 2006 UT App 261, 118 (citations omitted).
The Agency's fine (or monetary penalty, however denominated) is
unconstitutionally ten times the amount a district court is permitted to apply under Utah
Code Ann.§ 61-1-20(2). One of the "most important" Bajakajian factors is "Congress's
judgment about the appropriate punishment for the owner's offense." US. v. Wagoner

Cnty. Real Estate, 278 F .3d 1091, 1100 ( 10th Cir. 2002). Under the Eighth Amendment,
"the maximum statutory fine is an appropriate benchmark of excessiveness." Dufries v.

Greg Province, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143012, *33 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 23, 2010)
(citations omitted); see also Truman Mortensen Family Trust, 2000 UT 67, 1~f 36-37
(finding that a fine is unconstitutional when it is grossly disproportional to the maximum
statutorily authorized penalty). The Agency purports that the fine is not unconstitutional
because under the Agency's interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-20(1) "there is no

limit" to the amount of fine the Agency can impose. R. at 001277. This cannot be the
benchmark by which the court assesses the constitutionality of the fine. The Court
should instead look to the prohibition under Section 61-1-20(2) of fines in excess of a
statutory maximum of $10,000 per violation. In this case, at most, the Agency could
impose a fine of $40,000 against Phillips, representing four violations of the Securities
Act. The Agency imposed an unconstitutional excessive fine when it used its statutory
authority to enter a "fine" under Section 61-1-20(1) to impose a monetary penalty of

10

$413,750.00 where a district court would be limited to a maximum penalty of$40,000. R.
at 001107.
Moreover, the Agency's fine is unconstitutionally excessive because it fails to
reflect that Phillips received no monetary benefit from the alleged conduct and that the
fine bears no relationship to similarly imposed penalties under the Uniform Securities
Act. Under Bajakajian, a court must "'compare the amount of the forfeiture to the
gravity of the defendant's offense. If the amount of the forfeiture is grossly
disproportional to the gravity of the defendant's offense, it is unconstitutional."' State v.
Real Property at 633 E. 640 N., 2000 UT 17, 114, 994 P.2d 1254 (quoting Bajakajian,
524 U.S. at 331). This Court has held that under the Excessive Fines clause, a fine can be
"grossly disproportional" when "compared to the monetary value ... gained by [the
violator] participating in the prohibited activity." Brent Brown Dealerships, 2006 UT
App 261, 121.
Assuming arguendo that the Agency is not statutorily limited in the amount of
fines it can impose; the fine would be excessive given the conduct in this case. The
Agency found that "[t]here is no evidence in the record that [Phillips] received any
meaningful financial benefit, enrichment, commission, fee or other reconsideration from
the transactions involving the Persches and Reutlingers." R. at 001092. 15 The Agency

15

In Brent Brown Dealerships, the administrative agency imposed a $135,000
penalty. Brent Brown Dealerships, 2006 UT App 261, ,I 21. This Court found that the
fine was ''well within the limits of the Eighth Amendment" because of its relationship to
the defendant's illegal gain. Id. Unlike, Brent Brown Dealerships, Phillips did not
personally benefit from either the GIT transaction or the emerald deal. R. at 001092. In
11

ll

<if

also found that there was no evidence that Phillips had a "history of previous violations."
Id. Moreover, the amount of this fine is extreme in comparison to the statutory penalties
authorized by other states under the Uniform Securities Act. See supra note 5. The
Agency's fine is unconstitutional and must be vacated.

II.

THE AGENCY IMPROPERLY USED POST HOC RATIONALIZATIONS
TO BOLSTER AN UNLAWFUL FINE.
The Agency's attempt to bolster the deficient Initial Order in the Amended Order

is improper post hoc rationalization and must be disregarded. "When reviewing an
agency's interpretation of law, [this Court] review[ s] for correctness, granting little or no
deference to an agency's determination." Utah Chapter ofSierra Club v. Air Quality Bd.,
2009 UT 76, 113, 226 P.3d 719, 725 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Further, agency rules are reviewed "in the same manner as statutes, focusing first on the
plain language of the rule." Id. (citations omitted). Utah Admin. Code R164-31-l(b)(l)
provides that the Agency shall consider a number of factors in setting a fine, including:
(a) the serious, nature, circumstances, extent, and persistence of the conduct
constituting the violation; (b) the harm to other persons, including the
amount of investor losses, resulting either directly or indirectly from the
violation; (c) any financial benefit, enrichment, commission, fee or other
consideration received directly or indirectly by the person in connection
with the violation ...
In the Initial Order, the Commission failed to properly weigh the Rl 64-31-1 factors and
relied exclusively on "investor losses" to assess the $315,000.00 portion of the civil
penalty imposed. R. at 001107. The Department of Commerce recognized the

fact, Phillips invested his own money into the emerald deal and lost every penny of his
investment. See R. at 000949.
12

Commission's failure, finding that the Commission's order "does not reference the rule,
nor does the Order address or discuss the other factors in Subsection Rl64-31-l(l)." See
R. at 001281. The Department of Commerce nonetheless improperly affirmed the

amount of the Commission's fine and then remanded to the Commission with instructions
that the Commission articulate a legally sufficient basis under RI 64-31-1 ( 1) for the
previously assessed fine. 16
An agency's findings must be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary
facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was
raised. See Adams v. Bd. of Review ofIndus. Comm 'n, 821 P .2d 1, 4 (Utah Ct. App.
1991 ); Utahns for Better Dental Health-Davis Inc. v. Davis Cnty. Comm 'n, 2005 UT App
347, ,i 7, 121 P.3d 39. Importantly, "post hoc rationalizations of the agency ... cannot
serve as a sufficient predicate for agency action." Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v.
Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 540 (1981) (citations omitted). 17 Indeed, a "remand is not
intended to be a mere bolstering of the (factfinder's] previous decision." State v. Hansen,
857 P.2d 978,982 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citing State v. Starnes, 841 P.2d 712, 716
(Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("In so remanding, we do not intend that the new hearing be used

(See id. at p. 20, ,i 27 (remanding "solely for a more detailed Order that discusses the
Commission's thought process and analysis with respect to the Subsection R164-31-1 (1)
factors.")).
17 See also New Mexico ex rel. Richardson v. Bureau ofLand Mgmt., 565 F.3d 683, 704
(10th Cir. 2009) ("In considering whether the agency took a 'hard look' [at information
relevant to the decision], we consider only the agency's reasoning at the time of decisionmaking, excluding post-hoc rationalization concocted by counsel in briefs or argument."
(emphasis added)); Bar MK Ranches v. Yuetter, 994 F.2d 735, 739-40 (10th Cir. 1993)
(noting that an agency cannot supplement an administrative record "with post hoc
rationalizations for its decision").
16
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simply to bolster the trial court's previous holding that Bimstein was entitled to
restitution of$ 450.")).
The Department of Commerce's remand to the Commission for a "mere
bolstering" of a deficient order was improper. The Commission, as fact finder, is
required to articulate sufficient facts in its order on which the Department of Commerce
and this Court can evaluate the merits of the Commission's fine against Phillips. Here,
the Commission's Amended Order improperly bolstered its previous deficient decision
imposing a $413,750.00 fine instead of fully and properly evaluating the evidence before
making a conclusion on remand. See generally R. at 001090-1094.
The Department of Commerce asserts that the Amended Order was proper because
the Executive· Director of the Department of Commerce has "reviewed numerous cases
from the Commission and the Division" and therefore the Executive Director was able to
conduct a "meaningful review" of the Commission's "stated findings" and "implied

findings." R. at 001340 (citations omitted). In doing so, the Department of Commerce
incredibly purports to have the ability to read the Commission's mind, so to speak. The
Department of Commerce can cite no regulatory or statutory authority for its ability to
affirm the amount of a fine and order remand to bolster a deficient-unsupported order.

(See id.) Accordingly, the Amended Order must be disregarded as improper post hoc
rationalization.

III.

THE GIT TRANSACTION CLAIM IS TIME BARRED BY§ 61-1-21.1(1).
Section 61-1-21.1 ( 1) of the Securities Act provides that"[ n]o indictment or

information may be returned or civil complaint filed under this chapter more than five
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years after the alleged violation." In this case, the Division issued the Order to Show
Cause against Phillips on January 3, 2012, nearly six months after the statute of
limitations had expired for the GIT transaction. 18 Therefore, the Division's claim against
Phillips and the fine associated with the GIT transaction are barred by§ 61-1-21.1(1).
The Agency's response to Phillips' statute of limitations argument is that no statute of

limitations whatsoever applies to administrative actions brought by the Division. R. at
001102; R. at 001271. Section 61-1-21.1(1) limits any authority exercised by the
Division under the Securities Act for three reasons. First, by examining the plain
language of§ 61-1-21.1(1), its placement within the Securities Act, and analogous
federal statutes, it is plain that the legislature intended to bind the Division to a five year
statute of limitations regardless of the forum chosen. Second, without.imposing the same
statute of limitations in the administrative context as in the judicial context, the Court
would render an entire section of the Securities Act superfluous. Finally, the Agency
must be bound to § 61-1-21.1 ( 1) in order to prote~t the important public policy goals
furthered by a statute of limitations.

The GIT transaction occurred in July 2006. See R. at 001097. The Order to Show
Cause, dated January 3, 2012, occurred 5 years and 6 months following the GIT
transaction. See generally R. at 000486-497. Like its federal counterpart, the Utah statute
is not a discovery statute. $ee Gabelli v. S.E.C., 133 S. Ct. 1216, 1223 (2013). The
statute of limitations began to run against the Division at the moment of the Persches'
invested in the GIT transaction and therefore, the GIT transaction is time barred by § 611-21.1 ( l ).
18
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A.

Section 61-1-21.1 Prevents the Division from Forum Shopping Based
on the Age of the Underlying Conduct.

A "civil complaint" encompasses any authority exercised by the Division under
the Securities Act. The "'primary goal in construing statutory language is to give effect
to the true intent and purpose of the legislature."' State v. Houston, 2011 UT App 350,

ljj 12,263 PJd 1226 (quoting Miller v. State, 2010 UT App 25, ljj 12, 226 P.3d 743). The
first step in statutory interpretation is to examine the "plain language of the statute itself."
State v. Martinez, 2002 UT 80, 'ii 8, 52 P.3d 1276, 1278 (citations omitted). "Absent a

legislative grant of discretion, this [C]ourt reviews an agency's interpretation of its
organic statute for correctness, granting no deference to the agency's interpretation." LPI
Serv. v. McGee, 2009 UT 41, 215 P.3d 135, ljj 7.

The plain language of§ 61-1-21.1(1) is clear: "No indictment or information may
be returned or civil complaint filed under this chapter more than five years after the
alleged violation." (emphasis added). 19 Section 61-1-21.1(1) limits the Division's
authority exercised "under this chapter," meaning the Securities Act. In other words, any
authority granted to the Division under the Securities Act is bound by§ 61-1-21.1(1). As
described above, to enforce an order entered by the Agency, the Division must file an
action in district court pursuant to§ 61-1-20(2)(a). See supra. Furthermore, the
19

In Rogers v. Div. ofReal Estate ofDep't ofBusiness Regulations, 790 P.2d 102, 105
(Utah 1990), ~e court held that "[i]n absence of specific legislative authority, civil
statutes of limitations are inapplicable to administrative disciplinary proceedings." Here,
as will be described below, a "civil complaint" encompasses any authority exercised by
the Division under the Securities Act. Additionally, Rogers should be distinguished in
this matter because the case against Phillips is not a disciplinary proceeding. Phillips is
not a regulated professional. He is an Oregon resident sued by the Agency for violations
of the Act.
16

Division's action against Phillips is synonymous with a "civil complaint." The Order to
Show Cause included a statement of jurisdiction, an identification of the parties, general
allegations, causes of action, and the relief sought by the Division. See generally R. at
000486-497.
In 3M Co. (Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing) v. Browner·, 17 F.3d 1453, 1459
(D.C. Cir. 1994), the D.C. Circuit held that a five year statute of limitations barred part of
the Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") enforcement action against the
defendant, 3M. The EPA filed an administrative complaint in 1988 seeking civil
penalties. Id. at 1455. 3M argued that 28 U.S.C. § 2462's five year statute of limitations
applied and therefore, the EPA was barred from asserting a fine for any conduct outside
the statutory period. Id. The EPA's ALJ ruled that no statute of limitations applied
because § 2462 only applied to judicial proceedings, not the civil penalty enforcement
action brought by the EPA. Id. Section 2462 reads:
[A]n action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine,
penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, shall not be entertained
unless commenced within five years from the date when the claim first
accrued ....
28 U.S.C. § 2462 (Lexis 2015). The D.C. Circuit disagreed with the EPA's ALJ, finding
that § 2462 applies regardless of whether the "penalty is a proceeding started in a court or
in an agency." Browner, 17 F.3d at 1457. The court interpreted§ 2462's "action, suit or
proceeding" to "readily fit[]" the description of an agency action. Id. The court noted
that "[ c]ivil penalty proceedings under [the Act] emulate judicial proceedings: a
complaint is brought, the defendant answers, motions and affidavits are filed, depositions

17
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are taken, other discovery pursued, a hearing is held, evidence is introduced, findings are
rendered and an order assessing a civil penalty is issued." Id. at 1456. The court
concluded that there is "there is no discernible rationale for applying § 2462 when the
penalty action or proceeding is brought in a court, but not when it is brought in an
administrative agency." Id. at 1457. The court recognized that the concerns in either
context are the same. A statute of limitations prevents evidence from being lost or
forgotten while ensuring a defendant has "'settled expectations"' in either the judicial or
administrative context. Id. (citing Board ofRegents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 487
(1980)).
Just like Browner, there is "no discernible rationale" for applying§ 61-1-21.1(1)
any differently in the administrative enforcement action against an unlicensed person
than in the district court. A "civil complaint filed under this chapter" includes any
authority exercised by the Division under the Securities Act. An action brought by the
Division before the Agency is the functional equivalent of a civil court proceeding: a
complaint was filed against a non-licensed individual who is not a resident of Utah,
answers, motions, and pleadings were received, a hearing was held, and findings fact and
conclusions oflaw were issued by the Agency. See generally Utah Admin. Code R1514; R. at 000486; R. at 001095. As in Browner, a "civil complaint" encompasses an
administrative action just like "an action, suit or proceeding" is akin to an administrative
action. Further, whether the Division acts before the Agency or the district court, the
concerns are the same. Section 61-1-21.1(1) ensures evidence isn't lost or forgotten

18

while giving Phillips "settled expectations" in either context. The GIT claim against
Phillips must be vacated.

B.

Section§ 61-1-21.1(1) Prevents the Division from Doing an End-Run
around the District Court Through an Administrative Enforcement
Proceeding.

Ignoring the limitations of§§ 61-1-20 and 61-1-21.1, would create the result of
providing the Division an incentive to bypass the important due process protections of the
district court proceedings· through an administrative enforcement action. Statutes are to
be construed to avoid absurd results or results that would render portions of the statute
'"superfluous or inoperable."' Brent Brown Dealerships, 2006 UT App 261, 111

•

(citations omitted); Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P 'ship, 2011 UT 50, 1 26, 267
P.3d 863. "[T]he Securities Act provides concurrent jurisdiction in the district court and
the Division director to enforce the Securities Act." Mack, 2009 UT 47,134.
The remedies in the district court are broader than the administrative enforcement
action remedies, allowing the Division to utilize which forum that is most appropriate
based on the underlying conduct in the case-more egregious conduct will require a
broader order thus requiring the Division to exercise its power in the district court. If the
Division has no time bar in the administrative context, it is free to bring claims many
years after the alleged conduct by simply bypassing the district court and initiating an
administrative enforcement action. This reading of the Securities Act, coupled with the

•

Agency's belief that it can impose unlimited fines, see supra, would ensure that the
district court avenue is rarely, if ever, utilized by the Division. This Court should impose

•
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§ 61-1-21.1(1) regardless of the forum chosen by the agency and vacate the untimely GIT
claim against Phillips.

C.

The Agency's Position Is Contrary to Utah's Public Policy.

Section 61-1-21.1 must apply to the Division, regardless of the forum chosen, to
further this state's important public policy goals of limiting stale claims. As Justice
Marshall famously admonished, it '"would be utterly repugnant to the genius of our laws'
if actions for penalties could 'be brought at any distance of time."' Gabelli v. S.E. C., 133
S. Ct. 1216, 1218 (2013) (quoting Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. 336,342 (1805)). "Statutes of
limitations are not designed exclusively for the benefit of individuals but are also for the
public good." Hirt/er v. Hirt/er, 566 P .2d 1231 (Utah 1977). Statutes oflimitations
prevent the "revival and enforcement of stale demands" which may be difficult to defend
G

"because of lapse of time, fading of memory, and possible loss of documents." Id.
The statutory language found in§ 61-1-21.1(1) represents a give and take between
the compelling policy choices underlying the Securities Act. Indeed, the plain language
of the Securities Act represents a compromise between allowing the Division sufficient
time to fully investigate and bring claims against potential defendants, while still
providing predictability for those individuals and potential defendants who conduct
business in Utah. 20 In establishing a five year statute of limitations, the legislature
provides predictability, which in turn promotes commerce within the state and
encourages individuals to travel and conduct business in Utah. Additionally, "[u]nlike
By the Division's logic, a person could have committed securities fraud in 1970 and
still fall within the scope of the Division's administrative authority-long after memories
have faded and evidence has been lost or destroyed.

20
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the private party who has no reason to suspect fraud, the [Division's] very purpose is to
root it out, and it has many legal tools at hand to aid in that pursuit." Gabelli, 133 S. Ct.
at 1222. Therefore,§ 61-1-21.1(1) does not hinder the Division's mission under the
Securities Act.
Moreover, administrative proceedings by their very nature give a defendant less
procedural protections. The question the Agency's position raises is why the legislature
would provide a defendant with less protection in a forum where a defendant already
lacks all of the procedural safeguards of a judicial proceeding. The answer is that the
legislature never intended to write the Division a discretionary blank check to bring
claims whenever it pleased. Rather, the Division is bound by § 61-1-21.1 ( 1) and is
required to bring claims, regardless of forum chosen, within five years of the alleged
violation. Therefore, the GIT transaction claim against Phillips must be dismissed and
the monetary penalty should be reduced accordingly.

IV.

THE AGENCY UNLAWFULLY SHIFTED THE BURDEN OF PROOF
SUPPORTING THE AMOUNT OF THE FINE TO PHILLIPS.
The Agency bears the burden of justifying the fine or civil penalty levied against

Phillips, including the burden to prove any investor losses that it uses to justify the fine or
civil penalty. The Agency improperly shifted this burden to Phillips and calculated the
fine based on investor losses without sufficient proof of those losses.

It is undisputed that the Perches took 21 barrels of the "emeralds" purchased in the
emerald deal with investor funds. R. at 001106. The Agency failed to evaluate whether,
given the Persches receipt and retention of the "emeralds" purchased with investor funds,
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the Pershes actually suffered a loss from the transaction. When challenged by Phillips
with the fact that the losses were undefined, even by an expert initially hired by the
Agency itself (See R. at 001029, 1222-1223), the Agency improperly shifted the burden
to disprove investor loss to Phillips. It characterized the Perches 21 barrels of "emeralds''
as an offset that Phillips failed to prove. The Agency found, "While an offset potentially
might be appropriate, neither the Division nor the Commission has the burden to
calculate it." R. at 001107.

A.

The Agency Bears the Burden of Proof.

The Agency bears the burden of proof in an action brought in its administrative
adjudication process. By agency rule, "The Department has the burden of proof in a
proceeding initiated by a notice of agency action." Utah Admin. Code Rl51-4-709(1).
The Agency was required to bear the burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that Phillips has violated the Securities Act and justify the fine. See Utah
Admin. Code R151-4-709(1); Utah Admin. Code R151-4-708; see generally Utah Code
Ann. § 61-1-20.
The value of the gems in the possession of the Persches' is important in this matter
because the Agency relied heavily on investor loss to determine the fine imposed on
Phillips. R. at 001107. The key to determining the appropriate amount of investor loss is
the value of the "emeralds" in the Persches' possession. In shifting the Division's burden
to Phillips to prove the value of the "emeralds", the Agency committed a reversible error.
See Harrington v. Office ofMiss. Secy. ofState, 129 So. 3d 153, 173-75 (Miss. 2013)
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(reversing a division's fine because the division failed to provide "evidence regarding the
specific number of investors and the violations committed against each").
B.

Retroactively Applying a New Reading of the Statute Would be
Improper.

Alternatively, even if the Agency could, for the first time, articulate a new rule
that a respondent bears the burden to establish the value of an offset, that newly
articulated burden cannot apply retroactively to Phillips. The Agency's new burden
shifting rule would affect Phillips' substantive rights, creating an undue burden on
Phillips resulting in a substantial injustice. See, e.g., Monarrez v. Utah DOT, 2014 UT
App 219, ,I 30,335 P.3d 913 (noting that a ruling of a court may apply prospectively
"when retroactive application will result in 'substantial injustice."' (citations omitted));

Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm 'n of Utah, 862 P.2d 1348, 1352 (Utah 1993)
('" When we conclude that there has been justifiable reliance on the prior state of the law
or that the retroactive application of the new law may otherwise create an undue burden,
th_e court may order that a decision apply only prospectively."' (citations omitted)).
In this case, Phillips made strategic decisions for his defense based on the clearly
articulated rule that "the department has the burden of proof in a proceeding initiated by a
notice of agency action." Utah Admin. Code Rl 51-4-709( 1). Phillips justifiably relied
on this rule given the clear language in the regulation and the lack of any alternative
burden-shifting rule in the· statutes and regulations governing this matter. See id. (See

also R. at 001106-1107 (lacking any statutory cite for the notion- that Phillips bears the
burden of establishing the amount of a potential offset).) Accordingly, it is improper for
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the Agency to announce a new burden-shifting requirement that substantively affects
Phillips' rights and then apply it retroactively.

V.

PHILLIPS' DID NOT WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL.
A.

Phillips' Appeal of the Last Final Agency Action Incorporates All Prior
Agency Orders.

The Agency order dated June 5, 2015 held that Phillips waived most of the issues
raised in this appeal because he did not file his judicial appeal immediately after the
January 9, 2015 order in which the Agency affirmed the amount of the monetary penalty
but remanded for further explanation of the justification for the monetary penalty. R. at

-.

[)~

001332-1343. The agency's finding that Phillips waived his appellate rights is simply
legally incorrect. An Agency may dispose of'" discrete issues in one order while leaving
other issues for later orders,"' but a final agency action remains appealable until the "' last
day to appeal the last final agency action in the case."' Union Pac. R.R. Co., 2000 UT
40, ilil 13, 16 (quoting Barker, 970 P.2d at 706) (emphasis in Union Pac. R.R. Co.).
Under Barker v. Utah PSC, 970 P .2d 702, 705 (Utah 1998) and Union Pac. R.R. Co. v.

Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 2000 UT 40, ,r 16, 999 P .2d 17, Phillips was permitted to wait
until the last day to appeal the "last final agency action" before seeking judicial review.

Id. (emphasis in Union Pac. R.R. Co.). The Supreme Court's approach allows petitioners
to await the orderly conclusion of agency decision-making to appeal and obtain orderly
and efficient judicial review.
Phillips properly waited to file a judicial appeal until after the Department of
Commerce's partial remand was resolved and the Department of Commerce issued its
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order reviewing the Amended Order of the Utah Securities Commission on June 5, 2015.
See Utah Rules of App. Proc. R. 14(a); Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-4-401(3)(a). He was not

required to bring multiple requests for judicial review of the same agency action simply
to avoid waiving legal arguments he had already preserved in his successive
administrative appeals to the Utah Department of Commerce.
B.

The Order of the Department of Commerce Making a Partial Remand
Was Not a Final Agency Action Subject to Judicial Appeal.

Furthermore, it would have been error for Phillips to file an appeal from the Utah
Department of Commerce's January 9, 2015 order that remanded the factors justifying
the fine to the Utah Securities Commission for further explanation, because that order
was not a final agency action. The Court has jurisdiction to review "final agency actions"
under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. Utah Code Ann. § 63 G-4-40 I. To
establish finality, this Court must answer the following three part test in the affirmative:
( 1) Has administrative decision-making reached a stage where judicial
review will not disrupt the orderly process of adjudication?; (2) Have rights
or obligations been determined or will legal consequences flow from the
agency action?; and (3) Is the agency action, in whole or in part, not
preliminary, preparatory, procedural, or intermediate with regard to
subsequent agency action?
Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 2000 UT 40, ,I 16, 999 P.2d 17; see
Heber Light & Power Co., 2010 UT 27, 17.

Applying these factors, an immediate appeal of the Agency's January 9 th remand
was improper because it would have disrupted judicial review where, as the Agency
admits, the purpose of its remand was to "facilitate judicial review." R. at 001340. An
agency action is not final when an immediate appeal would "'disrupt the orderly process
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of adjudication." Courts have found that the orderly process of adjudication is disrupted
when "judicial review" takes place while [the agency] was evaluating" issues presented
in an agency order. See PentskiffInterpreting Servs. v. Dep 't ofHealth, 2013 UT App
157, 1, 6-7, 305 P .3d 218 (citations omitted). The justification of the monetary levied
against Phillips was still at issue, making orderly appeal of that issue impossible at that
time.
Also, the Agency's January 9th remand was "preliminary" because it left more
decision-making for the Agency to complete. An order that is "preliminary, preparatory,
procedural, or intermediate" does not constitute final agency action. Barker, 970 P .2d at
706. Agency orders that (1) "remand[] the·case for further proceedings," (2) "convert[]
informal proceedings into formal [proceedings], or (3) "deny[] motions to dismiss" are
not final agency actions. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 2000 UT 40, 121 (quoting Barker, 970
P.2d at 706) (citing cases). Although this-list is non-exhaustive, it "demonstrates what
kinds of orders are preliminary, preparatory, procedural, or intermediate." Id. The
January 9th order was "preliminary" and "preparatory" because the Department of
Commerce remanded the case to the Commission for "further proceedings." (First Order,
at 20). Although the Agency purports that the remand was for the sole purpose of
obtaining a more detailed discussion of the R164-31-1 factors, the remand, as described
above, relates to a crucial issue that permeates over the entire case. R. at 001282.
Therefore, Phillips properly waited for the final disposition of the Agency on June 5,
2015, before seeking judicial review.
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CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF

In sum, based on the foregoing, the Court should find that the Agency acted
unlawfully when it imposed the monetary penalty on Phillips. Phillips requests that the
Court vacate the monetary penalty and remand to the Agency with instructions limiting
the civil penalties and fines that may be imposed. The Court has the authority to grant
relief in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G-4-403 and 63G-4-404.
DATED this~

ay off{weclzr201s.
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER, P.C.

~
f
f
)
~
Maria E. Windham
Beth Ranschau
Attorneys for Petitioner
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'·,

Di vision of Securities
Utab Department of Commerce
160 East 300 South, 2nd Floor
Box 146760
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6760
Telephone: (801) 530-6600
FAX: (80 I)530-6980

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF SECURITIES
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF:

ORDER TO s:aow CAUSE

JACK PHILLIPS,
JAMES D. ELLIOTT,

Docket
Docket N o . ~

No.~fiifl.000}

Respondents.

It appears to the Director of the Utah Division of Securities (Director) thatJack Phillips and
James D. Elliott have engaged in acts and practices that violate the Utah Uniform Securities Act,
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1, et seq. (the Act). Those acts are more fully described herein. Based upon
infonnation discovered in the course of the Utah Division of Securities' (Division) investigation of
this matter, the Director issues this Order to Show Cause in accordance with the provisions of§ 611-20(1) of the Act.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
1.

Jurisdiction over Respondents and the subject matter is appropriate be.cause the Division
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alleges that they vio1ated § 6 l -1-1 (securities fraud) of the Act while engaged in the offer
and sale of securities in or from Utah.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
THE RESPONDENTS

2.

Jack Phillips (Phillips} was, at all relevant times, a resident of the State of Oregon. Phillips

has never been licensed in the securities industry in any capacity.
3.

James D. Elliott (Elliott) was, at all relevant times, a resident of the State of Tennessee.
Elliott has never been licensed in the securities industry in any capacity.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

4.

From January 2007 to March 2007, Respondents offered and sold investment conLracts to
investors, in or from Utah, and collected at least $330,000.

5.

Investment contracts are securities under the Act.

6.

Respondents made material misstatements and omissions in connection with the offer and
sale of securities to the investors below.

7.

Investors lost all $330,000 of their principal.
INVESTORS B.P. AND G.P. ffiUSBAND AND WIFE)

8.

B.P. and O.P. met Phillips through a mutual friend. At all relevant times., B.P. and O.P. lived
in Sall Lake Cow1ty, Utah.
FIRST INVESTMENT

2

UT. Div of Securities
Jack Phillips Case SD-12-0001
000487

ADDENDUM 2

9.

In February 2005, Phillips began discussing investment opportunities in Guardian
International Travel (GIT) with B.P. via telephone.

10.

Phillips stated there were two ways to earn a pro.fit from an investment in GIT:
(1)

Investors could make .five times the value of their initial investment by receiving
"condo cards,, redeemable at travel destinations with a face value ofthree limes what
an investor provided GIT; or

(2)

Investors would receive five times their initial investment in eighteen months because
their funds were used in FOREX trading.

11.

In or about July 2006, B.P. and G.P. invested $25,000 in GIT through Phillips. B.P. and G.P.
received several condo cards that never worked with any travel establishment and received
.$10,000 to $12,000 in return from GIT.

12.

On or about December 17, 2006, Phillips flew to Salt Lake City~ Utah to meet with B.P. to
discuss an investment opportunity in imported emeralds.

13.

During the meeting, Phmips made the following statements about an investment with

Phillips:
a.

The investment would result in tripling the investment funds in ninety days;

b.

The deal could subsequently include diamonds and rubies;

C.

It was Phillips' "deal" because he was an "insurance guy,, who would make sure the
deal was insured and he decided who got in;
3
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d.

The transaction involved an emerald mining operation in Brazil that needed to expo11
the emeraJds;

e.

A reverend with a mission in Brazil had fifteen years of experience in exporting
emeralds;

f.

The reverend needed to export the emeralds as soon as possible;

g.

There was a buyer in the United States already lined up to buy the emeralds;

h.

B.P. and G.P.'s money would be held in escrow as proof of funds and would never
leave the country;

i.

The worst case scenario would be that B.P. and G.P. only ge1 their principal back;

J,

B.P. and G.P. would have no responsibilities in the investment;

k.

Investors could reinvest every thirty days;

1.

Phi1lips was bringing B.P. into the investment as a favor to B.P. for being among a
select number offrjends and because he had invested in GIT; and

m.

Elliott would be involved in the transaction and Phillips bad done business with
Elliott for some time.

14.

On or about January 4, 2007) Phillips returned to Salt Lake City, Utah with Elliott to meet
with B.P.

15.

During the meeting Elliott presented the same offer and made the following statements:
a.

The investme11t was guaranteed;
4
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b.

B.P. would triple bis money in ninety days and the transaction was insured;

C.

Elliott knew the reverend involved in the export of emeralds;

d.

This offer was only available to a select few and Phillips had spoken very highly of

Q@)

B.P. and G.P.;
e.

Elliott and Phillips had been doing business together for some time;

f.

Because B.P. and G.P. invested in GIT, they were being offered this new investment;

g.

The buyer for the emeralds was already in place;

h.

Investors' funds would be used as proofof :funds and would never leave the country;

1.

Investors could reinvest every thirty days; and

J·

GIT had additional opportunities to grow wealth, such as a rubber tree company and a
concrete business.

16.

Based on Phillips' and Elliott's statements, B.P. and G.P. invested$30,000 with Phillips and
EWott. On or about January 26, 2007, B.P. and G.P. wired $30,000 to an account for

Marrical Music, LLC l.
SECOND INVESTMENT
17.

After B.P. and G.P.'s initial investmenl, Phillips advised B.P. to sell bis business quickly,
even if it sold it at a 50% loss, because B.P. would more than make that money back in the

1 Marrical Music, LLC is owned by Elliott's wife. They both have signatory authority over the account along with
other family members of Elliott.
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emerald transaction.
18.

B.P. sold his business on February l 0, 2007 intending Lo invest the proceeds with Phillips
and Elliott.

19.

On or about February 14, 2007, B.P. invested $270,000 wilh Respondents by wiring the
funds to a trust account set up by an attorney named Paul E. Emerson (Emerson).

20.

In February 2008 1 after many excuses for delays in payments, B.P. tracked down the

"emeralds" in Georgia and transported them back to Utah.
21.

B.P. had them appraised and it was detennined that they were not emeralds, but industrial
grade cul glass.

22.

B.P. and G.P. never received any payments from Phillips or Elliott and are owed $300,000 in
principal alone.

23.

Bank records show B.P. and G.P!s funds were used by Respondents in the following
manner:
a.

$150,000 paid to First Clearing? LLC;

b.

$106,000 transferred to Emerson's personal account;

c.

$14,000 paid to Gail Cato;

d.

$11,000 cashed;

e.

$8,000 paid to Elliott;

f.

$6,790 cashed with a memo for "Carn;
6
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g.

$2,181 paid to Mary E. Elliott;

b.

$600 paid to Jim Duncan; and

t.

$1,429 paid to miscellaneous expenses such as utilities, groceries, and liquor stores.
INVESTORS P.R. AND S.R. lHUSBAND AND WIFE)

24.

P.R. and S.R. met Phillips through a mutual friend. At all relevant times, P.R and S.R. lived
in Salt Lake County, Utah.

25.

In December 2006, Phillips began discussing investment opportunities in GIT with P.Rand

S.R. During this same month, P.R. and S.R. invested $30,000 in GIT.
26.

On or about January 17, 2007, Phillips and Elliott discussed a new invesbnent opportunity

via conference call with P.R. and S.R. P.R. and S.R. were in SaJt Lake County1 Utah during
the call.
27.

During the meeting, Phillips made the following statements about the new investment:

a.

The investment would result in tripling the investment funds in ninety days;

b.

The transaction involved an emerald mining operation in Brazjl that needed to export
the emeralds;

28.

C.

Investor funds would be sent to Elliott; and

d.

P.R. and S.R. would already be millionaires.

During the meeting, Elliott made the following statements about the new investment:
a.

The investment would result in tripling the investment funds in ninety days;
7
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29.

b.

The investment had no risk;

c.

They already had prior investors;

d.

They were looking for buyers for the emeralds; and

e.

Money couJd be refovested in diamonds and rubies.

Based on Phillips' and Elliott's statements, P.R. and S.R. invested $30,000 with Phillips and
Elliott in the following manner:

a.

On or about February 27, 2007, P.R. and S.R. mailed Elliott a cashier's check of
$7,500;

b.

OnoraboutFebruary27, 2007, P.R. and S.R. mailed Elliottasecondcashier'scheck

of $7,500;
c.

On or about March 5, 2007, P.R. and S.R. mailed Elliott a cashier's check of$6,000;

and
d.

30.

On or about March 5, 2007, P.R. aud S.R. mailed Elliott a cashier's check of$9,000.

On or about November 19> 2007, S.R. sent an email to Respondents requesting her principal
retun1ed.

31.

P.R. and S.R. never received any payments from Pbill~s or Elliott and are owed .$30,000 in
principal alone.
CAUSES OF ACTION

Securities Fraud under§ 61-1-1 of the Act
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Gt@

32.

The Division incorporates and re-alleges paragraphs 1 through 31.

33.

The investment opportunities offered and sold by Respondents are securities under§ 61-1-13
of the Act.

@

34.

In connection with the offer and sale of a security to the investors, Respondents, directly or
indirectly, made fa]se statements, including, but not limited to, the following:
a.

The investment funds would be held as a proof of funds only and would not be used,
when in fact, Elliott used funds to pay other businesses, individuals, and personal
expenses;

b.

The investment was guaranteed, when in fact, Respondents had no reasonable basis

for making such a statement;
c.

The investment held no risk, when in fact, Respondents had no reasonable basis for
making such a statement;

d.

The investment was insured, when in fact, Respondents never provided any proof of
insurance; and

e.

The investment would be in emeralds., when in fact, the cargo was industrial grade
cut glass.

35.

In connection with the offer and sale of a security to the investors, Respondents, directly or
indirectly, failed to disclose material infonnation, including, but not limited to, the following,
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which was necessary in order to make statements made nol misJeading:
a.

The identity of the emeralds buyer;

b.

Other jndividua]s would have signatory authority over the account in which the
investment funds would be deposited;

c.

Elliott had exercised W1authorized control over another investor's funds;

d.

Some or all of the information typically provided in an offering circular or
prospectus regarding Phillips and Elliott, such as:
1.

Financial statements;

ii.

Risk factors;

iii.

The involvement of Phillips and Elliott in legal proceedings;

iv.

The number of investors;

v.

The amount of money needed to be raised;

vi.

TI1e amount of money actually raised;

vii.

Suitability factors for the inve51ment;

viii.

Nature of competition;

ix.

Whether the investmen?-was a registered security or exempt from registration;

and
X.

Whether Respondents were licensed to sell securities.

ORDER
10
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The Director, pursuant to § 61-1-20 of the Act, hereby orders Respondents to appear at a
formal hearing to be conducted in accordance with Utah Code Ann.§ 630-4-202, -204 through -208,
and held before the Utah Division of Securities. The hearing will occur on Wednesday, February 1,
2012, at 9:00 a.m., at the office of the Utah Division of Secwities, located in the Heber Wells
Bui Iding, 160 East 300 South, 2nd Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah. The purpose of the hearing is to
establish a scheduling order and address any preliminary matters. If Respondents fail to file an
answer and appear at the hearing, the Division of Securities may hold Respondents in default, and a
fine may be imposed in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 630-4-209. In lieu of default, the
Division may decide to proceed with the hearing Wlder § 630~4-208. At the hearing, Respondents
may show cause, if any they have:

a.

Why Respondents should not be found to have engaged in the violations alleged by
the Division in th.is Order to Show Cause;

b.

Why Respondents should not be ordered to cease and desist from engaging in any
further conduct in violation of Utah Code Ann.§ 61-1-1, or any other section of the
Act;

c.

Why Respondents should not be barred from (i) associating with any broker-dealer
or investment adviser licensed in Utah; (ii) acting as an agent for any issuer
soliciting investor funds in Utah, and (iii) from being licensed in any capacity in the
securities industry in Utah; and

11
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d.

Why Respondents should not be ordered to pay to the Division a fine amount to be
determined by stipulation or by the presiding officer after a hearing in accordance
with the provisions of Utah Admin. Rule Rl64-31-1, which may be reduced by

restitution paid to the investors.
DATED thi~

c21

day of

Uu:nikV: ,2011.

Approved:

D. SCOTT DAVIS
Assistant Attorney General
D.W.
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Division of Securities
Utah Department ef Commerce
160 East 300 South, 2nd Floor
Box 146760
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6760
Telephone: (801) 530-6600
FAX:(801)530-6980

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF SECURITIES
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OFTHESTATEOFUTAH
IN THE MATTER OF:
JACK PHILLIPS,
JAMES 'D. ELLIOTT,

NOTICE OF AGENCY ACTION

Docket No. \\1)..

fl-@l

Docket N o . ~

Respondents.

THE DIVISION OF SECURITIES TO THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENTS:

You are he-reby notified that agency action in the form ofan adjudicative proceeding has been
commenced against you by the Utah Division of Securities (Division). The adjudicative proceeding
is to be formal and will be conducted according lo statute and rule. See Utah Code Ann.§ 630-4201 and 630-4-204 through -209; ~~Utah Admin. Code RlSl-4-101 1 el seq, The facts on
which this action is based are set forth in the accompanying Order to Show Cause. The legal
authority under which this formal adjudicative proceeding is to be maintained is Utah Code Ann. §
61-1-20. You may be represented by counsel or you may represent you.rselfin lhis proceeding. Utah
Admin. Code R151-4-110.

You must file a written response with the Division within thirty (30) days of the mailing date
of this Notice. Your response must be in writing and signed by you or your representative. Your
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response must include the file number and name of the adjudicative proceeding: your version of the
facts, a statement of what relief you seek, and a statement summarizing why the relief you seek
should be granted. Utah Code Ann. § 630-4-204() ). In addition, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
630-4-204(3): the presiding officer reqwres that your response:
(a)

admit or deny the allegations in each numbered paragraph of the Order to Show
Cause, inc]uding a detailed explanation for any response other than an W1qualified
admission. Al1egations in the Order to Show Cause not specifically denied are
deemed admitted;

(b)

identify any additional facts or documents which you assert are relevant in 1ightofthe
allegations made; and

(c)

state in short and plain tenns your defenses to each allegation in the Order to Show

Cause, including affomative defenses, that were applicable at the time of the conduct
(including exemptions or exceptions contained within the Utah Uniform Securities
Act).

Your response, and any future pleadings or filings that should be part of the official files in
this matter, should be sent to the following:

Signed originals to:

A copy to:

Administrative Court Clerk
c/o Julie Price
Ulah Division of Securities
160 E. 300 South, 2nd Floor
Box 146760
Salt Lake City, UT 84114:-6760
(80 l) 530-6600

D. Scott Davis
Assistant Attorney General
Ctah Division of Securities
160 East 300 SouthJ 5•h Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0872
(801) 366-0358

An initial hearing in this matter is set for February l, 2012 al the Division of Securities, 2nd

r·\).. r)J .
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Floor, 160 E. 300 S., SaJt Lake City, Utah, at 9:00 A.M. The purpose of the initial hearing is to enter
a scheduling order addressing discovery= disclosure, and other deadlines, including pre-hearing
motions, and to set a hearing date to adjudicate the matter alleged in the Order to Show Cause.
If you fail to fi]e a response, as described above, or fail to appear at any hearing that is set, the
presiding officer may enter a default order against you without any further notice. Utah Code Ann. §
630-4-209; Utah Adm.in. Code R1 SI -4-710(2), After issuing the default order, the presiding officer

may grant the relief sought against you in the Order to Show Cause, and will conduct any further
proceedings necessary to complete the adjudicative proceeding without your participation and will
determine all issues in the proceedmg. Utah Code Ann. § 630-4-209(4). In the alternative, the

Division may proceed with a hearing under§ 63G-4-208.
The Administrative Law Judge will be Angela Hendricks, Utah Department of Commerce!
160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 146701, Salt Lake City~ UT 84114-6701, telephone (801) 530-6035.
This adjudicative proceeding will be heard by Ms, Hendricks and the Utah Securities Commission.
You may appear and be heard and present evidence on your behalf at any such hearings.
You may attempt to negotiate a settlement of the matter without filing a response or
proceeding to hearing. To do so, please contact the Utah Attorney General's Office. Questions

regarding the Order to Show Cause should be directed to D. Scott Davis, Assistant Attorney General,
160 E. 300 South, 5th Floor, Box 140872, Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0872, Tel. No. (801) 366-0358.
Dated thiso?

f

day of ~rAt'r'
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Certificate of Mailing
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DlVISION OF SECURITIES
KEITH WOODWELL, DIRECTOR
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
P.O. BOX 146741
160 EAST 300 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY, UT AH 84114-67 l 1
Telephone: (801) 530-6628

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF SECURITIES
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
1

;

IN THE MATIER OF:

i FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
i LAW,ANDORDER

I

i

JACK PHILLJPS,

! CASE NO. SD-12-0001

RESPONDENT

i

j
j

i

l
APPEARANCES:
Mark Pugsley and Maria Heckel for Respondent.
Paul Amann and Keith Woodwell for the Divisjon of Securities.

COMMISSION MEMBERS:
Erik Anthony Christiansen
Brent Baker
Tim Bangerter
David Russon

BY THE UTAH SECURJTrES COMMISSION:
On January 3, 2012, the Utah Division of Securities (Division) brought allegations
~gainst Jack Phillips ("Respondent") through a Notice of Agency Action and Order to Show

Cause. This matter was heard by four members of the Utah Securities Commission
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("Commission") in a hearing held March 27, 2014 and Apri] 21, 2014. The Commission has
considered and weighed the admitted evidence according to the applicable standard of proof, that
being a preponderance of the evidence, and now enters the following findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and order.
FINDINGS OF FACT

l . Respondent is a resident of Oregon.

2. Respondent has never been licensed to sell securities.
3. Respondent has a criminal record. On or about October 29, 2002, Respondent was

convicted of unlawful gambling in the first degree (case number 00112764, Linn County
Circuit Court, State of Oregon).
4. At relevant times, Respondent has been involved in a multi-level marketing company

called Guardian Internationa] Travel ("GJT").
5. Elliott James ("James") was Respondent's sponsor and a vice president at GJT.
6. Respondent sold the GIT opportunity and was paid commissions for doing so.
Respondent was extremely successfully in marketing GlT and was rewarded for his
success through bonuses and gifts.
7. Respondent was the first and primary source of infom1ation for Bi11 and Gidgette Persch
(''the Persches) and for Paul and Sherry Reutlinger ("the Reutlingers") regarding GIT.
8. In soliciting the Persches to participate in GIT, Respondent assured them that they did not
have to do anything other than invest in order to realize a return. In addition, Respondent
made _the following assurances and representations:
a. The investments would be used for FOREX trading. 1

1 The Commission takes notice that FOREX trading, also known as the foreign exchange marker, is a global
decentralized market for the trading of currencies.

1oci~
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b. Any investment would generate a five-fold return within 18 months.

9. ln soliciting the Persches to invest in GIT, Respondent omitted to disclose the following:
a. The fact that Respondent had been convicted for il1ega1 gambling.
b. The risks involved in trading foreign currencies.
c, The track record of GlT and its investors.
d. Whether the GIT investment opportunity was registered as a security or exempt
from registration.

e. Whether Respondent was licensed to sell securities or exempt from licensure.
l 0. In or about July 2006, the Persches tendered $25,000 to GIT through Respondent.

11. The Persches' investments were not used for FOREX trading. Whi1e the Persches
received nominal payments for a time, they never made back their initial investments or
realized any profits.

12. In or about November 2006, James approached Phillips with a deal involving the
purchase, importatjon, and sale of emeralds.
13. Among other tl1ings, James told Respondent that James could arrange for the purchase
and jmportation of emeralds, which would sell within 90 days for three times the value
paid by an investor ("the emera)d dea1").
14. On or about November 14, 2006, Respondent invested in the emerald deal.
15. Shortly thereafter, Respondent began soliciting the Persches and Reutlingers to join a
conference call in which James would invite them to invest in the emerald deal. This
solicitation took place in Utah.

llOO

Page 3
UT. Div of Securities
Jack Phillips Case SD-12-0001
001097

ADDENDUM19

16. In soliciting the Persches and Reutlingers to participate in the conference call,
Respondent assured them that they would have no responsibility to operate the enterprise

or manage the investment. In addition, Respondent made the following representations:
a. The emeralds were gem-quality.
b. There was a buyer on board to purchase the emeralds.
c. Investment capitaJ was needed solely to establish proof of funds; therefore, money
tendered by investors would not leave the country, but would be held in an escrow
accoW1t.

d.

An investor would make three times the investment amount within a maximum

of90 days.
e. There was no risk. The worst possible scenario would be a return of the initial
investment.
At hearing, Respondent urged that James made these representations to him, thus
inducing him to invest and that he merely repeated the infonnation to those he solicited.
1

The Commission did not find Respondent's testimony credible.
17. In soliciting the Perscbes and Reutlingers to invest in the emerald deal, Respondent
omitted to explain or disclose the following:
a. The fact that Respondent had been convicted for illegal gambling.
b. The ideotjty of the buyer who would purchase the emeralds from James.
c. What risk factors were attached to the investment.
d. The number of investors.
e. The amount of money that needed to be raised.
f.

SuitabiJ ity factors for the investment and investors.

I lo l
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g. The nature of any competition.

h. Whether the emeralds investment opportunity was registered as a security or
exempt from registration;
1.

Whether Respondent was licensed to sell secutities or exempt from licensure.

18. On or about January 26, 2007, Bill Persch invested $30,000 in the emerald deal.
19. On or about February 14, 2007, Bil1 Persch invested an additional $270,000 in the
emerald deal.
20. Between approximately February 27, 2007 and March 5, 2007, the Reutlingers invested
$30,000 in the emerald deal.
21. The money tendered by the Persches and Reutiingers was not held in escrow. Some of it

was used to purchase emeralds, but they were not gem-quality. Much ofit was used by
James at his discretion. No buyer for the emeralds was in p]ace at any relevant time. The
investors have not rea]ized any profits from the emerald deal. There was no credible or
admissible evidence presenled that the Persches or Reutlingers would ever rea1ize any

profits from the emerald deal.
22. When the Persches and Reutlingers made their Febrnary and March 2007 investments,
around 90 days had passed since Respondent's initial investment in the emerald deal.
Respondent had not received a return on his investment. He did not infonn the Persches
and Reutlingers of this delinquency before or shortly after the Persches and Reutlingers
invested in the emerald deaJ.
23. The emeralds purchased by James and his associates were shipped to the United States.
Currently, at least some of the emeralds are in the custody of the Persches. There is
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insufficient information or admissible evidence in the record from which to calculate or
estimate the commercial value of the gems, if any.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
l. Utah Code § 61-1-13(1 )( ee)(i)(K) provides that an investment contract is a security. Utah
Code§ 61-1-13(l)(s}(ji) 2 sets forth a four-part lest for determining whether an agreement
under which money changes hands constitutes an investment contract. The test is as
follows:
a. An offeree furnishes initiaJ value to an offerer.
b. A portion of the initial value is subjected to the risks of the enterprise.
c. The furnishing of the initial value is induced by the offerer's promises or
representations that give rise to a reasonable understanding that a valuable benefit
of some kind over and above the initial value will accrue to the offeree as a result
of the operation of the enterprise.
d. The offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical ~d actual control over
the managerial decisions of the enterprise.
2. As to the GIT investment. the Commission concludes that it was an investment contract

and, therefore, was a security, as follows:

2 The

Commission notes that Utah Code § 61-1 et seq as in effect on March 16, 2007, did not include a definition of
the tenn "inve.1tment contracL" However, the fundamental elements of the test have been in effect at all relevant
times under the common law. Securities & Exchange Commission ,,. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 291 (1946), The
Utah Legislature adopted the test into statute in 2009, with tile founh prong staling I.hat the offeree has no right to
"practical or actual" control. The conjunction was changed to "and" in the 2011 Legislative Session. Thal linguislic
change does not affect die analysis here.
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a. The Persches furnished initial value as offerees when they bought into GIT.
Where Respondent solicited the tender of this initial value, he was an offerer in
the transaction. 3
b. Some or all of the value tendered by the Persches was subjected to the risks of
GIT's use and management.
c. The Persches were induced to buy into GIT by Respondent's promises and
representations that they would receive a five-fold return on their investment
within 18 months. A five-fold return constitutes a valuable benefit over and above
the initial value t.endered. In addition, while the Persches were allowed

Lo

bring

additional distributers into the GIT marketing system, they were assured that it
was not necessary for them to do so in order to receive the promised return on
their investments. Therefore, the return was premised on the operation of GIT as
an enterprise, not on the work and contribution of the Persches.
d. The Persches did not have any duty, obligation, or opportunity to participate in or
control decisions made by GIT, whether as to trading foreign currencies or
otheiwise. Therefore, they did not have practical or actual control over the
managerial decisions of GIT.
3. In concluding that the GIT investment was a security, the Commission has considered
'Respondent's argument to th.e effect that multi-level marketing companies and securities
are mutually exclusive. The Commission disagrees. A multi-level marketing company is
a system for advertising, distributing, and selling something of value. If the offering that
is advertised, distributed, and sold satisfies the statutory test for an investment contract,

; Utah Code § 61-1-13( 1)(bb)(ii) defines "offer" or "offer to sell" as including "an attempt or oll'er 10 dispose of, or
solicitation of an offer to buy, a securny or interest in a security for value" (emphasis added).

lloW.
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then it is a security, at least on the facts before the Commission in this case. It is the
nature of the offering that is sold-not the manner of sale or the ind1.1stry at issue-that
delennines whether a security is at issue. Based on the specific facts at issue, a security
was involved in the sale of the GIT investment opportunity to the Persches.
4. The Commission has also considered Respondent's argument that the Persches' GIT
transactions occurred more than five years prior to the date on which the order to show
cause was issued in this administrative matter. The Commission has previously ruled that
no stat\lte of Iimitations applies. 4 Regardless, Respondent argues that the age of the
transaction should insulate him, in part if not in whole, from any liability regarding it.
The Commission disagrees.
S. The Division has discretion to prosecute any case, regardless of its age. While the

Division might make it a practice on an ad hoc basis to decline prosecution of a violation
that occurred more than five years prior to the date a complaint is submitted, it is not
required to adhere to sucb a practice without exception, and does not. Jt is a. question of
agency discretion.
6. As to the emerald deal, the Commission concludes that it was an investmenl contract and,
therefore, was a security, as follows:
a. The Persches and Reutlingers furnished initial value as offerees when they bought
into the emerald deal. Where Respondent solicited their participation, in the
transaction, he was an offerer,
b. Some or all of the value tendered by the Persch es and Reut1ingers was subjected
to the risks of James's use and management, as well as to the risks of the gem
markel.
4

See the Commission's March 24, 2014 order denying RespondenL's motion for summn.ry judgment.
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c. The Persches and Reutlingers were induced to buy into the emerald deal by
Respondent's promises and representations th.at they would receive a three-fold

return on their investment within 90 days. A three-fold return constitutes a
valuable benefit over and above· the initial value tendered. In.addition, the
Persches and Reutlingers had neither the obligation nor the opportunity to
participate in or direct the purchase, transport, and resale of the emeralds in order

to receive the promised return on their investments. Therefore, the return was
premised on the operation of the emerald deal as an enterprise, not on the work
and contribution of the Persch es and ReutJingers.
d. Neither the Persches nqr the Reutlingers had any duty, obligation, or opportunity

to participate in or control decisions made by James and his associates in
procuring emeralds for resale. Therefore, neither bad practical or actual control
over the managerial decisions regarding the emerald deal.
7. Utah Code § 6 l-1-1 (2) prohibits any person engaged in the offer and sale of securities to
directly or jndirectly make an untrue statement as to a material fact.
8. As to the GIT transactions, Respondent falsely stated that the Persches1 invesbnents
wouJd be used for FOREX trading and would generate a five-fold return. A reasonable
person would routinely consider the rate of retum and the nature of the investment in

determining whether to invest. Therefore, the infonnation provided by Respondent on
these issues constitutes material facts. Where Respondent's statements as to these facts

were untrue, he violated Section 61-1-1 (2).
9. As to the emerald deal, Respondent falsely stated that the Persches and Reutlingers would
receive a three-fold return on their investment, which would remain in an escrow accowtt

l t Ov
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within the United States as proof of funds in the purchase of gem-quality emeralds. A
reasonable person would routinely consider the rate of return, the nature of the
investment, and the proposed use of invested funds in determining whether to invest.
Therefore, the information provided by Respondent on these issues constitutes material
facts. Where Respondent's statements as to these facts were untrue, he engaged in an
additional violation of Section 6J-1-1 (2).
10. Utah Code Ann.§ 61-J-J (2) prohibits any person engaged in the offer and sale of
securities to directly or indirectly fail to disclose material information that would be
necessary jn order to make representations made not misleading.
11. As to the GIT transactions, Respondent failed to disclose his criminal history and the
risks, nature, and track record of the offering when he assured the Persches that their
money would be safe. Had the Persches known Respondent to be a convicted gambler,
and had they widerstood the true nature of the investment and the risks involved, they
would have had reason to doubt Respondent's assurances, Therefore, Respondent's
omissions were material and resulted in investors being misled into believing that their
money was not at risk. These circumstances constitute an additional violation of Section
61-1-1(2).

12. As to the emerald transaction, Respondent failed to disclose his criminal history and the
risks, nature, and suitability of the offering when he assured the Persches and Reutlingers

that their money would be safe. As to the Reutlingers 1 investment and the Persches1 final
investment, Respondent also failed to disclose that a return due to him was delinquent.

Had the Persches and Reutlingers known Respondent to be a convicted gambler, had they
understood the true nature of the investment and the risks involved, and had they
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understood that promised returns were already delinquent, they would have had reason to
doubt Respondent's assurances. Therefore, Respondent's omissions were material and
resulted in investors being misled into believing that their money was not at risk. These
circumstances constitute an additional violation of Section 61-1-1 (2).
13. In concluding that Respondent made false statements and material omissions regarding
the emerald deal, the Commission has considered Respondent's argument that he was not
the maker of the statements he conveyed to investors. In making this argument,
Respondent relies on the case of Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders, ] 31 S.
Ct. 2296 (2011).

14. The Janus Capital decision interprets federal law and establishes a safe haven for a

person who disseminates fn1se infonnation to investors but does not have "authotity over
the content of the statement and whether and how to communicate it. 11 Id at 2303. The

Janus Capital safe haven is not appHcab]e in this case, particularly given Respondent)s
lack of credibility.
15. First, the Janus Capital test regarding who is ''the maker" of a statement has not been

adopted in Utah. Utah Code§ 61-1-1(2) states that it 11 is wtlawful for any person, in
connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly to make
any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact[.]" There is no
state court decision to interpret the verb 11 to make, 11 which interpretation is the focus of
the Janus Capital case. As such, the applicable law does not djstinguish the creator of a
false statement from a person who repeats or passes along misinformation.
16. Second, even if the Janus Capital test were the law in Utah, Respondent did have
authority over the content and dissemination of the statements he made. In the Janus
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Capital cases the problem statements were published in a prospectus filed by, and bearing

the name of, the entity that controlled the offering. TI,ere is no parallel circumstance here.
Respondent did not pass along to investors a description or prospectus written by and
attributed to James. Instead, he personally sought out investors and made verbal
representations and promises lo them. Indeed, Respondent described the emerald deal as
"his deal." He had complete control over the statements he made. He had complete
discretion regarding to whom he made the statements. More importantly, the Commission
does not find credible Respondent's argument to the effect that he couldn't have known he
was sharing untrue and misleacLing information. At the relevant time, Respondent was a
top producer for GIT. He had been with the company for some time, and he had a
personal relationship with James. As such, the Commission concludes that Respondent
was in a position to exercise due diligence, through which he could and should have
discovered the truth about the low quality of the emeralds; the lack of a ready, willing,
and able buyer; and other material facts regarding lhe transaction. In these circumstances,
the Commission concludes that Respondent is liable for the statements he ·made to the
Persches and the Reutlingers.
17. Utah Code§ 61-1-20 provides that a person who is found to have violated Section 61-1-1
et seq may be ordered to cease and desist from further violations and may be ordered to
pay a fine.

18. In assessing a fine, the Commission is authorized to consider the amount of investor
losses. In this case, the Corn.mission calculates that the Persches and Reutlingers have lost
a total of $315,000. Respondent argues that the emeralds currently jn the possession of
the Persches have some value and that, therefore, any fine is subject to an offset.
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19. While an offset potentially might be appropriate, neither the Division nor the
Commission has the burden to calculate it. The investors did not enter into the emerald
deal in order lo obtain emeralds. Their objective was to realize a finandal profit. If
Respondent believes that the investors have been made whole other than through a
financial profit, he has the burden to prove his position, including the value of the
emeralds to a reasonable certainty. Here, Respondent has speculated to that end, but has
failed to provide admissible, credible evidence sufficient to establish a basis for offsetting
the fine requested by the Division.

ORDER
Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Utah Securities
Commission orders Respondent to cease and desist from any further violations of Utah Code§
61-1 et seq. In addition, Respondent is permanently barred from associating with any brokerdealer or investment advisor licensed in Utah for life; from acting as an agent for any issuer or
solicitor of investor funds in Utah for life; and from being licensed in any capacity in the
securities industry in Utah for )ife. Finally, Respondent is ordered to pay to the Utah Division of
Securities a civil penalty in the amount of $413,750, as foJlows:
•

$315,000 in investor losses;

•

$78,750 as a fine for violations of Utah Code§ 61-1-1 et seq as herein found; and

•

$25,000 in investigative costs.

The total civil penalty is due in full with 15 days of the date of this order.

This order shall be effectjve on the latest of the signature dates below.

~, lD
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NOTICE OF RJGHT TO ADMINISTRA TlVE REVIEW

Agency review of this order may be obtained by filing a request for agency review
with the Executive Director of the Department of Commerce, 160 East 300 South, Box
146701, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6701, within thirty (30) days after the date of this
order. The agency action in this case was a formal proceeding. The laws and rules
governing agency review of this proceeding are found in Section 63G-4-101 et seq. of the
Utah Code, and Rule 151-4 of the Utah Administrative Code.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ,t_sdtay of llflltl~ ----,-2014 the undersigned served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing FlNDING~ONCLUSlONS OF LAW, AND ORDER
by mailing a copy through first-class mai1, postage prepaid, to:
Jack Phillips
c/o Mark Pugsley, Maria E. Heckel
Counsel for Jack Phillips
36 South State Street, SuHe 1400

SaJt Lake City, UT 841 11
and caused a copy to be hand delivered to:

Paul Amann, Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General of Utah
Fifth Floor, Heber M. We11s Building
Sa1t Lake City, Utah
Keith Wood well, Utah Division of Securities
Special Assistant Attomey General
Second Floor, Heber M. Wells Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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JAN 12 2015
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ______,:, NEBEKER

BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

1N THE MA TIER OF THE REQUEST
FOR AGENCY REVIEW OF

O()C t{ i:l' ,

CifOJ'
1,v·r~:.ilr11R
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FINDINGS OF FACT.,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
and
ORDER ON REVIEW

Jack Phillips,

PETITIONER

Case No. SD-12-0001

INTRODUCTION

Jack Phillips ("Petitioner") brings this request for agency review before the
Executive Director of the Department of Commerce ("Department") followfog a decision
entered against him by the Utah Securities Comrnission (hereafter "Commission'i on
May 23, 2014..

STATUTES OR RULES .PERMITTING OR :REQUIRING REVIEW
Agency review of the Division's decision is conducted pursuant lo Utah Code
Annotated, Section 630-4-301, and Utah Administrative Code, RlSl-4-901 et seq.
ISSUES REVIEWED

I.

Whether Petitioner has fail~ to properly challenge the Commission's

Findings of Fact.
2.

Whether Petitioner has failed to establish that the Commission improperly

interpreted or applied the law.

3.

Whether Petitioner failed to establish that the fiues assessed were a

violation of the Eighth Amendment,
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~

4.

Whether a remand for more detailed findings and conclusions is

appropriate solely on the Commission's application of Utah Admin. Code Section RI 6431-l(B).

FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

Petitioner is a resident of Oregon who hos never been licensed to sell

securities in Utah.
2.

On January 3, 2012, the Utah Division of Securities (''Division") issued a

Notice of Agency Action and Order to Show Cause dated December 29, 2011. The
Order to Show Cause also named Jrunes Elliott as a respondent. The Division alleged
that Petitioner and Elliot1 sold two investment opportunities to Utah ~itizens (the Persches
and Reutlingers) in violation of the Utah Uniform Securities Act: 1 ( l) a multi-level
marketing opportunity called GIT, and (2) a deal involving the purchase of emeralds.
3.

Elliott did not participate in the proceedings and the Division issued an

Order of Default against him.

4.

On March 27, 2014, the parties entered into a Stipulation on Undisputed

5.

A hearin~ was held before tilt:: Commission on March 27, 20 l 4 and April

Facts.

21, 2014.

6.

On May 23, 2014, the Commission's Flndings of Fact, Conclusions of

Law and Order ("Order'>) was entered permanently barring Petitioner from associating

with any broker-dealer or investment advisor licensed in Utah. n.cting as an agent for any
issuer or solicitor of investor funds in Utah, and being licensed i!l any capacity in the
securities industry in Utah. The Commission also assessed a civil penalty of$413,750.00
'Hereafter, "Securities Act"
2
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($315,000.00 of which was for investor losses; $78,750.00 as a fine for violations of the
Securities Act; and $25,000.00 for investigative costs). The Commission concluded that
the GlT investment and the emerald deal were investment contracts and therefore
securities, and that Petitioner violated the Securities Act in providing false material
information or omitting material information about the securities to investor.

7.

Petitioner filed a timely request for agency review on June 9, 2014. The

parties have sjnce filed their memoranda.

. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The standards for agency review within the Department of Commerce

correspond to those established by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code
Annotated Section 630-4-403(4). Utah Admin. Code R151-4-905.
2.

On agency review Petitioner asks that the Order be reversed on the
I

following grounds: {l) that the Commission exceeded its statutory authority in assessing
the civil penalty against Petitioner, (2) the assessed fme is excessive and violates the
Eighth Amendment of the US Constitution, (3) the Commission wrongly shifted the
burden of proof to Petitioner to prove investor loss, (4) the statute of limitations
prevented action taken against Petitioner> (5) it was error to impose a duty of diligence on
Petitioner to investigate investments offered by others before recommending them to
potential investors, and (6) Petitioner was not the maker of statements about investment
opportunities.

A.

The Commission's Findings of Fact Accepted ns Conc]usive
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3.

The Division asks the Executive Director to strike or disregard the

Statement of Facts section in Petitioner 1s Memorandum in Support of Request for
Agency Review. The Division points out that Petitioner's Statement of Pacts is large]y
argument and often refers to what fmdings and conclusions are not found in the
Commission's Order.

4.

To successfully challenge a finding of fact, a party requesting agency review

must show that the finding is not supported ,by substantial evidence when viewed in light of
the whole record. Subsection 63G-4-403(4)(g). The burden remains upon the party
challenging the facts to marshal all of the evidence in support of the decision and to show
that despite such evidence, the decision is not supported by aubstantia1 evidence. Subsection
11

Rl 51-4-902(3)(a). An appellant must first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding
and then demonstrate that 1he evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even

when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below," Sweet v. Sweet, 2006 UT App
216,

,r 6, 138 P.3d 63.

Moreover, a petitioner fails to satisfy his obligation to marshal the

evidence in persistently arguing his own position without regard for the evidence supporting
the Division's findings. Reineke v. Dept ofComnJerce, 810 P.2d 459,464 (Utah Ct. App.
1991). The failure to marshal the evidence pennits the Executive Director to accept findings
of fact made by the Comnussion as conclusive. Subsection R151-4 . . 902(3)(c); Campbell v.

Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
5.

Petitioner's Statement of Facts js indeed unusual as noted by the Division;

it also appears to confuse findings of foct with conclusions oflaw. In response to the
Division,s request that the Statement of Facts be stricken, Petitioner states that he
"accepts as true the findings of fact with the exception of paragraph 17/1 which Petitioner
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believes he properly marshaled. Reply Memorandum., pp. 2-3. However, Petitioner has

not met the marshaling requirement with regards to Paragraph 17 of the Commission's
Findings of Fact, which states:

In soliciting the Persches and Reutliagers to invest in the emerald deal,
[Petitioner] omitted to explain or disclose the following:
a. The fact that [Petitioner] had been convicted for illegal gambling,
b. The id.entity of the buyer who would purchase the emeralds from
James.
c. What risk factors were attached to the investment,
d, The number of investors,
e. The amount of money that needed to be raised.
f. Suitability factors for the investment and investors.
g. The nature of any competition,
b. Whether the emeralds investment opportunity was registered as a
security or exempt from registration;
i. Whether [Petitioner) was licensed to sell securities or exempt from
licensure.

Thus, Paragraph 17 refers to information that. Petitioner failed to disclose. Petitioner
apparently does not dispute that he did not disclose the informatio!11isted in Paragraph
17. Rather, Petitioner's Statement of Facts attempts to marshal the evidence in support of

a conclusion that knowledge of Petitioner's criminal conviction would have been material
and relevant to a decision to invest, which was not the substance of the finding in
-ParagraP,h 17 ..

6.

. .......

•

•••

t

Because Petitioner failed to meet the marshaling requirement in

Subsection R151-4-902(3)(a) in challenging Paragraph 17, and because he states that he
challenges no other finding of fact in the Order, the Executive Director accepts the
Commission's Findings ofFact as conclusive. Subsection RI 51-4-902(3)(c); Campbell,
at 808. It is therefore unnecessary to strike Petitioner's Statement of Facts.

B,

Failure to Establish Improper Application or Interpretation of Law
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7.

Petitioner raises various arguments relating to the application and

interpretation of the Utah Securities Act; that the statute limits fines for violations to
$] 0,000.00, that the Division is required to

file a civil action to enforce the Commission's

orders, that the Commission does not have statutory authoriLy to make an award of

restHution, and that part of the action in this case was barred by a five-year statute of
limitations.

8.

Under the Utah Securities Ac~ it is unlawful for any person, in connection

with the offer, sale, or purcha9e of any security1 directly or indirectly to:
[M]ake an untrue statement of a material fact or to ornit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the Light of the
circwns~ces under which they are made, not misleading.
Utah Code Ann. §61-1·1(2). Section 61-1-20 authorizes the Division and the
Commission to take an e.dministrative or civil action for violations of the Securities Act
as follows:

Whenever it appears to the director that a person has engaged, is engaging,
or is about to engage in an act or practice constituting a violation of dus
chapter or a rule or order under this chapter, in addition to specific powers
granted in this chapter:
(l)(a) The director may issue an order directing the person to appear
before the commission a.Rd show-cause why an order should not be jssued
directing the person to cease and desist from engaging in the act or
practice, or doing an act in furtherance of the activity;
(b) the order to show cause shaU state the reasons for the order and the
date of the hearing;
(c) director shall promptly serve a copy of the order to show cause upon a
person named in the order;
(d) the eommlssion shalJ hold a hearing on the order to show cause no
sooner than 10 business days after the order is issued;
(e) after the hearing, the commission may issue an order to cease and
desist from engaging in any act or practice. constituting a violation of this
chapter or a ruJe or order under this chapter;
(f) the commission may impose a fine;
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(g) the commission may bar or suspend that person from associating with
a licensed broker-dealer or investment adviser in this statej and
(h) the commi.ssion may impose a combination of sanctions in Subsections
(I )(e) through (g),
(2)(a) The director may bring an action in the appropriate district court of
this stale or the appropriate court of another state to enjoin an act or
practice and to enforce compliance with this chapter or a rule or order
under this chapter.
(b) Upon a proper showing in an action brought under this section, the
. co'Jrt may:
(i) issue a permanent or temporary, prohibitory or mandatory injunction;
(ii) issue a restraining order or writ of mandamus;
(iii) enter a declaratory judgment;
(iv) appoint a receiver or conservator for the defendant or the defendant's
assets;
(v) order disgorgement;
(vi) order recission;
(vii) order restitution;
(viii) impose a fine ofnot more than $10,000 for each violation of the
ch.apter; and
(ix) enter any other rel:ef the court coosiders just.
(c) the court may not require the division to post a bond in en action
brought under this subsection (2)
(3) An order issued under Subsection (I) shall be accompanied by v.Titten
findings of fact and conclusions of law.

(4) When detennining the severity of a sanction to be imposed under th.is
section, the commission or court shall consider whether:
(a) the person against whom the sanction is to be imposed exercised undue
influence; or
(b) the person against whom the sanction is imposed undel' this section
knows or should know that an investor in the investment that is the
grounds for the sanction is a vulnerable adult.

Section 61-1-20 (emphasis added). Willful violations of the Securities Act may also
result in criminal action against the perpetrators. Section 61-1-21. In a criminal matter,
in addition to ordering the individual to serve time in jail, the court may impose the

penalties in Subsection 61-l-20(2)(b). 2

Where the person violat[llg the Securities Act is a liecnso applicant or a licensee, the Division may deny
the application or the Commission may take 11cUon against the licensee for violations of the Securities Act

1
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Statutory interpretation is a question of law reviewed by the Executive

9.

Director under a correctness standard. ABCO Enters. v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 2009
'

UT 36, 17,211 P.3d 382. "In interpreting a statute, we look to its plain language, unless
it is ambiguous." State v. Johnson, 224 P.3d 720, !29, 2009 UT App 382. Where a
statutory ambiguity exists, securities laws are given broad and liberal construction to give
effect to the legislative purpose of preventing fraud. Id. (citations omitted). "OnJy when
we find ambiguity in the statute's plain language need we seek guidance from the
legislative history and relevant policy consjderation." Salt Lake Cowity v. Holliday

Water Co., 2010 UT 4S, 131, 2010 UT 45, citing World Peace Movement ofAm. v.
Newspaper Agency Corp., 819 P.2d 253, 259 (Utah 1994).
10.

Petitioner raises various public policy considerations which need not be

considered, because the plain meaning of the applicable statutes is clear. First. the
Division's administrative action against Petitioner for the OlT investment opportunity ls
not barred by a statute of limitations. Petitioner claims that the five-year statute of
limitations in Subsection 61-1-2 l.1 applies to administrative actions as well as civil and
criminal actions. Subsection 61-1-21. l provides that "[njo indictment or information

-~ay be returned or civil ·eomplaint-filed under this cha.ptei, more than five years after the
alleged violation." In her Recommended Order on Respondent's Motion for Summary
Judgment issu~ on March 24, 2014, the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") ruled on this
issue and made a recommendation to the Commission that Subsection 61-1-21.l did not
limit the Division's administrative actions to five years. The Commission adopted the
ALJ's recommendation.

pursuant to Section 61-1 •6, Since Petitioner is not a licensee or an applicant for a licenso, Section 61-1-6 Is
not relevant lo the analysis in this case.
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I J.

The plain language of Subsection 61-1-21.1 imposes a five-year statute of

limitations on civil and criminal actions. The ALJ and the Cornrrussion correctly
interpreted this provision as inapplicable lo administrative actions by the Division. The
instant matter is not a lawsuit in a cow1 of law or a criminal action.

"in the absence of

specific legislative authority, civil statutes of limitalion are inapplicable to administrative
disciplinary proceeclings,,, RogerJ' v. Div. ofReal Estate of Dep 't ofBusiness Regulations,
790 P.2d 102, 105 (Utah 1990). Had the Utah Legislature inlended to establish a statute
of limitations for administrative actions under the Securities Act, it would have so stated
its intention in the Act. Bourgeous v. U1ah Dep't o/Commerce, 2002 UT App 5, !21, 41
P.3d 461.
12.

Section 61-1-20 sets forth.two options for the Division in taking action

against an individual who has violated the Securities Act. The Division-may talce an
administrative action against the individual by issuing an order to show cause and
holding a hearing. Subsection 6 l-l -20(l)(a)- (d). After the hearing, the Commission
may issue a cca~e and desist order, impose a fine, and bar or suspend the person from

associating with a licensed broker-dealer or investment ndviser in this state. Subsection
61-l-20(1)(e) :- (g}. The statute do~s not establish a fine limitation or cap as to
administrative proceedings initiated under Subsection 61-1-20(]). 1n this case, the
Division initiated an administrn1ive action under Subsection 61-1-20(1) by issuing its
Order to Show Cause.
13,

Petitioner claims that he should not be liable under the Securities Act,

because he was not the maker of any statements that were jn violation of Section 61-1-1.
Under Section 61-1-1(2), it is unlawful for any person to make an untrue statement of a
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material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. The
Commission foW1d that Petitioner made representations and failed to notify the
Reutlingers and Persches of various pieces of infonnation that a reasonable person would
find material too. decision to invest. 3 Commission Order, 1il 8, 9, 16, 17. Petitioner
relies on the Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296
(2011). However, Jam,s interpreted federal securities laws, rather than the Utah
Securities Act at issue in this ca~e. Here, Subsection 61-1-1(2) applies to "any person"
who makes an untrue statement or makes a material omission artd does not distinguish the
creator of a false statement from a person who repeals or passes along the information.
Moreover, as the Commission noted, Petitioner personally sought out investors and made
verbal represen~lions a11d promises to them, including describing the emerald deal as
"his deal''.

14.

The analysis of Subsection 61-1-1 (2) in State v. Johnson, is applicable and

persuasive. Johnson was an attorney who sat in the room with a men named Schwenke
who spoke to potentiaJ investors about an investment opportunity. During the meeting,
S-chwenke introduced fohnson as a "high powered law.yer" and a "securit)'. expert from
New York," and neither Schwenke nor the appellant notified the potential investors that
appellant was the subject of disciplinary proceedings by the Utah State Bar for
misapproprialing client funds, .224 PJd 720, ~2. After the district court convickd
Johnson for securities fraud, Johnson appealed to the Court of Appeals. One of his

Gohler v. Wood. 919 P2.d 561 (Utah 1996), held that Seclion 61-1-1(2) does not contain a subjective
reliance element, that ii wus not necessary lo establish that the individunl inveslors relied upon tbe
statements made, so long as a reasonablo person in similar circumsranccs would have relied upon 1he
statements in making the investment. Johnson, 1111144. Also, cviden~ ofuctual reliance is appropriate. ill
3
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arguments on appeal was that Subsection 61-1 • 1(2) requires that the person who omits a
material fact aJso be the person who made the predicate statement. The Court held that

Schwenke•s statements regarding Johnson's background were designed to create
confidence in the transaction and gave th·e potential investors a false sense of security.

Id.,

14 3,

The Court further stated, "the jury could have reasonably found that predicate

statements were made and that Johnson omitted to state a material fact necessary to make
those statements not mfaleadtng.1• Id According to the Court, Johnsoo>s. view would
inject language not found in the statute and would allow a person to evade criminal
liabi1ity by remaining silent while others make gross misstatements about the person•s
background, skills, experience, or other qualities, Id, at ~42, footnote 16. Under
the State v. Johnson analysis, the Commission•s conclusion that Petitioner was
responsible for violations of the Securities Act was proper. Because it is concluded that

the Janus Capital analysis is inapplicable in this case, it is not necessary to address
Petitioner's argument that the Commission wrongfully imposed upon bjm a duty of due
diligence.
15.

Petitioner relies on Subsection 61-1-20(2), the option of filing a civil

action, in arguing that the Com.mission's fine authority is limite{i to $10,000.00. Under
Subsection 61-1-20(2), the di~trict court has the authority to issue an injunction, a
restraining order or wrj t of mandamus; the court may also order restitution and impose a
fine ofnot more than $10,000 for each violation of the Securities Act. Subsection 61-1 •
20(2)(b). Petitioner would like the fine limitation in this Subsection to be applied to
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administrative actions,4 but interpreting the statute that way would be to ignore the plain
meaning of the Act, which does not include the same limitation for administrative actions
under Subsection 61-1-20(1). The Securities Act plainly treats the two types of actions,
administrative and civil, as separate mattezs with separate remedies. Moreover, the Utah
Supreme Court bas held that administr~tive matters are m1ique statutory proceedings and
not civil actions. Rogers v. Div. ofReal Estate ofDep 'I of Business Regulations, 790
P.2d 102, 105 (Utah 1990). Had the Utah Legislature intended to set limitations on fines
resulting from administrative actions, it would have so stated iJ1 Subsection 61-1-20( 1).
Wjth respect to criminal proceedings for willful violations of Securities Act., for example,
lhe Legislature specific1dly provided that the penalties included those provided in
Subsection 61-l -20(2){b), with the fine liroit of$ I 0,000.00 for each violation, while the
Commission's authority to impose fines against respondents in a disciplinary action
contains no limiting language in Subsection 61-l-6(l)(a)(iv) •.
l 6.

Petitioner relies on State v. Bushman, 231 P.3d 833, 2010 UT App 120,

arguing that the Utah Court of Appeals held lhat Subsection 61-1-2.0(l) limits the fines in
administrative proceedings to $10,000.00. In that case, an individual who had agreed to a
con.sent orde1· with ~he Div.isi,m argued that.criminal a~tiQil taken against hlm would
violate his constitutional rights age.inst double jeopardy. The Court held that the criminal

action did not violate double jeopardy principles, stating that fines assessed in an
administrative proceedi11g were a civil penalty and intended for remedial puzposes rather
than for punishment, which is reserved for criminaJ actions. Bushman,

,rn l 0-20.

The

• Interestingly, Petitioner want., to b'eat Subsections 61-1-20(1) and (2) the same when it comes to a limil or
$10,000.00 for each violation of the Securities Act, but then argues that they are different as to restitution be cannot have it both ways,

12
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Court also held that the Security Act's fine authority was not excessive in relation to its
beneficial and remedial purpose. ld, f21. ln a subsequent footnote 1 the Court stated:
We note that the fines that the Division could impose and judicially
enforce were limited to $500 for each violation of the Act at the time of
the entry of the Consent Order, see Utah Code Ann. §6J-1-20(2)(b)(vii)
(2006), and are now limited to $10,000 per violation, see id §61-J20(2)(b)(viii) (Supp. 2009). We express no opinion as to whether a fine
that is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the underlying securities
vlolation might give rise to some sort of as-applied double jeopardy •
challenge in the appropriate case; this case, however, does not present
such circwnstances.
·
Id., footnote 4. Petitioner relies on this footnote 4. It is important Lo note, however, that

in Bushman, the Court considered the double jeopardy clause issue and the differences
between criminal end administrative actions; the Court did not squarely address the
differences between administrative and civil actions. Thus, the Court's footnote did not
focus on the fine limits i~ an administrative action as opposed to fine limits in a civil
action. If that was squarely at issue, the Court would certainly have tloted the plain
language of Sections 61-1-20(1) and (2), with a limit of$10,000.00 provided only-in civil
notions-} Finally, even if it were held that the Commisslon>s authority to issue fines for
violations of the Sec~rities Act is limited to $10,000.09 per violation, the Commission,s
Ord~r with its fine of$78,750.00 for four violations of the Act would meet such a Ii~t
See Commission Order, p. 13. ;Petitioner clearly challenges the $3 l 5 000.00 fine
1

I

assessed for investor losses, which is addressed fully below.

17.

/

Contrary to Petitioner's arguments, the Securities Act does not require the

Division to first obtain an administrative order from the Commission under Subsection
61-1-20(1) and then file a civil action under Subsection 61-1-20(2) to enforce the

Commission's order. The plain language in Section 61-1-20 does not make the
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administrative action dependent on a follow up civil action, This is clear from the use of
''may" rather than "shall in both Subsection 61-1-20( 1) and (2). 11 According to its
11

ordinary construction, the term

'may means permissive, and it should receive th.at

interpretation unless such a construction would be obviously repugnant to the intentfon of
the Legislature or would lead to some other inconvenience or absurdity." MC. v. K.H.C.
(state Ex Rel M.C.), 940 P.2d 1229, 1235 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), citations omitted. The
term 11shall,U is usually presumed mandatory. Board ofEduc. v. Salt Lake County, 659
P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 1983). See also Herr v. Salt Lake County, 525 P.2d 728, 729

....
,,21

(Utah 1974) ("The meaning of the word shall is ordinarily that of command.'').

18.

As the Division has pointed out., ifwe interpreted Section 61-1-20 to

require the Division lo file a civil action each time an order in an administrative action
was issued, there would be no reason to file any administrative actions before the
Commission and Subsection 61-1-20(1) would b~ superfluous. It is our duty to avoid
interpreting a stalute in a manner that renders portions of the statute meaningless. Brent
Brown Dealerships v. Tax Comm 'n, Motor Vehicle Enforcement Div., 139 P.3d 296 1
111, 2006 UT App 261 ~ Lyon v. Burton, 5 P.3d 616,119, 2000 UT 19. Any reliance on
Subsection 630-4-50 l(lXa) is misplaced. That Subsection provides, ''fi]n addition to

other remedies provided in law, an agency may seek enforcement of any order by-seeking
civil enforcement in the district court." That Subsection also uses a permissive "may,"
and does not make it mandatory for an agency to immediately file a civil action to
enforce its orders, Rather, Subsection 630-4-501 (1) provides the agency a remedy when
a violator fails to comply with an administrative order of Lhe agency.
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19.

Petitioner next claims that the Commission violated its statutory authority

in assessing a $315,000.00 fine for investor losses, stating that the fine in fact constjtutes
restitution, which the Commission does not hove the authority to assess under Subsection
61-1-20(1). However, the Legislature gave the Commission the authority in Section 611-20(1 )(f) to impose a fin<;,, and as stated previously, there is no limit set by the

Legislature for such fines in an administrative action. The Legislature also gave the
Division the authority, with the concurrence of the Commission, to adopt rules to carry
out the provisions of the Securities Act. Section 61-1-24(l)(a).

20.

Pursuant to a rule adopted by the Divisioa, the Commission may consider

various factors in detennining the amount of fines against violators of the Securities
Act. Utah Adm in. Code Section R164-31-l 1 "Guidelines for Assessment of
Administrative Fines," provides:
(1) For the purpose of detennining the amount of an administrative ·fine
assessed agai~ a person under the Utah Unifonn Securities Act, the
Commission shall consider the following factors:
(a) the seriousness, nature, circwnstances, extent, and persistence of the
conduct constituting the violation;
(b) the harm to other persons. including the q.mount of investor losses.
resulting either directly or indirectly from the violation;
(c) any financial benefit, enrichment, commission, fee or other consideration
received directly or indirectly by the person in connection with the violation;
(d) cooperation by the person in any inquiry conducted by the Division
concerning the violation, efforts to prevent future occurrences of the violation,
and efforts to mitigate the harm caused by the violation, including any
restitutio.n paid or disgorgement of ill-gotten gains to persons injured by the
acts of lhe person;
(e) the history of previous violations by the person;
(f) the need to deter the peCSOJ? or other persons from committing such
violations in the future;
(g) the costs of the Division in investigating and prosecuting the action; and
(h) such other matters as justice may require.
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Rl64-31-l(B}(emphasis added). Therefore, the $315,000.00 fine was not for
restitution, but was assessed pursuant to authority granted to the Commission as
part of its administrative action against someone who violated the ~ecurities Act.
Petitioner's reliance on a newspaper article supposedly quoting the Division
Director is misplaced. The Division Director's reference in that article was to a
whistle blower provision in the Securities Act, which allows the Commission to
make an award from the Securities InvesLigadons, Education, Licensing, and
Enforcement Fund to a person who reports a violation of the Act. Section 61-1106.
21.

Petitioner argues that the Division failed to carry out its burden of proof

as to losses suffered by the Persches 1 claiming that the Division has a duty to establish the
value of the stones now in possession of the Persches for a potential offset or reduction in
Petitioner's fine. Pursuant to Utah Admjn. Code R l 51 -4-709( I.), the Di vision has the
burden of proof to establish a violation of the Secudties Act pursuant to its Order to
Show Cause. The Division met that burden. Nothing in the applicable laws or rules
requires the Division to prove any offset to the fines properly assessed by the

Commission·pursuant to statute. The Division and the Commission are ~ot assessing
actual damages like in a civH case and need not engage in the analysis of actual value of
the stones. Given that the Division met the burden of proof to establish Petitioner's
violations of the Securities Act, it was not unreasonable for the Commis~ion to require
Petitioner to establish the value of the stones. Hnd Petitioner presented evidence of the
actual value of the stones, the Commission would have offset the fines assessed. The
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Commission Order stated that while a potential offset could be appropriate> Petitioner
has the burden to establish th'e valu~ of those stones. Commission Order, at 13.
22.

The total civil penalty of$413,750'.00 does not violate the Eighth

Amendm~nt, which states "[e]xcessive bail shall not be requ!redJ oar excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted. U.S. Constitution. A,nendment
Vl11. Petitioner relies on the case of United Stales v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998).
Mr. Bajakajian at1empted to transfer $357 144.00 in casn out of the country and he failed
1

to disclose those funds in violation of law. Bajakajian, at 334. The question was
whether it violated the Eighth Amendment to require him to forfeit the entire amount.
The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that forfeiture of the entire amount would violate the
Eighth Amendment, stating the principles that the amount of the forfeiture must bear
some relationship to the gravity of the offense and judgments about th.e appropriate
punishment for an offense belong in the first instance with the legislature. Jd,at 334,
336.

23.

The Utah Supreme Court used that Bajakajian analysis in Brent Brown

Dealerships v. Tax Comm 'n, Motor Vehicle Enforcement Div. TI1e Court h.eld that a fine
, violates the Eighth Amendment only if it is "grossly disproportiona} to the gravity of a .
defendant>s offense.': Brown, 139 P.3d 296, at 116. The Court also stressed that the fine
assessed should be compared to the maximum that could have been levied, and that the
extent of the unlawful activity and amount of iJlega~ gain should be considered in relation
to the penalty and the harm caused. The Court upheld the fine of $135,000.00 assessed
by the Utah Division of Vehicle Enforcement against Brent Brown Dealerships for
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selling vehicles through unlicensed sales people as not grossly disproportional to the
repeated licensing violations over a period of time. Id, at 120.
24.

Now applying the analysis in Brown and Bajakajian, the Executive

Director concludes that the $413,750.00 fine assessed against Petitioner is not grossly
disproportionate to the gravity of Petitioner's conduct and violation of law. The Utah
Legjslature gave the Commfasion the authority to talce administrative action against lhose

who violate the Securities Act and to assess fines for such violations. The Legislature did
not establish a maximum fine that the Commission may impose. Petitioner's conduct in
presenting the investment opportunities to the Persches and the Rcutlingers in vfolation of
Subsection 61-1-1(2) was deserving of the $413,750.00 fine in Jigbt of the four violations
of the Securities Act involving multiple investors, the investigation costs incurred by the
Division, and the victims 1 loss of more than $315,000.00 in amounts invested. As the
Division has pojnted out, Bajakajian and Brown are distinguishable. There were no
victims with losses of $315,000.00 in those cases. Jn Brown, those who purchased cars
from unlicensed dealers receiyed the value of their investment when they rece~ved 1heir
vehicles, while in Bajakajian, there we.re no victjms. In addition, there we.s only one
violation of ~aw in BaJakajian.
25.

Petitioner hns also failed to establish that the civil penalty of $413,750.00

was clearly unreasonable. In Johnson-Bowles v. Division ofSec., 829 P .2d 101, 114

(Utah App.), ce11. denied, 843 P.2d 516 (U1ab 1992), the Utah Court of Appeals
examined Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-6(1) and found that the Legislature granted the agency
express or, at the least, implicit discretion to penalize the licenses of s~curities brokers for

violations of the Securities Act. Due to the broad discretionary powers of the agency to
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impose sanctions, the Court held that it would not disturb the agency's decision unless it
11

is clearly unreasonable or otherwise an abuse of that discretion. 11 Johnson-Bowles, 829
P.2d at 116, citing Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i)( 1989), predecessor to
Subsection 63G-4-403(4)(h)(i). Accordingly, the Executive Director will not disturb the
civil penalty assessed by the Commission, because as discussed in paragraph 22 above,
Petitioner has failed to establish that the fine is clearly unreasonable. Johnson.. Bowle'S,
829 P. 2d at 116.
26.

Petitioner claims that the Commission failed to consider the factors

in Utah Ad.min. Code Subsection R 164-31-1 ( 1), Subsection Rl 64-31--1 ( l) sets forth

numerous factors that the Commission ushall" consider in "determining the amount of an
administrative fine assessed against a person under the Utah Uniform Securitie~ Act. A
11

review of the Commission Order indicates that the Commission acknowledges, its
authority to consider investor losses, which is authority given in Subsection R164-311( 1)(b), but the Order does not reference the rule, nor does the Order address or discuss

\

!

the other factors in Subsection Rl64~31-l(l). An agency's findings should be sufficienlly
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate
conclusion on each factual issue was raised. Adams v. Board of Review ofIndus.

Comm'n, 821 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Utahns/or Better Dental Health-Davis,
Inc. v. DavisCountyComm'n, 2005 VTApp.347,117, 121 P.Jd39. Where.a Division
order fails to reveal a logical analysis of the applicable law and the facts, the appropriate

remedy is a remand to the Division for further proceedings. LaSa/ Otl Co. v. Department
o/Envtl. Quanry, 843 P.2d 1045, 1049 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Adams, atp. 8.
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27.

Because the Corrurusston Order does not include a discussion and analysis

of the factors in Subsection Rl64-3l-1 (1) that it found relevant in ~ssessing the total fine
against Petitioner, this matter is remanded to the Comrni~sion solely for a more detailed
Order that discusses the Commission's thought process and analysis with respect to the
Subsection Rl q4-31- l (1) factors.

ORDER ON REVIEW

The Com.mjssion's Order is affi.rm.ed as follows. The Findings of Fact are
adopted as conclusive. Petitioner has failed to establish that the Commission's
interpretation or application oflaw was in error. The fines assessed against Petitioner do

not violate the Eighth Amendment.

However, a remand is appropriate for the limjted

purpose of obtruning a more detailed Order that discusses the Commission's thought
process and annlysjs with respect to the Subsection RI 64-31-1 (1) factors.

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL

Judicial Review of this Order may be obtained by filing a Petition for Review

with the Court of Appeals within 30 days after the issuance ofth1s Order. Any Petition
for Review must comply with the requirements of Sections 630-4-401 aod 630-4-403,
Utah Code Annotated. In the alternative, but not required in order to exhaust
administrative remedies reconsideration may be requested pursuant to Bourgeous v.
1

Department o/Commerce, et al., 981 P.2d 414 (Utah App. 1999) within 20 days after the
date of this Order punuant to Section 63G-4-302.
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Dated this

C/f!l of January, 20l5 .
~

• , ••1

~

•

()-uJ...

Francine A. Giani, Exec tive D
Utah Department of Commerce
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

[ certify that on the

'\th day of January, 2015, the undersigned mailed a true and

correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order on
Review by first class and certified mail to:

MARK W PUGSLEY ESQ
MARlA E HECK.EL
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER PC
36 SOUTH STATE STREET 14iH FL
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84145-0385
and caused a copy to be electronically mailed to:
Keith Woodwell, Director (kwoodwell@utah.gov)
Division of Securities
160 East JOO South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Tom Melton, Assistant Attomey General (tmelton@utah.gov)
Office of the Attorney General
Box 140872
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0872

~-
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DIVISION OF SECURITIES
KEITH WOODWELL. DIRECTOR
DBPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
P.O. BOX 146741
160 EAST 300 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84114•671 l
Telephone: (801) 530-6628

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF SECURITIES
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OFTHESTAT80FUTAH
I

IN TiiE MATIER OF:

JACK PHILLIPS,

i AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT,

j CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER
!I
!I CASE NO. SD·l2-000I
i

RESPONDENT

i

BY THE UTAH SECURITIES COMMISSION:

Pursuant to the January 9, 2015 Order issued on a.gency review by the Department of
Commerce in this matter, ·the Utah Securities Commission supplements and amends, as follows,
Paragraphs 18 and 19 in the Conclusions of Law section set forth in tJ,.e May 23, 2014 Order
issued in this matter following hearing.

18. ln assessing a fine, the Commission is charged under Utah Administrative Code§ R164-31-l(b)(l) to consider the following factors:
a. the seriousness, nature, circumstances, extent, and persistence of the conduct
congtituting the violation;
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b. the harm to other persons1 including the amount of investor losses, resulting either
directly or indirectly from the violation;
c. any .financial benefit, enrichment, commission, fee or other consideration received
directly or indirectly by the person in connection with the violation;
d. cooperation by the person in any inquiry conducted by the Division concerning
the violation, efforts to prevent future occurrences of the violation, and efforts to
mitigate the harm caused by the violation, including any restitution paid or
disgorgement of ill-gotten gains to persons injured by the acts of the person;

e. the history of previous violations by the person~
f.

the need to deter the person or other persons from committing such violations in
the future;

g, the costs incurred by the Division in investigating and prosecuting the action; and

h. such other matters as justice may require.
In this case, Respondent developed very personal, trusting relationships with the Persches
and Reutlingers over time. On the basis of these relationships of trust and confidence, and
through repeated and persistent solicitation, Respondent convinced the Persches and
Reutlingers that he was favoring them with an exclusive opportunity not otherwise
available. This predatory behavior in taldng advantage of persons with whom he had a
close, personal relationship constitutes affinity fraud by Respondent, which is a
particularly serious and repellent form of deceit and must be severely sanctioned in ardor
for the sanction to act as a deterrent. In addition, Respondent has not cooperated with the
Divisiot1i either to locate James or in any other manner. In these circumstances, the total
investor losses of $315,000 directly caused by Respondent's actions are appropriately
included in the totru fine amount, as are the Division1s claimed investigative costs of
$25,000.
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In accordance with precedent, the Corom,jssion also finds it appropriate to assess, as a
penalty for violations of the chapter, a fine calculated at 25% of the Lota] investor losses. 4•
19. Respondent argues that the emeralds currently in the possession of the Persches have
some unspecified value and that, therefore, any fine is subject to an offset. While an
offset potentially might be appropriate, neither the Division nor the Commission has the
burden to investigate and calculate a potential offset, if any. The investors did not enter
into the emerald deal in order to obtain emeralds. Their objective was to realize a
financial profit from an investment. If Respondent believes th.at the investors have been
made whole other than through a financial return, Respondent has the burden to prove his

position, including the value of the emeralds to a reasonable certainly, with competent
and admissible evidence. Here, Respondent has speculated lo that end, but has failed to

provide admissible, credible evidence sufficient to establish any factual basis for
offsetling the fine requested by the Division. Respondent merely speculates about

potential value, but does not prove the value, if any, of the alleged emeralds.

This amended order shall be effective on the latest of the signature dates below.

4• There is no evidence in the record that Respondent received any meaningful financial benefit, enrichment,
commission, fee or other co11sideration from lbc trllnsactio.113 involving the Perscbcs and the RcuUingcra. Nor js
there evidence that Re.,pondcnt bas a hutory ofpmvious violations. If such evidence were available, the
circwnslances,might constitute additional aggravating facto!'$ justifying an addjtional pt;t111Jty. Without such
evidence, the Commi&!ion finds itappropria1e to assess Respondent's fine according to csl.ablishcd preoedent for a
first offense where the respopdeut received little to no financial benefit from the transactions at issue.
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uc
DATED this _ _
l_day of

:f7 6v'-' "r';) , 2015.
UTAH SBCURlTIBS COMMISSION
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DATBDtrus1__dayof~2015.
Signed by the Presiding Officer pursuant to a grant
of authority from Commissioner Tim Bangerter and
on Mr. Bangerter's behalf.

-.J<.

DATED this_.£_ day'

~
(J

Jennie T. Jonsson, p..,,i ·

orJ~

2015.

Signed by the Presiding Officer pursuant to a grant
of authority from Commissioner Brent Baker and on
Mr. Baker's behalf.
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NOTICE OF RIGHT TO ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW
Agency review of this order may be obtained by filing n request for agency review
with the Executive Director of the Department of Commerce, 160 East 300 South, Box
146701, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6701, within thirty (30) days after the date of this
order. The agency action in this case was a form.nl proceeding. The laws and rules
governing agency review of this proceeding are found lo Section 63G-4-101 et seq. of the
Utah Code, and Rule 1S1-4 of the Utah Administrative Code,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
l hereby certify that on the
day of - j ~I~
, 2015 the undersigned served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing AMEND.~ OF FACTj CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND ORDER by mailing a copy through first-class mail, postage prepaid, to:

!:/t.

JACK PlfilLIPS
C/0 MARX PUGSLEY, ;MARIA E HECKEL
36 S STATE ST STE 1400
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
and caused a copy to be hand delivered to:
Thomas Meltonr Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General of Utah
Fifth Floor. Heber M. Wells Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Keith Woodwell, Utah Division of Secwities
SpeciaJ Assistant Attorney General
Second Floor, Heber M. Wells Buildiog
Salt Lake City, Utah
Francine A. Gieni, Executive Director
c/o Masuda Medcalf, Administrative Law Judge
Utah Department of Commerce
Second Floor, Heber M. Wells Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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RAY QUINNEY

MAY 27 201~

.,.;.\

o~ff&r

DIVISION OF SECURITIES
KEITH WOODWELL, DIR.ECTOR
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
P.O.BOX 146741
160 EAST 300 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH &4114-6711

CONTR.Ot.

Telephone: (801) S30-6628

BEFORE TI-IE DMSION OF SECURITIES
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
!

IN THE MATIER OF:

!LAW, AND ORDER

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF

l
I
!

JACK PHILLIPS,

! CASE NO. SO~12-0001

RESPONDENT

i

i
I
I

i
APPEARANCES:

Mark Pugsley and Maria Heckel for RespondenL
Paul Amann and Keith Woodwell for the Division of Securities.
COMMISSION l\lmMBERS:

Erik Anthony Christiansen
Brent Baker
Tim Bangerter
David Russon
DY THE UTAH SECURITIES COMMISSION:

On January 3, 2012, the Utah Division of Secwities (Division) brought allegations
~gainst Jack Phillips ("Respondent") through a Notice of Agency Action and Order to Show
Cause. This matter was heard by four members of the Utah Securities Commission
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("Commission") in a bearing held March 27, 2014 and April 21, 2014. The Commission has
considered and weighed the e.d.mitted evidence according to the applicable standard of proof, that
being a preponderance of the evidence, and now enters the following findings of fact,
conclusions oflaw, and order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. Respondent is a resident of Oregon.
2. Respondent has never been licensed to sell secmities.

3. Respondent has a criminal record. On or obout October 29, 2002, Respondent was
convicted ofW1lawful gambling in the first degree (case number 00112764, Linn County
Circuit Court, State of Oregon),
4. At relevant limes, Respondent has been i.nvolved in a multi-level marketing company
called Guardian International Travel (''GIT").
5. Elliott James ("James") was Respondent's sponsor and a vice president at GIT.

6. Respondent sold the GIT opportunity and was paid commissions for doing so.
Respondent was extremely successfully in marketing GIT and was rewarded for his
success through bonuses and gifts.
7. Respondent was the first and primary source ofinfom1ation for Bill and Gidgette Persch
("the Persches) and for Paul and Sherry Reutlinger ("the Reutlingers") regarding GIT.
8. In soliciting the Persches to participate in GIT, Respondent assured them that they did not
have to do anything other than invest in order to realize a return. In addition, Respondent
made the following assurances and representations:
a. The investments would be used for FOREX trading.

1The Commission 1alce9 notice that FORP..X trading, also known
decentralized market for lhc trading of cuJTencies.

&.s

1

the foreign exchange maTket, is a global
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b. Any investment would generate a five-fold return witlrin 18 months.
9. In soliciting the Persches to invest in GIT, Respondent omitted to disclose the folJowing:

a. The fact that Respondent had been convicted for illegal gambling.
b. The risks ;nvolved in trading foreign currencies.
c. The track record of GIT and its investors.

d. Whet.her the GIT investment opportunity was registered as a security or exempt
from registration.
e. Whether Respondent w~s licensed to sell securities or exempt from Jicensure.
10. ln or about July 2006, the Persches tendered $25,000 to GIT through Respondent.
11. The Persches' investments were not used for FOREX trading. While the Persches
received nominal payments foT a time, they never made back their initial investments or

realized any profits.
12. ln or about Novemb'1r 2006, James approached Phimps with a deal involving the
purchase, importation, and sale of emeralds.

13. Among other things, James toJd Respondent that James could arrange for the purchase
and importation of emeralds, which would sell within 90 days for three times the value
paid by an investor ("the emerald deal 11 ).
14. On or about November 14 1 2006, Respondent invested in the emerald deal.

15. Shortly thereafter, Respondent began soliciting lhe Persche.s and Reutlingers to join a
conference call in which James would invite them to invest in the emerald dea.J. T11is
solicitation took place in Utah.
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16. In soliciting the Persches and Reutlingers to participate in the conference call,
Respondent assured them that they would have no responsibility to operate the enterprise
or manage the investment. In addition, Respondent made the following representations:
a. The emeralds were gem-quality.

b. There was a buyer on board to purchase the emeralds.
c. Investment capi taf was needed so)ely to establish proof of funds; therefore, money
tendered by investors would not leave the country, but would be held in an escrow
account.
d.

An investor would make three times the investment amount within a maximum
of90 days.

e. There was no risk. The worst possible scenario would be a return of the initial

------------·· .... ~-· ··--------· --------··--·

investment.

Al hearing, Respondent urged that James made these representations to him, thus
inducing him to invest and that he merely repeated the information to those he solicited.
1

The Commission did not find Respondent's testimony credible.
l 7. In soliciting the Persches and Reutlingers to iovest in the emerald deal, Respondent

omitted to explain or disclose the following:
a. The fact that Respondent had been convicted for illegal gambling.
b. The identity of the buyer who would purchase the emeralds from James.
c. What risk factors were attached to the investment.
d. The number ofinvestors.
e. The amount of money that needed to be raised.

f.

Suitability factors for the investment and investors.
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g. The nature of any competition.
h. Whether the emeralds investment opportWJity was registered as a security or
exempt from registration;
L

Whether Respondent was licensed lo sell securities or exempt from licensure.

18. On or about January 26, 2007, Bill Persch invested $30,000 in the emerald dea].
19. On or aboul February 14, 2007, Bill Persch invested an additional $270,000 in the
emerald deal.
20. Between approximately February 27, 2007 and March 5, 2007, the Reutlingers invested
$30,000 in the emerald deal.
21. The money tendered by the Persches and Reutlingers was not held in escrow. Some of it
was used to purchase emeralds, but they were not gem~qua1ity. Much of it was used by
James at his discretion. No buyer for the emeralds was in ploce at any relevant tim~. The
investors have not realized any profits from the emerald deal. There was no credible or

admissible evidence presented that the Persches or Reutlingers would ever realize any
profits from the emerald deal.
22. When the Persches and Reutlingers made their February and March 2007 investments,
around 90 days had passed since Respondent's initial investment in the emerald deal.
Rr,Spondent h~d not received a return on his-investment. He did·not inform the Pcrsches
and Reutlingers of this delinquency before or shortly after the Persches and Reutlingers
invested in the emerald deal.
23. The emeralds purchased by James and his associates were shipped to the United ?tates.
Currently, at least some of the emeralds are in the custody of the Persches. There is
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insufficient info1ma.tion or admissible evidence in the record from which to calculate or
estimate the commercial value of the gems, if any.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. Utah Code § 61-1-13( I)( ee)(i)(K) provides that an investment contract is a security. Utah
Code§ 6I-1-1J(l)(s)(ii)2 sets forth a four-pa1t test for determining whether an agreement
under which money changes haods constitutes an investment contract. The test is as
follows:
a. An offeree furnishes initial value to an offerer.

b. A portion of the initial value is subjected to the risks of the enterprise.
c. Tl1e furnishing of the initial value is induced by the offerer's promises or
representations tha.t give rise to a reasonable understanding that a valuable benefit
of some kind over and above the initial value will accrue to the offeree as a result
ofthe operation of the enterprise.
d. The offerec docs not receive the right to exercise practical and actual control 9ver
the managerial decisions of the enterprise.
2. As to the GIT investment, the Commission concludes that it was an inve_stment contract
~d, therefore, was a security, as follows:

The Commission notes that Utah Code § 61-1 el seq as in effect on March 16, 2007, did not include a definition of
the term "investment conlrllcl." However, the fundamental elements of the test have been in effect at all relevant
times under the common !Aw. Securities & Exd,ango Commission v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 US. 293 (/946). The
Utah Legislature adopted the leSl ioto slatutc iu 2009, with the fourth prong stating that the offerce has no right lo
"practical or actual" control. The conjunction wa.~ changed lo "and'' in the 201 J Legislative $es.qion. TMl lingwslic
2

change does noL affeci the analysis here.
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a. The Persches furnished initial value as offerees when they bought into GIT.
Where Respondent solicited the tender of this initial value, he was an offerer in

the transaction. 3
b. Some or all of the value tendered by the Perscbes was subjected to the risks of

GIT's use aod management.
c. The Persches were induced to buy into GIT by Respondent's promises and
representations that they would receive a five-fold return on their investment

within 18 mouths. A five-fold retlml constitutes a valuable beaefit over and above
the initial value tendered. In addition, while the Persches were allowed to bring
additional distributers into the GIT marketing system, they were assured that it
was not necessary for them to do so in order to receive the promised return on
their investments. Therefore, the return was premised on the operation a f GIT as
an enterprise, not on the work and contribution of the Persches.

d. The Persches did not have any duty, obligation, or opportunity to participate in or
control decisions made by GIT, whether as to trading foreign currencies or
otherwise. Therefore, they did not have practical or actual control over the
managerial decisions of GIT.
3. In concluding that the GIT investment was a security, the Commissiou has considered
Respondent's argument to the effect that multi-level marketing companies and securities
are mutually exclusive. The Commission disagrees. A multi-level m_arketing company is

a system for advertising, distributing, and selliug something of value. If the offering that
is advertised, distributed, and sold satisfies the statutory test for an investment contract,

3 Utah Code§ 61-1-).l(l)(bb)(ii) defines "offer" or •offer to sell" as including "an 111tempt or offer to dispose of, or
solicitulion of an offer to buy, a s_ecurily or interesl in a security for value" (emphasis added).
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then it is a security, at least on the facts before the Commission in this case. It is the
nature of the offering that is sold-not the manner of sale or the industry at issue-that
determines whether a security is at issue. Based on the specific facts at issue, a security
was involved in the sale of the GIT investment opportunity to the Persches.
4. The Conunission has also considered Respondent's argument that the Persches' GIT
transaction~ OCC\UTed more than five years prior to the dale on which the order to show

cause was issued in this administrative ma~r. The Com.mission has previously ruled that
no statute of litnitations applies. 4 Regardless, Respondent argues that the age of the

transaction should insulate him, in part if not in whole, from any liability regarding it.
The Commission disagrees.
5. The Division has discretion to prosecute any case, regardless of its age. While the

Division might make it a practice on an ad hoc basis to decline prosecution of a violation
that occUJTed more than five years prior to the date a complaint is submitted, it is not
required to adhere to such a practice without exception, ond does not. It is a question of
agency discretion.
6. As to the emerald deal, the Commission concludes that it was an investment contract and,
therefore, was a security, as follows:
a. Tbe Persches and Reutlingers furnished initial value as offeree.'i when they bought
into the emerald deal. Where Respondent solicited their participation, in the
transaction, he was an offerer.
b. Some or all of the value tendered by the Persches and Reutlingers was subjected
to the risks of James'.s use and management, as well as to the risks of the gem
market.
4 See

<he Commiuion's March 24, 2014 order denying R.eapoodent's motion for summary Judgment.
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c. The Persche.c, and Reutlingers were induced to buy into the emerald deal by
Respondent's promises and representations that they would receive a three-fold
return on their investment within 90 days. A three-fold return constitutes a
valuable benefit over and above the initial value tendered.. In addition, the
Persches and Reutlingers had neither the obligation nor the opportunily to
participate in or direct the purchase, transport, and resale of the emeralds in order
to receive the promised rclum on tbeir investments. Therefore, the return was
premised on the operation of the emerald deal as an enterprise, not on the work

and contribution of the Persches and Reullingers.
d. Neither the Persches nor the Reutlingers had any duly> obligation, or opportunity

to participate in or contra] decisions made by James and his associates io
procuring emerald3 for resale. Therefore, neither had practical or actual control
over the managerial decisions regarding the emerald deal.
7. Utah Code§ 6 J .. 1-1 (2) prohibits any person engaged in the offer and sale of securities to
directly or inclirecUy make an untrue statement as to a material fact

·

8. As to the GIT transactions, Respondent falsely stated that the Persches' investments

would be used for FOREX trading and would generate a five ..fold return. A reasonable
person would routinely consider the rate of return and the nature of the investment in
determining whether to invest. Therefore, the information provided by Respondent on
tl1ese issues constitutes material facts. Where Respondent's statements as to these facts
were untrue, he violated Section 61 ~ 1-1 (2).

9. As to the emerald deal; Respondent falsely stated that the Persches and Reutlingers would
receive a three-fold return on their investment, which would remain in an escrow account
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within the United States as proofof funds in the purchase of gem-quality emeralds. A
reasonable person would routinely consider the rate of return, the nature of the
investment, and the proposed use of invested funds in determining whether to invest.
Therefore, the infomiation provided by Respondent on these issues constitutes material
facts. Where Respondent's statements as to these facts were untrue, he engaged in an
additional violation of Section 61- l -l (2).
10. Utah Code Ann.§ 61-1-1(2) prohibits any person engaged in the offer and sale of
securities to directly or indirectly ta.H to disclose material infonnation that would be
necessary in order to make representations made not misleading.
11. As to the GIT transactions Respondent failed to disclose his criminal history and the
1

risks, nature, and track record of the offering when he assured the Perscbes that their
money would be safe. Had the Persches known Respondent to be a convicted gambler,

and had they understood the true nature of the investment and the risks involved, they
would have had reason to doubt Respondent's assurances. Therefore, Respondent's
omissions were material and resulted in investors being misled into believing that their

money was not at risk. These circumstances constitute an additionaJ violation of Section
61~]-](2).

12. As to the emerald transaction, Respondent failed to disclose his criminal history and the
risks, nature, and suitability of the offering when he assured the Persches and Reutlingers
that their money would be safe. As to the Reutlingers' investment and the Persches1 final
investment, Respondent also failed to disclose that a return due to him was delinquent.
Had the Persches and Reutlingers known Respondent to be a convicted gambler had they
1

understood the true nalure of the investment and the risks involved, and had they
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w,ders1ood that promised returns were already delinquent, they would have had reason to
doubt Respondent's assurances. Therefore, Respondent's omissions were material and
resulted in investors being misled into believing that their money wns not at 1isk. These
circumstances constitute an additional violation of Section 6 J-1-1 (2).
13. In concluding that Respondent made false statements and material omissions regarding
the emerald deal, the Commission has considered Respondent's argument that he was not
the maker of the statements he conveyed to investors. In making th.is argumen~
Respondent relies on the case of Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Trad~rs, 131 S.
Ct. 2296 (2011).
14. The Janus Capital decisjon interprets federal.law and establishes a safe haven for a

person who disseminates false information to investors but does not have "authori_ty over
the content of the statement and whether and how to communicate it." Id at 2303. The
Janus Capital safe haven is not applicable in this case, particularly given Respondent's

Jack of credibility.
15. First, the Janus Capital test regarding who is "the maker'' of a statement has not been

adopted in Utah. Utah Code§ 61-1-1(2) states that it "is unlawful for any perso~ in
connection with the offer1 sale, or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly to make

any untrue statement of a material fact o_r to omit to state a material fact[.)'' There is no
state court decision to interpret the verb "to make, 11 which interpretation is the focus of
the Janus Capital case. As such, the applicable law does not distinguish the creator of a
false statement from a person who repeats or passes along misinformation.

16. Second, even iftheJanus Capital test were the Jaw in Utah, Respondent did have
authority over the content and dissemination of the statements be made. fu the Janus
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Capital case, the problem statements were pub1ished in a prospectus filed by, and bearing
the name of1 the entity that controlled the offering. There is no parallel circumstance here.
Respondent did not pass along to investors a de.-1crlption or prospectus written by and
attributed to James. Instead, he personally sought out investors and made verbal
representations and promises to them. Indeed, Respondent described the emerald deal as
"his deal.u He had complete control over the statements he made. He had complete
discretion regarding 1o whom be made the statements. More importantly, the Comm,ssion
does not find credible Respondent's argument to the effect that he couldn't have known he

was sharing untrue and misleading infonnation. At the relevant time, Respondent was a
top producer for GIT. He had been with the company for some time, and he had a
personal relationship with James. As such, the Commission concludes that Respondent
was jn a posit.ion to exercise due diligence 1 through which he could and should have

discovered the truth about the low quality of the emei:alds; the lack ofa ready, willing,
and able buyer; and other material facts regarding the transaction. In these circumstances,
the Commission concludes that Respondent is liable for the statements he made to the
Persches and the Reutlingers.
17. Utah Code§ 61 -1-20 provides that a person who is found to have violated Section 61-1-1

· et seq may be ordered to cease and desist from further violations and may be ordered to
pay a fine.
l 8. In assessing a fine, the Commission is authorized to consider the amount of investor

losses. In this case, the Commission ca.lcu]ates that the Persches and Reutlingers have lost
a total of $315,000. Respondent argues that the emeralds currently in the possession of
the Persches have some value and fha.l, therefore, any fine is subject to an offset.
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19. While an offset potentially might be nppropria.te1 neither the Division nor the
Commission has the bw-den to calculate it. The investors did not enter into the emerald

deal in order to obtain emeralds. Their objective was to realize a financial profit. If
Respondent believes that the investors have been made whole other than through a
financial profit 1 he has the burden to prove his position, inc]uding the value of the
emeralds to a reasonable certainty. Here, Respondent has speculated to that end, but has
failed to provide admissible, credible evidence sufficient to establish a basis for offsetting
the fine requested by the Division.

ORDER
Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Utah Securities
Commission orders Respondent to cease and desist from any further violations of Utah Code§
61~ 1 et seq. In addition, Respondent is permanently barred from associating with any broker~
dealer or investment advisor licensed in Utah for life; from acting as an agent for any issuer or

solicitor of investor funds in Ulah for life; and from being licensed in any capacity in the
securities industry in Utah for life. Finally, Respondent is ordered to pay to the Utah Division of
Securities a civil penalty in lhe amount of .$413,750, as follows:

••

•

•

$315,000 in investor losses;

0

$78,750 as a fine for violations of Utah Code§ 61-1-,I et seq as herein found; and

•

$25,000 in inv~tigative costs.

The total civil penalty is due in fu1l with 15 days of the date of this order.
This order shall be effective on the latest of the signature dates below.
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DATED this

,;J,/ ddayof

~

, 2014.

UTAH SECURITIES COMMISSION

Tim BnRgerter

BrentBek~

~
David Russon
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NOTICE OF RIGHT TO ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW

Agency review of this order may be obtained by filing a request for agency review
with the Executive Director of the Department of Commerce, 160 East 300 South, Box
146701, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6701, within thJrty (30) days after the date of this
order. The agency action in this case was a formal proceeding. Tbe laws and rules
governing agency review of this proceeding are found in Section 63G-4~101 et seq. of the
Utah Code, and Rule 151-1 of the Utah Ad.m.inistrative Code.

CERTIFICATE OF SER VICE
I hereby certify that on the ~ a y of

vJlltlvi

_--:-2014 the w1dersigned served a true ~d

correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGSO~ONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER
by mailing a copy through first-class mail, postage prepaid, to:
Jack Phillips

c/o Mark Pugsley> Mada E. Heckel
Counsel for J ad; Phillips
3 6 South State Street, Suite 1400

Salt Lake City, UT 8411 l
tind caused a copy to be hand delivered to:

Paul Amann, Assistant Attorney Genera]
Office of the Attorney General of Utah
Fifth Floor, Heber M. Wells Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Keith Woodwe11, Utah Division of Securities
Special Assistant Attorney General
Second Floor, Heber M. Wells Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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-----------------,----------rN THF. MATTER OF THE REQUEST
FOR AGENCY REVIEW OF
Jack Phillips,

SECOND FINDINGS OFF ACT,
CONCLUSfONS OF LAW,
~nd
ORDER ON REVIEW

PETITIONER

Case No. SD-12-0001

------···- ····-·•·-·-··-· -----· - - - INTRODUCTION
Ja-ck. Phillips ("Petitioner") brings this request for agency review before the
Executive Director of the Department of Commerce ("Department") following the

Amt:ndcd Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order ("Amended Order") issued by
the Ut1:1f1 Securities Commission ("Commission") on February 4, 2015.

STATUTES OR RULES PERMITTING OR REQUIRING REVIEW
Agency review of the Commission's decision is conducted pursuant to Utah Code
Annol<tted, Section 630-4-301, and Utah Administrative Code, Rl 51-4-901 et seq.

ISSUES REVlEWE0
Whetht:r Petitioner has failed to establish any error in the Commission's

A.me11deu Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I,

Petitioner is a resident of Oregon who has never been licensed to sell

securities in Utah.
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2.

On May 23, 2014, the Commission!s Findings of Fact: Conclusions of

Law anJ Order (''Order") were entered. The Order pennanently barred Pelitioner from
assodating witr. any broker-dealer or investment advisor Jicensed in Utah, acting as an
agent for any issuer or solicitor of investor funds in Utah, and being lic.ensed in any
capacily in the securities industry in Utah. The Commission also assessed a civil penalty

of $413,750.00 ($315,000.00 of which was for investor losses; $78,750.00 as a fine for
violations of the Securities Acl; and $25,000.00 for investigative cosls). The
Commission concluded Lhat Petitioner sold securities without a license in violation of the
Utah Uniform s~curities Act by selling n multi-level marketing opportu11ity and also
selling an inveslmenl opportunity involving the purchase of emeralds. The Commission

held that Petilior\er further violated the Securities Act in providing false malerial
information or omitting material informaLion about the securities to investors.
'lI,

l'etitionec filed a reriuest for agency review on June 9, 2014. On January

9, 20 l \ the executive Director issued her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
0

Order on Review ( 0rder on Review") affirming the Commission's Order. The
Executive Director>s Order on Review adopted the Commission's Findings ofFact as
concll~5ive and held that the Commission had noL en·oneously intcrpreLed or applied the
law. Order on Review, pp. 4-14. The Executive Director also upheld the fines assessed
hy the Commission, concluding thal the fines were within the scope of the Commission's
SH\tutory authority; lhal they were not grossly disproportionate to the gravity of

P,~t1tioner's conduct and vioJation of law, and thus, did not violate the Eighth
Amendment; ancl that Petitioner had not established that the fine amount was clearly
unreasnnabk·. Id. pp. 15-19.
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4.

The Order on Review rejected Petitioner's argument that the Division had

the burden of proof as to losses suffered by the investors, Mr. and Mrs. Persch, and that
the Division has a duly to establish the value of the emeralds now in the possession of the
Pcrsches for a potential offset or reduction in the fine assessed against Petitioner. The
Order on Review stated:
121. Pursuant to Utah Adm in. Code R 151-4-709( l ), the Division has the
burden of proof to establish a violation of the Securities Acl pursuant to its
Order to Show Cause. The Division met that burden. Nothing in the
appHcablt! laws or rules requires the Division to prove any offset for the
fines properly assessed by the Commission pursuant to statute. The
Division and the Commission are not assessing actual damages like in a
civil case and need nol engage in lhe analysis of actual value of the stones.
Given that the Division met the burden of proof to establish Petitioner's
violations of the Securities Act, it was not unreasonable for the
Commission to require Petitioner to establish the value of the stm1es. Had
Petitioner presented evidence of the actual value of the stones, the
Commission would have offset Lhe fines assessed. The Commission Order
stated that while a potential offset could be appropriate Petitioner has the
burden Lo cstabl ish the value of those stones.
Comm~ssjon Order, at 13.

5.

Finally, in discussing Petitioner's claims that the Commission faiJed to

consider the factors in Utah Admin. Code Section Rl64-31-1 in determining the amount
of the fine, the Order on Review stated as follows:
,26 .. , Subsection R 164-3 l-1 (1) sets forth numerous faclors that the
Commission "shall" consider in "determining the amount of an
administrative fine assessed against a person under the Utah Uniform
SecudHes Act.n A review of the Commission Order indicates that the
Commission acknowledges its authority to consider investor losses, which
is aulhorily given in Subsection RI 64-31-l(l)(b), 1 but the Order does not
reference the rule> nor does the Order address or discuss the other factors
in Sub~ection Rl 64-31- l (I). An agency's findings should be sufficiently
detniled and include enough subsidiary facl"s to disclose the steps by which
the ultimate conclusion on each factual is.sue was raised. Adams v. Bourd
of Neview of Indus. Comm 'n, 821 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1991 ) Utahns
for Beller Dental Health-Davis, Inc. v. Davis County Comm 'n, 2005 UT
1

·--·-· ·--~-----

1 There appeal' to be· a few t)'pogr~phical error:,: in the Order on Review with respect to Lhe Division rule;
the con eel citijiio:: is Subsection R 164-31-1 (A)( I).
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App. 347,117, 121 P.3d 39. Where a Division order fails to reveal a
logical analysis of the applicable law and the facts, Lhe appropdate remedy
is a remand to the Division for further proceedings. LaSaJ OiJ Co. v.
Department ofEnvll. Quality,843 P.2d 1045, 1049 (Utah Ct. App. 1992);
Adams, at 8.

,121.

Because the Commission Order does not include a discussion and
analysis of the factors in Subsection Rl64-31-1(1) that it found relevant in
assessing the total fine againsl Petitioner, this matter is remanded lo the
Commission solely for a more detailed Order that discusses the
CJmmission's (hvught process and analysis with respect to Subsection
Rl 64-31-1 (1) factors.
Order on Review, pp. 19-20.

6.

The Order on Review notified Petitioner of his right to file a petition for

judicial review with lhe Court of Appeals within 30 days of the Order on Review.

Petitioner did .f10l file a petition for judicial review lo challenge the Executive Director's
decision which affinned the Commission's Order (including the amount of the fines
a~sesscd and the holding that the Division did nol have a duly to prove the value of the
emeralds for any offset of the fines assessed} and remanded the matter only for a
di5cussion of lhe Commission's analvsis of the factors in Subsection Rl64-3 l-l (8)(1 ).

7.

On Februa,ry 4, 2015, the Commission issued its Amended Findings of

f.'act, Conclusions of Law, and Order ("Amended Order,,). TI1e Amended Order amended

par~graphs I8 :md 19 in the Conclusions of Law section of the original Order. The
changes are ,.f'-.~ked below:

,11 s. In assessing a fine, the Commission is al-f¼h&ri7.ed le co~~eer-t:he-&meUfl-t:-&t:"
ifl-VeS{-&~e,14le-GeiM'1~--t:i-l-ates--ilia-HJ:t~e
~:ngers ha1,•e-lest-a-t-&hl-l-0.f $] 15,000:----R-espfHiSall=-a-F~es-1-ha-H-l=te-omerolds
e1:1rrentl y irHhe-pessessre ~e--P-er-se-l~~0it1e-va.l ue nn<l ll~al, t'1ei:efefe.;
any-HAc is suoje&l i-o aH o ffsat-:cbargl!d under Ut~h AdminislJ•ative Code § R 1643 l :-1-(b){l) to consider the folJowing factors:

a. the. seriousness, natui:e, circumstances. exten1·, and persistence oflhe conduct
constituting lhe violation=.
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b. the ham, to other persons, including lhe amount of investor losses. resulting
either directly or tnc{.irectly from the violation;

c. any financial benefit. enrichment, commission. fee or other consideration
received directly or indireclly by the person in connection witl1 the violation;
d. cooperation by the person in any inguh:y conducted by the Division
con.ceming the vi.olation, efforts to prevent future occurrences of 1he
violation. and efforts to mitigate the harm caused hy the violation, including
any re-slitution poid or disgorg:emenl of ill~gotten gains lo persons injured by
the acts of the !Jerso1.~

e. the histo1y of previous violations by the person~
f.

the need to ,fr~ler the person or other ncrsons from commilling such
vioJations in the future

g. the costs incurred by the Division in investigating and prosecuting the
action~ and

h. SL:ch other matter~~~ justice may require.
In this case. Respondent developed very personal, trusting relationships with the
Persches and Re~1tlingers over time. On the basis of these relationships of trust
and t.u;·1tidence, and through repeated and persistent soli.~ltati<;m, Respondent
convinced the Persches and Reutlingcrs that he was fay.Qring them wilh an
~xclusivt: opportunity not otherwise available. This predatory behavior in t-akinu
advanlag1:: of persons with w..hom he had a close, personal relationship consti1ules
affinJ!y_ fraud by Respondent, which is a partjcularly serious and repellent form of
deceit and must be severelv sanctioned in order for the sanction lo act as a
deterrent. In addition. Respond.;:nl has not cooperated with the Division, cilher lo
locate James or in any other manner. In these circumstances, the total investor
losses of $315,000 directly caused by Respon<ltnt's actions are appropriately
included in the total fine amount. as are the Division's claimed investigative costs
Q,f $25,000. In aC~lwdancc with precedent. the Commission also finds iL
illfilLD..ru:iate to assess. as u ru;nalty for violations or the chap\cr, a fine crilculnted at
25% of the to Lai :nvestor losscs.'1

--··----·-·----4_:rhere is no evidence in lhe record th111 RCSl}9Jl4~131.rf:.£.£i.Y.~~--fil.1Y mcaningfi.1I financial benetil, enrichmenl.
~~mmi.,,~ion. fee or olhcr considcrnllon ((911;\Jb.~ transactions involving, the Persches and the fleutling,ers.
"o.c...iti!ic.i·c evicJenc-e tha< l~~§RQ!!t1.~n.UroL'i.hh;Jory of previous violations. If such evidence we1·e available
.L.he circ1m1~.li.••J~~!..m.i_gb_U;.P..nill!llto ac!dhjona) aggrav.atlng factors justifying an a"dditlonal penalty. Without
suc),evidcncc-'Jh2Comm ission finds ii appropriate to assess Respondent's line according. to C!>lnblished
preced~1.1Uor a first offense where the l'eS)"!Qtt..d..~DL!.:'t~~i.'l.~Q..U.ttl~_!Q.IJ.Q_f.i!!AOJ;ial_b.~.nefit from the
transactions at issue.
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~ 19.

8.

Respondent argues that the emeralds currently in the possession of the Persches
have some unspecified value and that, therefore, any fine is subject to an offset.
While an offset potentially might be appropriate. neither the Division nor lhe
Commission has the burde11 to investigate and calculate [it]a potential offset, if
~. The investors did not enter into the emerald deal in order to obtain
emeralds. Their 0bjective was to realize a financial profit from an investment. If
Respondent believes that the investors have been made whole other than
through a fin~11:cial (pref+t]return, [he]Respondenl has the burden to prove his
position, including the value of the emeralds to a reasonable certainty, with
comp~tent and admissible evidence. Here, Respondent has speculated to that
end, but has failed to provide admissible, credible evidence sufficient to
estabHsh any factual basis for offsetting the fine requested by the Division.
Respondenl merely speculates about potential value, but does not prove lhe
value, if any, of the alleged emeraJds.

On March 6, 2014, Petitioner filed a re.quest for agency review of the

Amended Order. The parties have submitted their respective memoranda.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
l.

The standards for agency review within the Department of Commerce

coJTesIJnnd to those established by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code

A.I-notated Section 630-4-403(4). Utah Admin. Code RlSl-4-905. The Executive
Director appqes the correction-of-error standard when reviewing the Commission's
interpr~tation of general questions of law, granting

M

deference to the Commission•s

decisions. Assflciated Gen. Contr. v. Bd. of Oil, Gas & Mining, 2001 UT 112,118, 38
P.Jd 29 l. Therefore: whelher the Commission correctly applied the instructions given in
the Order on Review is reviewed for correctness.

2.

Petitioner asks that the .'\mended Order be reversed. He argues that the

Commission wrongfully assessed the $4 l 3) 750.00 fine againsl him without providing the
necessar~· analysis of thl' f:~~lors supporting the fine under Subsection R 164-3 1-1 (B)( I),
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and it is only t~ow with the Commission's "posr hoc rationalizations" and analysis in the
Amended Order that the Executive Direclor can make an accurate determination

regarding the reasonableness of the fine. Petitioner's Motion and Memorandum in
Supporl of Agency Review (' 1Memorandum in Support»')~ pp. 2-3. Petitioner relies on
case law including State v. Hansen, 857 P.2d 978, 982 n. 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) for the

proposition that a remand for detailed findings of fact is not intended to be a mere
"holstering" of the trial cot1rt 1 s pr<.'.vious decision. Memorandum in Support, pp. 3-4.
Petitioner incorporates by ·reference the arguments made in his prior request for agency

review filed on June 9~ 2014. id.
J.

The Executive Dirc.ctor has already ruled on all the issues raised by

Prtiuoner in the Order on Review issued on January 9, 2015. The Executive Director
e:r.plici.LJy stated that the remand was for the very narrow purpose of articulating the
Commission's thought process under Subsection R 164-31-1 (B)( I). If Petitioner believed
that the Executive Director's ruling was improper under any legal theory: his remedy was
to request reconsideration or seek judicial review. By remaining silent while the

Commission acted on the Executive Director's specific instructions, Petitioner waived
any objection he might have made as to those instructions.

4.

Petitioner argues that the Amended OrdeJ' improperly shifted the burden of

proof to Petitioner regarding any potential offset of the fines assessed. Id., p. 3. This
issue was fully c1ddressed in the Order on Review, and the matter was remanded to the
Commission solely for a written discussion of the Subsection R 164~3 l-1 (B)(l) factors
considered by the Commission. The Amended Order revised ,Il 8 in the Conclusions of
Law hy reorganizing the discussion of lhe value of the emeralds artd any offset as to fines
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a~sessed to a nt'.wly numbered 119 and adding the Commission ls discussion of
Subsection R l 64-31-1 (B )( 1) factors lo 118. The newly numbered 119 has minor changes
from the original Commission Order when discussing the value of the emeralds and an

offset of the fine amount. As the Order on Review remanded the matter for the limited
purpose of a di:-icussion of Subsection R 164-31-1 (B)( 1) factors, any alterations from the

original Commission Order as to the value of the emeralds and an offset of the assessed
fines, beyond organizing the discussion into the new ~19. are hereby stricken. The

Commission shall therefore issue a corrected Amended Order as indicated herein.

s.

The Order on Review concluded that the fines assessed by the

Commission were within the scope of the Commission ~s statutory authority! that they
Wt:re no1 grossly dispropo1tionate to the gravity of the offense so as lo violale the Eighth

Ame.ndment, anrl that Pe:titioner had not prove11 that the total fine amount was clearly

unr?a:-:onabh•. in l1ght of the Comrnissjon~ s statutory grant of discretion. Order on
Review. pp. IS• i 9. The record was clear lhat the Commission considered Subsection

R164-3 1-1 (D )(I) in setting the amount of the fine. The parties brought the factors to the
Commission's attention on severaJ occasions at the hearing. 3 The Commission Order
stated rhat the Commission was authorjzed to consider investor losses,4 a factor provided
for in Subsection Rl64-3 l-l(B)(1). [n addition, in other parts of the Commission Order,
other ~\tbscction RI 64-31-1 (B )(I) factors such as the nature, circumstances and
scriou~nes~ of the violations were mer,Honed as were the costs of the investigation. s

----·- - · - - - - 3

Fo, e.<amplc, in <;!osings argt•ments, counstl for both parties fully discussed the factors in Section Rl64l 1-l(B)l ').1 rJnscripl, 424:24-25, 425.1-i:,; 448:\3~25; 449:)-6.
4
Commiss,on Ordc,, 118.
1
Co1;1m i:,sion 01 der, pp. 2-13.
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6.

The Bxecutive Director has reviewed numerous cases from the

Commission and lhe Division; she has knowledge of the Commission's statutory
aulhority and is aware of the precedent with respect to establishing fines for violations of
the Utah Unifonn Securities Act. The Executive Director was therefore able to conduct a
meaningful review in light of the Commission's stated findings, its implied findings,6 and
the Executive Director's own knowledge, See Utah Code Ann. §630-4-206(1 )(b)(iv)
(providing that a presiding officer may take official notice of any facts ·within the
agency's specialized knowledge). However, where the Utah Court of Appeals would not
ha ,,e the same knowledge of the age11cy's precedent, the Executive Director required the

Commission to state rather than imply its analysis of the rule factors in order to facilitate
judicial review.
7.

The Executive Director does not consider the Amended Order, with its

discussion of the factors in Subsection R164-31-1 to be impennissible bolstering, but
simply an articulation of the Commission's decision. Therefore, the Amended Order is
hereby affirmed with the modification indicated herein, removal of any changes from the
ol'iginal Commission Order in the newly numbered Conclusion of Law 119 regarding the
value of the emeralds.
8.

As a final matter, in r.onducting this second agency review, the Executive

Director notes an error in Conclusion of Law paragraph 16, p. 13 of the original Order on
Review. The second to lhe last sentence of that paragraph does not make mathematical

'See Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-4-403(4)(g) (providing that relief may be granted only lfa petitioner has been
prejudiced by agency aclion based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency.) See al.to,
Aa'ams ,,. Board of /le,,iew of/ndu~·trial Comm'n, 821 P.2d I, S (Utah Ct App. 1991)(holding that
nnding., may be implied).

UT. Div of Securities
Jack Philllps Case SD-12·0001
001340

9

ADDENDUM 84

sense:
1

Finally, even if it were held that the Commission s authority to issue fines
for violations of the Securities Act is limited to $10,000.00 per violation,
the Commission•s Order with its fine of $78,750.00 for four violations of
the Act would meet such a limit.
Order on Review, p. 13. This error needs to be noted should this matter be appealed.
However, where the quoted language is dicta, it does not affect or change the conclusion
reached by the Executive Director in the first part of paragraph 16 that based on a
statutory interpretation, the $10,000.00 limit in Utah Code. Ann. §61-1-20(2) for civil
actions does not apply to this administrative action by the Commission.
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ORDER ON REVIEW
T:1e Commission's Amended Order is affirmed with the modification that the text
of the new ,19 in the Conclusions of Law section revert to the exact language used in the
original Commission Order when discussing the value of the emeralds.

NOTICE OF RIG HT TO APPEAL

Judicial Review of this Order may be obtained by filing a Petition for Review
with the Court. of Appeals within 30 days after the issuance of this Order. Any Petition

for R<.:\ iew m1,;st comply with the requirements of Sections 630-4-401 and 63G-4-403,
1

Utah Code ·\nnotated. ln the alternative, but not required in order to exhaust
administru:ivc remedies, reconsideration may be requested pursuant to Bnurgeous v.
Departrrm:/ of Commerce, et al., 981 P.2d 414 (Utah App. 1999) within 20 days after the

dat:! of this Order pursuant to Section 6JG .. 4-302.
~

DatcJ this

5 - of June, 2015.

~~~ Qj~
Francine A. Giani, E;(cutivO~
Utah Department of Commerce
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· CERTlFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the C:,iV\ day of June 1 2015, the undersigned mailed a true and
c.c,rrect copy of the foregoing Second Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order on
Review by first class and certified mail to:

MARK W f)UGSLEY ESQ
MARIA E HECKEL
I~\ Y QUMNEY & NEBEKER PC
36 SOUTH STATE STREET 14"' FL
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84145-0385
and caused ~ ::r,py to be electronically mailed to:
Keith Woodwell. Director (kwoodwell@utah.gov)
Division of Se:wities

160 E£1st 300 South
Salt Like City, UT 84111

Tom Melton, Assistant Attorney General (tmelton@utah.gov)
Office of the Attorney General
B()X 140872
SAlt Lake City, UT 84114-0872
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§ 61-1-20. Enforcement, UT ST§ 61-1-20

·•··•··········-·---·-··--··----·-·-·------

!West's Utah Code Annotated
!Title 61. Securities Division-Real Estate Division
IChanter 1. Utah Uniform Securities Act (Refs & Annos)
U.C.A. 1953 § 61-1-20
§ 61-1-20.

Enforcement

Currentness

(I) Whenever it appears to the director that a person has engaged, is engaging, or is about to engage in an act or practice
constituting a violation of this chapter or a rule or order under this chapter, in addition to specific powers granted in this
chapter:
·
·

(a) the director may issue an order directing the person to appear before the commission and show cause why an order
should not be issued directing the person to cease and desist from engaging in the act or practice, or doing an act in
furtherance of the activity;

(b) the order to show cause shall state the reasons for the order and the date of the hearing;

(c) the director shall promptly serve a copy of the order to show cause upon a person named in the order;

(d) the commission shall hold a hearing on the order to show cause no sooner than 10 business days after the order is
issued;

(e) after a hearing, the commission may issue an order to cease and desist from engaging in an act or practice constituting a
violation of this chapter or a rule or order under this chapter;

(f) the commission may impose a fine;

(g) the commission may bar or suspend that person from associating with a licensed broker•dealer or investment adviser in
this state; and

(h) the commission may impose a combination of sanctions in Subsections (l)(e) through (g).
/.:,,.,,,1..:":•,Next -i) 201 !'> Tl1or11siun F~eulers. No dc1im to ori9in.Jf U S. Government Wr.xks.
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§ 61-1-20. Enforcement, UT ST§ 61-1-20

-----

______,. .. .,._........

---..

-•-•.--••-'•--"'"

---•-.-,...........................---·-----.

'..., ...

·-···- _.. ~-·- ... •----·-·- ...... --•- ... -~-·----•---.. -.... -....----··•-------···--· ----.. . .

(2)(a) The director may bring an action in the appropriate district court of this state or the appropriate court of another state to
enjoin an act or practice and to enforce compliance with this chapter or a rule or order under this chapter.

(b) Upon a proper showing in an action brought under this section, the court may:

(i) issue a permanent or temporary, prohibitory or mandatory injunction;

(ii) issue a restraining order or writ of mandamus;

(iii) enter a declaratory judgment;

(iv) appoint a receiver or conservator for the defendant or the defendant's assets;

(v) order disgorgement;

(vi) order rescission;

(vii) order restitution;

(viii) impose a fine of not more than $10,000 for each violation of the chapter; and

(ix) enter any other relief the court considers just.

(c) The court may not require the division to post a bond in an action brought under this Subsection (2).

(3) An order issued under Subsection (I) shall be accompanied by written findings of fact and conclusions of law.

- - -

• - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - • • -••--•-•-•••

-•-

". • - -

· • • • • • - • - • - • - - • •••••••
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§ 61-1-20. Enforcement, UT ST§ 61-1-20

···----------·-.. ----·---------------·-------------------(4) When determining the severity of a sanction to be imposed under this section, the commission or court shall consider

whether:

(a) the person against whom the sanction is to be imposed exercised undue influence; or

(b) the person against whom the sanction is imposed under this section knows or should know that an investor in the
investment that is the grounds for the sanction is a vulnerable adult.

Credits
Laws 1963, c. 145, § I; Laws 1983, c. 284, § 29; Laws 1986, c. 107, § I; Laws 1990, c. 133, § 13; Laws 1994, c. 12, § 70;
Laws 2009, c. 351, § 19, eff. May l2, 2009; Laws 2011, c. 319, § 3, eff. May 10, 2011.
Notes of Decisions (4)

U.C.A. 1953 § 61-1-20, UT ST§ 61-1-20
Current through 2015 General Session.
End of flocumcnt

C 2015111oms.111 R1:11ters. No claim 10 original U.S. Oovcmmcnt Works.

',\'f:~~tl.a•.vNexr © 2015 Thornsc;1n Rellters. Mo clc1i111 to original U.S. Government Works.
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§ 61-1-21.1. Limitation of prosecutions, UT ST§ 61-1-21.1

---··-------··------------------------~-------·-·--··-........ _

IWest's Utah Code Annotated
!Title 61. Securities Division--Real Estate Division
IChapter 1. Utah Uniform Securities Act fRefs & Annas)
U.C.A. 1953 § 61-1-21.1
§ 61-1-21.1.

Limitation of prosecutions
Currentness

(I) No indictment or information may be returned or civil complaint filed under this chapter more than five years after the

alleged violation.

(2) As to causes of action arising from violations of this chapter, the limitation of prosecutions provided in this section
supersedes the limitation of actions provided in Section 76-1-302 and Title 78B, Chapter 2, Statutes of Limitations.

Credits
Laws 1991, c. 161, § 13; Laws 1992, c. 216, § 5; Laws 2008, c. 3, § 134, etT. Feb. 7, 2008.
Notes of Decisions (1)
,;Ji,

'W

U.C.A. 1953 § 61-1-21.1, UT ST§ 61-1-21. I
Current through 201 S General Session.
End of D11cu111ent

,i;; 2015

Thol1\S(ln Reuters. Nu claim tu original ll.S. Government W<•rks.

\/V?.stlai,vNexr © 2015 Thomson R<:l1ters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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STATE v. BUSHMAN

Utah

Clte111231 P.3d 833 (UtahApp. 2010)

that whether a postjudgment motion is required to preserve these claims of error is
dependent on the trial court's opportunity to
address the issue at the time of decision.
See In re KF., 2009 UT 41 ~1161-62, 201
P.3d 985 ("A challenge to the adequacy of
the court's findings is notably different from
a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence. . . . It would be superfluous to demand that a party challenge the evidentiary
support for a court's findings shortly after
the court articulates them. But it is quite a
different matter and wholly necessary for a
party to challenge and thus afford the tiial
court 'an opportunity to cmTect the alleged
error' of inadequately detailed findings in
order to provide for meaningful appellate
review of the court's decision. . . . A tlial
court judge has the opportunity to address
the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the findings in his or her judgment. But a
tiial judge docs not have the chance to address the adequacy of the findings themselves, unless that issue is brought before
him or her."). As I have discussed above,
the trial cow-t had the opportunity to-and
did-address the notice issue as it was rendering its decision. See supra 11 33. Therefore, even under the autholity cited by the
concurring opinion, the instant case would
be one in which no post.judgment motion
was required to preserve the issue for appeal.
11 38 In sum, I do not think that D.B. was
required to raise an objection in order to
preserve the error for appeal where (1) the
error did not arise at trial, (2) requiring an
objection as the decision was announced is
not suppol'ted by the preservation rule or the
pw·poses behind it, and (3) no post.judgment
motion is necessary to preserve the issue for
appeal. I would therefore directly address
the issue D.B. raises on appeal. And considering the evidence and argument from tiial,
as properly set forth above, I do not think
that D.B. was given adequate notice that the
State was pursing a finding of guilt under an
accomplice liability theory. 12 I would therefore reverse the determination of the tiial
12, Cndced, I am not convinced that the State
itself was aware that accomplice liability was at
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court that D.B. committed these charges of
theft and criminal trespass.

20!0 UT App 120

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.
Harold Earl BUSHMAN, Defendant
and Appellant.

No. 20080979-CA.
Cow-t of Appeals of Utah.

May 6, 2010.
Background: Defendant entered conditional guilty plea in the Fourth District
Court, Provo Department, Samuel D.
McVey, J., to one count of securities fraud
and six counts of attempted securities
fraud. Defendant appealed.
Holding: The Cow-t of Appeals, Thorne,
J., held that administrative fine was not
criminal punishment of the sort that could
trigger double jeopardy protections and
preclude subsequent criminal punishment.
Affirmed.
Orme, J., concw·rcd in the result and issued
opinion.
1. Criminal Law ~1134.70

A trial cow·t's decision to grant or deny
a motion to dismiss criminal charge presents
a question of law that is reviewed for correctness.
2. Double Jeopardy €;:::)25
Stipulation and Consent Order, under
which Division of Securities ordered defendant to repay clients who were harmed by
defendant's financial dealings and pay an administi·ative fine in the amount of $2,500, did
not constitute ctiminal punishment and thus
issue.
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did not trigger double jeopardy protections
as to preclude future ciiminal prosecution
and punishment fol' the same acts that gave
rise to the administa'!ltive action; fine, as
authorized by Uniform Securities Act, was
presumptively civil in legislative purpose and
intent, and the statutol'y scheme was not so
punitive, either in pm-pose 0l' effect, as to
transfonn what was clearly intended as a
civil remedy into a criminal penalty.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5; West's U.C.A.
§ 61-1-1 et seq.
3. Double Jeopardy e=,5,1
The 1ight of protect.ion against double
jeopardy pl'otects only against the imposition
of multiple ciiminal punishments for the
same offense, and then only when such occurs in successive pl'oceedings. U.S.C.A.
ConsLAmend. 5.

4. Double Jeopardy e=i1
The constitutional gua1·antee against
double jeopardy affo1,:ls a ctiminal defendant
three separate protections by prohibiting: (1)
a second prosecution for the same offense
after acquittal; (2) a second pl'osecution for
the same offense after conviction; and (3)
multiple ci·iminal punishments fol' the same
offense. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.

effect, as to transform the civil 1·emedy into a
ciiminal penalty in mannet· as to t.rigge1·
double jeopardy protections and p1•eclude additional criminal punishment, couits considet·
the following: (1) whether civil sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint;
(2) whether it has historically been reg111,:led
as punishment; (3) whether it comes into play
only on finding of sciente1·; (4) whether its
operation will promote traditional aims of
punishment-retlibution and dete1T1mee; (5)
whether behavior to which it applies is already a crime; (6) whether an alternative
purpose to which it may rationally be connected ls assignable for it; and (7) whether it
appears excessive in relation to alternative
purpose assigned. U.S.C.A. ConsLAmend. 6.
Margaret P. Lindsay and Douglas J.
Thompson, Spanish Fo1·k, fo1· Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Atty. Gen., and Jeanne
B. Inouye, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City,
for Appellee.
Before Judges ORME, THORNE, and

BENCH.1
OPINION
THORNE, Judge:

5. Double Jeopardy e=i23, 25
When determining whether a p111ticubu·
prior punishment ls criminal 01· civil, for pui•poses of detel'mining whethel' double jeopal'•
dy protections are implicated, a cou1t fu'St
must ask whether the legislatu1·e, in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated
eithel' expt'eBSly or impliedly a prefei-ence fol'
one label 01· the othe1·; then, even in those
eases whei-e the legislature has indicated an
intention to establish a civil penalty, a court
must also examine whethe1· the statutory
scheme was so punitive either in pul'pose or
effect as to transform what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a ciiminal
penalty. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6.

'ii 1 H111-old E111·l Bushman appeals fi:om his
convictions on one count of seCU1ities fraud, a
third degi-ee felony, see Utah Code Ann.
§§ 61-1-1,-21 (2006 & Supp.2009), and six
counts of attempt.ad secmities fraud, each a
class A misdemeanor, see id.i Utah Code
Ann. §§ 76-4-101 to-102 (2008). Bushman
entei-ed a conditional guilty plea to these
coW1ts, see generaJJ:y State v. Sery, 768 P .2d
986, 989 (Utah Ct.App.1988), preserving his
right to appeal the distiict court's denial of
his motion to dismiss all charges against him
on double jeopai•dy grounds. We affirm.

6. Double Jeopardy e=i25
When detei,nining whether civil penalties are so punitive, either in pm-pose or

112 On September 10, 2007, the State
ch111·ged Bushman with twelve criminal
counts mising fl'Om a seiies of financial

1. The Honorable Russell W.

Bench, Senior
Judge, sal by special assignment pursuant to
Utah Code section 78A-3-103(2) (2008) and rule

BACKGROUND

I 1-201(6) of lhe Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice.
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transactions in which he had been involved.
On July 301 20081 Bushman filed a motion to
dismiss, arguing that the criminal prosecution against him violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, see U.S. Const.
amend. V. Bushman's motion argued that he
had already been punished for the acts alleged in the information when he entered
into a Stipulation and Consent Order (the
Consent Order) with the Utah Division of
Secuiities (the Division) to resolve an investigation conducted by the Division regarding
those same acts.
'ii 3 The Consent Order, entered July 3,
2007, contained extensive investigative findings cataloguing Bushman's financial activities. The Consent Order concluded that
Bushman's actions constituted willful violations of the Utah Uniform Secuiities Act (the
Act), see Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1 to-25
(2006 & Supp.2009), and required Bushman
to cease and desist from any fw·ther violations of the Act. Finally, the Consent Order
required Bushman to pay a fine. The Consent Order also stated that it did not protect
Bushman from potential civil liability to third
parties nor did it "affect any c1iminal cause
of action that a prosecutor might b1ing...
,i 4 The fine imposed by the Consent Order
was structured to encourage Bushman to
promptly compensate his victims for their
losses and to obey the Division's cease and
desist order. The Consent Order stated,
Harold Earl Bushman [shall] pay a fine of
nineteen thousand three hundred dollars
($19,300) to the Division by Monday, October 1, 20071 reduced dollar for dollar for
any money paid to the victims by July 15,
2007. The total owed to the victims is
$14,300. If Bushman pays the victims in
full by July 16, 2007, the Division will
waive half of the remaining fine of $5,000,
leaving $2,600 due by October 1, 2007. If
at any time the Division discovers that
Bushman acted in violation of Utah securities laws, the waived portion of the fine
would be due to the Division within one
month of the date on which the Division
gives Bushman wiitten notice. If Bushman fails to pay the victims in full by July
15, 2007, the entire amount of the fine

(minus any amounts actually paid to the
victims) will be due to the Division by
October 1, 2007.
Bushman repaid his victims in full within the
time frame contemplated in the Consent Order and also timely paid the remaining $2500
of the fine to the Division.
'1 5 Bushman's motion to dismiss the criminal charges against him argued that the Consent Order constituted a criminal punishment
for his violations of the Act and that the
subsequent criminal prosecution was therefore barred as placing him in double jeopardy. The district court denied Bushman's
motion, ruling that the Consent Order imposed an administrative sanction rather than
a punitive one and that Bushman had therefore not been placed in c1iminal jeopardy by
the Consent Order. Bushman subsequently
entered a conditional plea of guilty to reduced charges and now appeals the district
court's ruling on his motion to dismiss.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
[l] ,i 6 Bushman's sole argument on appeal is that the dist.J.ict cow-t erred in denying his motion to dismiss on double jeopardy
grounds. u 'A trial court's decision to grant
or deny a motion to dismiss presents a question of law, which we review for correctness."' State v. Bernert, 2004 UT App 321,
,i 61 100 P.3d 221 (quoting State v. Horrocks,
2001 UT App 4, ,i 10, 17 P.3d 1145).

ANALYSIS
[2] ,i 7 Bushman's appeal presents the
issue of whether an administrative fine under
the Act, such as that imposed in the Consent
Order, triggers the Double Jeopardy Clause
so as to preclude future criminal prosecution
for the same acts giving rise to the administrative action. We agree with the distiict
court that such a fine does not constitute
p1ior criminal punishment such as to implicate double jeopardy and, accordingly, we
affirm Bushman's convictions.
[3, 4) 118 The Double Jeopardy Clause
provides that no "person [shall] be subject
for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const. amend.
V. In Iludson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93,
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118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997), the
Supreme Court stated that it has "long recognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause
does not prohibit the imposition of ail additional sanctions that could, in common parlance, be described as punishment." / d. at
98-99, 118 S.Ct. 488 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Rather, 11[t]he Clause protects only against the imposition of multiple
criminal punishments for the same offense,
and then only when such occw·s in successive
proceedings." Id. Thus, "[t]he constitutional
guarantee against double jeopardy affords a
ciiminal defendant three separate protections by prohibiting: (1) a second prosecution
for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a
second prosecution for the same offense after
conviction; and (3) multiple [c1iminal] punLc;hments for the same offense." Staie v.
Trafny, 799 P.2d 704, 709 (Utah 1990).

ture intended administrative sanctions uncle1·
the Act to be criminal or civil in natw·e.
Hudson held that certain sanctions-fines
and occupational debarment-imposed by
federal banking regulators pw·suant to federal statutes were intended to be civil sanctions. See id. at 103, 118 S.Ct. 488. The
Court reasoned that "[w]hile the provision
authorizing debarment contains no language
explicitly denominating the sanction as civil,"
see id., it is "significant that the authoiity to
issue debarment orders is confei,·ed upon the
approp1iate Federal banking agenc[ies]," see
id. (alteration in oliginal) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The Cow·t stated, "That
such authority was confe1Ted upon administrative agencies is prima facie evidence that
Congress intended to provide for a civil sanction.'' IcL2

(5) 119 Bushman argues that the' Consent
Order constitutes criminal punishment such
that any subsequent criminal conviction and
penalty would present "multiple punishments
for the same offense," see id. Hudson, the
Supreme Court's most recent decision on the
subject, focused on the double jeopardy implications of administrative sanctions and
outlined a two-step test for determining
"[w]hether a particular [prior] punishment is
ciirninal or civil." 522 U.S. at 99, 118 S.Ct.
488. First, a court must "ask whether the
legislatw·e, 1in establishing the penalizing
mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the
other.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Ward,
448 U.S. 242, 248, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 65 L.Ed.2d
742 (1980)). Then, "[e]ven in those cases
where the legislatw·e has indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty," id., a cow-t
must also examine uwhether the statutory
scheme was so punitive either in pw-pose or
effect as to transfor[m] what was clearly
intended as a civil remedy into a criminal
penalty," id. (alteration in otiginal) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).

V11 AB with the debarment sanction in
Hudson, the fine contained in the Consent

I. Legislative Intent
,r 10 The first prong of the Hudson test
requires us to determine whether the legisla2. The Hudson court limited this line of reasoning

the debarment order because the fines at issue
were expressly labeled as civil in the enabling

lo

Order was imposed pw·suant to the Act's
conferral of autho1ity upon the Division, an
administrative agency. Accordingly, such
fines and other sanctions imposed by the
Division under the Act are presumptively
civil in pw-pose and intent. See id. Bushman's only real argument for criminal legislative intent is the fact that the Act authorizes
both administrative and c1iminal sanctions.
See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-20 (Supp.2009)
(authorizing agency enforcement of secuiities
regulations); id. § 61-1-21 (authorizing
ciiminal enforcement of securities regulations). However, the fact that the administrative and ci·iminal sanctions are autho1ized
by two separate sections of the Act suggests
to us that the administrative sanctions are
not intended to be ciiminal in natw·e. See
generaJ,ly State v. Kirby, 2003-NMCA-074,
ml 25-26, 183 N.M. 782, 70 P.3d 772 (11 0f the
fifty-seven sections in [New Mexico,s Secmities] Act, only one section specifies c1iminal
conduct .... We determine that, as opposed
to [the section] that provides for ciiminal
penalties, the legislative pm-pose in enacting
the civil penalty was that the penalty constitute an integral part of an overall remedial
statutes. See llud.so11 v. United States, 522 U.S.
93, 103, 118 S.Cl. 488, I 39 L.Ed.2d 450 ( I 997).
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regulatory and administrative scheme to protect the public.").
4iJ 12 Bushman has failed to overcome the
presumption that the legislature intended the
Act's administrative sanctions to be civil in
nature when it authorized the Division, an
agency, to administer them. See generally
Hudson, 522 U.S. at 103, 118 S.Ct. 488. We
therefore hold that the legislature intended
that administrative sanctions under the Act,
such as those imposed by the Consent Order,
be deemed civil in nature.

II. Purpose or Effect
~ 13 Having determined that the legislature intended administrative sanctions under
the Act to be civil, we next tum to the
question of "whether the statutory scheme
was so punitive either in purpose or effect as
to transfor[m] what was clearly intended as a
civil remedy into a criminal penalty." H1uison v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99, 118
S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 {1997) (alteration
in original) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). In making this determination, the Hudson Court described the factors
enumerated in Kennedy v. Mendozar-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9
L.Ed.2d 644 (1963), as "useful guideposts."
See Hwblon, 522 U.S. at 99, 118 S.Ct. 488.

[6] 1114 The Kennedy factors include
(1) "[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint"; (2)
"whether it has historically been regarded
as a punishment"; (3) "whether it comes
into play only on a finding of scienter"; (4)
"whether its operation will promote the
traditional aims of punishment-retiibution
and deterrence"; (5) "whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime";
(6) "whether an alternative purpose to
which it may rationally be connected is
assignable for it"; and (7) "whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned."

Id. at 99-100, 118 S.Ct. 488 (alteration in
original) (quoting Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 16869), 83 S.Ct. 554. "[T]hese factors must be
considered in relation to the statute on its
face," id. at 100, 118 S.Ct. 488 (internal quotation marks omitted), and "only the clearest
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proof will suffice to override legislative intent
and transform what has been denominated a
civil remedy into a ciiminal penalty," id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
1115 Addressing the seven Kennedy factors
in order, we first conclude that the Act does
not allow the administrative imposition of an
affirmative disability or restraint. The sanctions that the Division can impose under the
Act-cease and desist orders, monetary
fines, and bars against association with licensees under the Act, see Utah Code Ann.
§ 61-1-20(1)-do not constitute affirmative
disabilities or restraints for purposes of Kennedy. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 104, 118
S.Ct. 488 (providing that a monetary fine
coupled with an indefinite ban on working in
the banking industry did not constitute an
"affirmative disability or restraint" because
the sanctions did not "approach[ ] the infamous punishment of imprisonment" (internal
quotation marks omitted)). We also note
that civil penalties under the Act do "not
carry the stigma of a ciiminal conviction."
See State v. Kirby, 2003-NMCA-074, 11 30,
133 N.M. 782, 70 P.3d 772.
CJ 16 Second, neither monetary fines nor
the other administrative sanctions that may
be imposed under the Act have historically
been regarded as punishment. See Hudson,
622 U.S. at 104, 118 S.Ct. 488 ("[N]either
money penalties nor debarment has historically been viewed as punishment."); United
States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 256, 100 S.Ct.
2636, 66 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) ("[M]onetary assessments are
traditionally a form of civil remedy.").

1117 Third, administrative sanctions under
the Act do not require a finding of scienter
or other mental state. Utah Code section
61-1-20 allows for the imposition of administrative sanctions "[w Jhenever it appears to
the director [of the Division] that a person
has engaged, is engaging, or is about to
engage in an act or practice constituting a
violation of this chapter or a rule or order
under this chapter," without regard to the
violator's mental state. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 61-1-20. By contrast, Utah Code section
61-1-21 allows for criminal penalties for secu1ities violations only for actions that are
willful or knowing. See id. § 61-1-21.
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1118 Fourth, we determine that the Act's
administrative sanctions-fines, in particular-do incidentally promote 1·etJ.ibution and
deterrence, both of which are traditional
aims of punishment. However, such sanctions are "plainly part of the [Division's] arsenal for regulation of persons dealing in the
sale of secmities to the public, and speak[ J
as much, if not more, to that regulatory
challenge than to a sole need to punish."
Kirby, 2003-NMCA-074, 1134. As such, we
determine that "while the civil penalty may
by its nature have effects of deterrence and
punishment, those effects are incidental to
and do not oveii.ide the Act's and the civil
penalty's primarily remedial pm-pose." Id.
11 19 Fifth, the actions for which the Act
imposes administJ.•ative sanctions-violations
of Utah securities laws-do not constitute
criminal behavior under the Act unless undertaken with the appropriate mental state.
See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (imposing
c1iminal penalties only for willful or knowing
acts). Thus, only some of the "behavior to
which [the Division's civil authority] applies
is already a crime" under the Act, and we do
not deem this factor to cut in favor of a
criminal pm-pose or effect. See Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 872 U.S. 144, 168, 88
S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963). But see
Kirby, 2003-NMCA-074, ~ 35 (holding fifth
Kennedy factor satisfied, despite differing
scienter requirements, where "it is clear that
the conduct upon which the civil penalty was
based also formed the basis of Defendant's
indictment").
1120 Sixth, we determine that there are
alternative, nonpunitive pm-poses to which
the Act's administrative sanctions may be
rationally connected. Certainly, the structured fine contained in the Consent Order,
see supra 11 4, was intended to encourage
Bushman's prompt restitution of his victims,
a purpose that is clearly nonpunitive. Although a small portion of the overall fme did
not go towards restitution,3 securities regulations such as the Act also "regulate a lawful
3,

Bushman, citing Slate v. Mendoza, 938 P.2d
303 (Utah CLApp.1997), argues thal the portion
or the fine not going toward resliLution must be
justified by some nonpunitive reason such as
covering the cost or the administrative investiga•
tion. However, we no longer view Mendoza as

and important financial industJ.-y so that investors are not deceived or swindled through
acts and practices ow· Legislature believes to
be wrongful and harmful to society." State
v. Kirby, 2008-NMCA-074, ~ 36, 138 N.M.
782, 70 P.3d 772; see also Seciirities & Exch.
Comm'n v. Palmisano, 135 F.3d 860,866 (2d
Cfr.1998) ("[T]he deterrence of secmities
fraud serves other important nonpunitive
goals, such as encom·aging investor confidence, increasing the efficiency of financial
markets, and promoting the stability of the
secmities industJ.-y."). Additionally, fines imposed by the Division go into a fund fo1·
investor education and training, fmi:her supporting the nonpunitive nature of such fines.
See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-18.7 (Supp.
2009); cf. Ki?'by, 2003-NMCA-074, ~ 36
("The Legislatm·e has added substance to the
remedial purposes of the Act by earmarking
the civil penalty funds for public education
and training on securities matters."). For
these reasons, we determine that the Act's
administJ.·ative sanctions may be rationally
connected to purposes other than punishment.
1121 Finally, the administrative sanctions
do not appear excessive in relation to the
alternative purposes we have identified. As
stated by the New Mexico Comt of Appeals
in discussing that state's version of the Act,
The Secwities Act regulates lawful and
often complex transactions in which New
Mexico citizens engage for their financial
secmity. Fraudulent practices in secwities transactions required the United
States Congress as well as states to pass
comprehensive regulato1-y and administrative remedial legislation. The Secutities
Act's p1imai-y pm-pose is remedial, heavily
01iented toward asswing that members of
t11e public are not swindled through deceptive practices. The civil penalty is attached to an important pait of the remedial aspect of the Securities Act. In any
measurement, it is not a sanction that is
out of proportion or excessive when considcontrolling authority in light of its reliance on
the double jeopardy analysis contained in United
Stales v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.CL 1892,
104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989), which was substantially
overruled by 1/udson. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at
96, 118 S.Ct. 488.
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ering the obvious legislative view that an
essential, if not the most effective, way to
prevent and remedy deceptive practices is
through a comprehensive regulatory and
administrative legislative scheme.
Kirby, 2003-NMCA--074, ~ 37. We agree
and determine that Utah's Act is similarly
not excessive in relation to its beneficial and
remedial purpose.~

11 22 In sum, the only Kennedy factor that
could minimally suggest that administrative
sanctions under the Act should be deemed
criminal punishment is the fact that, in some
cases, civil sanctions could be imposed for
behavior that also constitutes a crime under
the Act. See supra ti 19. However, this one
factor alone is not enough to override the
legislature's intent to make the Act's administrative sanctions civil in natw·e. See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 105, 118
S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997) C'[T]he
conduct for which OCC sanctions are imposed may also be criminal (and in this case
formed the basis for petitioners' indictments). This fact is insufficient to render
the money penalties and debarment sanctions criminally punitive, particularly in the
double jeopardy context." (citations omit,..
ted)); see ~o United States v. Di.wn, 509
U.S. 688, 704, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d
556 (1993) (rejecting "same-conduct" test for
double jeopardy purposes). Thus, we hold
that administrative sanctions for violations of
the Act are civil in nature and that the
Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude
subsequent criminal prosecutions under the
Act ru.ising from the same underlying facts.
~ 23 In light of our holding, the district
court's order denying Bushman's motion to
dismiss is correct. The Consent Order does
not constitute a criminal punishment and
therefore does not implicate the Double
,Jeopardy Clause, Accordingly 1 the State
was not barred from seeking and obtaining
subsequent c1iminal convictions against
Bushman for his violations of the Act.

4. We note that the fines that the Division could
impose and judicially enforce were limited lo
$500 for each violation or the Act al the time of
the entry of the Consent Order, see Utah Code
Ann. § 61-l-20(2)(h}(vli) (2006), and are now
limited to $10,000 per violation, sec id. § 61-120(2)(b)(viii) (Supp.2009). We express no opin-

CONCLUSION
'124 We conclude that Bushman's criminal
convictions are not barred by double jeopardy because the fine imposed by the Consent
Order is a civil penalty and not criminal
punishment for pm-poses of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Accordingly, the district court
properly denied Bushman's motion to dismiss, and we affirm Bushman's convictions.
,i 25 I CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH,
Senior Judge.

ORME, Judge (concurring in the result):

1126 I concur in this court's judgment affirming the district court's denial of Bushman's motion to dismiss all chru.·ges against
him on double jeopardy grounds. But I do
not see any need to discuss at length the
intricacies of double jeopardy jurisprudence.
In my view, Bushman waived any claim he
might otherwise have under the Double
Jeopardy Clause when he voluntarily entered
into the Consent Order and specifically
agreed that the Consent Order was no bru.· to
"any ciiminal cause of action that a prosecutor might bring."
'1 27 Without such a provision, Bushman
might at least have a good due process ru.·gument that he should be relieved of his obligations under the Consent Order, as most
citizens would assume that by entering into
such an agreement with an enforcement arm
of the State, they were buying comprehensive peace with the State. But with such a
provision in place, Bushman did not proceed
under any such misapprehension and, on the
contrary, expressly recognized the possibility
that a ci·iminal prosecution might be forthcoming and that the Consent Order had no
effect on the validity of any such prosecution.

ion as to whether a fine that is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the underlying securities
violation might give rise to some sort of as•
applied double jeopardy challenge in the appropriate case; this case, however, does not present
such circumstances.
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!United States Code Annotated
!Constitution of the United States
IAnnotated
IAmendment VIII. Excessive Bail, Fines, Punishments
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. VIII
Amendment VIII. Excessive Bail, Fines, Punishments
Currentness

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
Notes of Decisions (6032)

U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. VIII, USCA CONST Amend. VIIJ

Current through P.L. 114-49 approved 8-7-2015
End nf Dornmcnf
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RlSl. Commerce, Administration.
RlSl-4. Department of Commerce Administrative Procedures Act Rule.
RlSl-4-708. Standard of Proof.

Unless otherwise provided by statute or a rule applicable to
a specific proceeding, the standard of proof in a proceeding under
this rule (RlSl-4), whether initiated by a notice of agency action
or request for agency action, is a preponderance of the evidence.
RlSl-4-709.

Burden of Proof.

Unless otherwise provided by statute:
(1)
the department has the burden of proof in a proceeding
initiated by a notice of agency action; and
(2}
the party who seeks action from the department has the burden
of proof in a proceeding initiated by a request for agency action.
KEY:
administrative
procedures,
adjudicative proceedings,
government hearings
Date of Enactment or Last Substantive Amendment: April 10, 2015
Authorizing,
and Implemented or Interpreted Law:
13-1-6;
63G-4-102(6)
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R164. Commerce, Securities.
R164-31. Administrative Fines.
R164-31-1.
Guidelines for the Assessment of Administrative Fines.

(A} Authority and purpose.
(l} The Division enacts this rule under authority granted by
Sections 61-1-6, 61-1-12, 61-1-14, 61-1-20 and 61-1-24.
( 2)
This rule identifies guidelines for the assessment of
administrative fines.
The guidelines should not be considered
all-inclusive but rather are intended to provide factors to be
considered when imposing a fine.
(B}
Guidelines.
(1)
For the purpose of determining the amount of an
administrative fine assessed against a person under the Utah Uniform
Securities Act, the Commission shall consider the following factors:
(a)
the seriousness, nature, circumstances, extent, and
persistence of the conduct constituting the violation;
(b) the harm to other persons, including the amount of investor
losses, resulting either directly or indirectly from the violation;
(c) any financial benefit, enrichment, commission, fee or other
consideration received directly or indirectly by the person in
connection with the violation;
(d) cooperation by the person in any inquiry conducted by the
Division concerning the violation, efforts to prevent future
occurrences of the violation, and efforts to mitigate the harm caused
by the violation, including any restitution paid or disgorgement of
ill-gotten gains to persons injured by the acts of the person;
(e) the history of previous violations by the person;
(f) the need to deter the person or other persons from committing
such violations in the future;
(g)
the costs of the Division incurred in investigating and
prosecuting the action; and
(h) such other matters as justice may require.
KEY: administrative fines, securities regulation, securities
Date of Enactment or Last Substantive Amendment: January 8, 2013
Notice of Continuation: May 28, 2013
Authorizing, and Implemented or Interpreted Law:
61-1-6; 61-1-12;
61-1-14; 61-1-20; 61-1-24
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